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Evidence and Epistemology in Early Modern English Drama focuses on ways of 
knowing in a period before the disciplinary paradigms that we use today crystallized. 
Operating in a period of epistemological flux, writers in late sixteenth- and early 
seventeenth-century England were faced with two competing knowledge systems: late 
Renaissance humanism from their schooling and early empiricism emerging in the works 
of Francis Bacon and others. Throughout their writing, commercial playwrights—
Shakespeare, Jonson, and Middleton among them—attempted to work through these 
competing knowledge structures and presented spectacles using methods from both 
paradigms. These dramatists, I argue, adapt strategies of mixed method verification and 
use their dramatic art as the overarching mediating mode to unite oftentimes competing 
modes of knowledge. 
I first examine oral reporting in Hamlet as a dramatic tool that conveys 
information not only about the plot, but also the speaker’s ethos and reliability. I argue 
that Shakespeare exploits the convention of the anonymous messenger-character (or 
nuntius) to create a skeptical space wherein the murderer Claudius is ironically the most 
reliable reporter. Next, I contrast “ocular proof” in Othello with Middleton and Rowley’s 
The Changeling. In Othello, the visual is made verbal through ekphrastic and logical 
proofs as Iago offers rhetorical evidence of Desdemona’s infidelity that Othello 
internalizes as concrete. In The Changeling, the verbal becomes visual as Beatrice-




results of the virginity-revealing potions. Then, I posit that in Bartholomew Fair, Jonson 
uses Justice Overdo as a negative exemplum of the poor interpretative practices 
criticized in the play’s Induction. Blending the sensory, rhetorical, and historical modes 
of inquiry, I finally explore how Shakespeare translates methods of knowing the past 
into dramatic tools that present history as a dynamic continuum that simultaneously 
touches the past, present, future, and imaginative spaces in-between in 1-3 Henry VI and 
Richard III. Ultimately, this dissertation clarifies the historical context needed for 
comprehending how playgoers may have understood the transition between humanism 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
In the 1623 First Folio edition of Shakespeare’s plays, compilers and fellow 
actors John Heminge and Henry Condell included, among several noteworthy paratexts, 
a dedicatory epistle/advertisement famously directed to “The Great Variety of Readers.” 
In this letter, Heminge and Condell address readers of varying abilities, ranging “from 
the most able, to him that can but spell,” and calls for the aforementioned readers to 
purchase the giant tome.1  
 Critics and enthusiasts alike draw two compatible takeaways from this letter. The 
more overtly critical in the academy tend to focus on Heminge and Condell’s 
admonitions to “buy it first,” seeing this letter as a tool of persuasion that appeals to 
Shakespeare’s fame, the “legitimacy” of the collected texts in this collection as opposed 
to corrupt quarto editions that were already in the market, and the reader’s delight in 
critique. Appealing to a wide variety of readers too is an economic strategy. In direct 
contrast to other prefaces which lament the ineffectual reader such as Ben Jonson’s “To 
my Bookseller” in his Workes (1616) or Henry Fitzgeffrey’s “Post-script” to Satyres and 
Satyrical Epigrams (1617) which seek to limit readership to those with a certain level of 
experiences, Heidi Brayman Hackel contends that by “urging the reader to ‘buy…what 
                                                 
1 John Heminge and Henrie Condell, “To the Great Variety of Readers,” in Mr. William 
Shakespeares Comedies, Histories, & Tragedies. Published according to the True 
Originall Copies (London, 1623), reprinted in The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. 




euer you do, Buy,’ Heminge and Condell show little of the concern expressed in 
contemporary prefaces about the worthiness of prospective readers.”2 This opening 
epistle therefore represents the unique nature of the Folio’s marketing and the shifts in 
reading habits that were well underway due to the (much) earlier invention of the 
printing press and increased amounts of popular texts including drama and broadsides 
intended for wider consumption.3  
Another less economically or rhetorically-driven, but nevertheless immensely 
popular take on these lines are the claims that Shakespeare, as Heminge and Condell 
present him, is meant for all. Teachers especially are fond of this reading as it positively 
frames Shakespeare as not only accessible to but belonging to all. This reading is 
especially clear in the final sentences of the epistle: 
But it is not our province, who onely gather his works, and give them you, to 
praise him. It is yours that reade him. And there we hope, to your divers 
                                                 
2 Heidi Brayman Hackel, “The ‘Great Variety’ of Readers and Early Modern Reading 
Practices,” in A Companion to Shakespeare, ed. David Scott Kastan (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 1999), 139-140. 
3 For more on literacy in the early modern period, see David Cressy, Literacy and the 
Social Order: Reading and Writing in Tudor and Stuart England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980). For responses to Cressy that call for an expanding of 
his more narrow definition of literacy, see the more recent: Brayman Hackel, “The 
‘Great Variety’ of Readers,” and Reading Material in Early Modern England: Print, 
Gender, and Literacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Margaret W. 
Ferguson and Mihoko Suzuki, “Women’s Literacies and Social Hierarchy in Early 
Modern England,” Literature Compass 12, no. 11 (2015): 575-590; Elizabeth Rivlin, 
“Theatrical Literacy in The Comedy of Errors and the Gesta Grayorum,” Critical Survey 
14, no. 1 (2002): 64-78; and Eve Rachele Sanders and Margaret W. Ferguson, 
“Literacies in Early Modern England,” Critical Survey 14, no.1 (2002): 1-8; and Akihiro 
Yamada, Experiencing Drama in the English Renaissance: Readers and Audiences 




capacities, you will finde enough, both to draw, and hold you: for his wit can no 
more lie hid, then it could be lost. Reade him, therefore; and againe, and againe: 
And if then you doe not like him, surely you are in some manifest danger, not to 
understand him.4  
The language here does not undermine the rhetorical strategies of selling—if anything, 
the appeal is even stronger as it places agency on the reader, even if it does potentially 
insult the reader’s intelligence by implying that only someone who does not understand 
what they have read could find fault with Shakespeare’s verses and prose. There is also a 
subtle move away from the opening lines which state that readers will both read and 
“censure” whereas at the end, Heminge and Condell move from censuring to “praise.”  
But what I see in this letter are not only the above readings but a description of a 
knowledge practice that by now is perhaps so commonplace that we miss it. Throughout 
the epistle, Heminge and Condell repeat “read” in a variety of grammatical guises, with 
the final verbal form being the command to “Read him, therefore; and againe, and 
againe.” The writers here link this act of repetitive reading with a reader’s delight—“you 
will finde enough, both to draw, and hold you”—along with asserting Shakespeare’s 
prowess as a writer. This type of reading was also common to the previous generation of 
readers educated in the humanist English school system. In order to “know” 
Shakespeare, to censure him, praise him, and even to own him, Heminge and Condell 
make clear, one must not only provide the one-time purchase price, but read repeatedly. 
                                                 




This form of knowledge acquisition is but one of many lurking in plain sight within the 
texts of the period.  
Epistemology “in plain sight” occurs not only in epistles comprising the front 
matter of printed books—if we know to look, we may see several other ways of knowing 
in Shakespeare’s plays as well as the plays of his contemporaries. In an early scene of 
Romeo and Juliet, the Nurse gives a rambling monologue on Juliet’s age and key 
developments as a small child about to be married that is subsequently silenced by her 
listeners, Juliet and Lady Capulet. In these lines, the Nurse highlights several knowledge 
practices that distinctively correspond to her physical identity as a mother, revealing 
both an internalized, almost occult knowledge of breastfeeding and childcare alongside 
the methods for how she understands local history: 
   I remember it well. 
’Tis since the earthquake now eleven years, 
And she was weaned—I never shall forget it— 
Of all the days of the year upon that day; 
For I had then laid wormwood to my dug, 
Sitting in the sun under the dovehouse wall— 
My lord and you were then at Mantua— 
Nay, I do bear a brain—but, as I said, 
When it did taste the wormwood on the nipple 
Of my dug and felt it bitter, pretty fool— 




“Shake,” quoth the dovehouse; ‘twas no need , I trow, 
To bid me trudge. 
And since that time it is eleven years.5  
The Nurse’s knowledge of how to wean a child by applying the bitter-tasting wormwood 
to her breasts is never explained in the text, but it does not need to be. The Nurse simply 
possesses a distinctly feminine and maternal knowledge gained presumably through 
other breastfeeding women in her life as well as any variety of midwifery manuals. 
Where her knowledge comes from is hidden—what is important is that the knowledge is 
accurate, for once Juliet tastes the wormwood, she “fall[s] out with the dug,” or refuses 
the breast. Surrounding this embedded womanly knowledge is another epistemology that 
the Nurse actually explains: how to count or reckon years in terms of important life 
events. She links the weaning of a three-year-old Juliet with two events: the earthquake 
and the absence of the Capulets during the event. The Nurse also situates her knowledge 
in a specific place—outside the dovehouse—to ground what she knows. These multiple 
acts of remembering by linking significant personal events to larger, shared phenomena 
are then obscured by Lady Capulet and Juliet who demand the Nurse’s silence: “hold thy 
peace” (1.3.51) and “And stint thou too, I pray thee, Nurse” (1.3.60). Nevertheless, while 
the knowledge she espouses is not privileged whether being in the mouth of the comic 
character or by being actively ignored by her on-stage listeners, the types of things she 
                                                 
5 William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, The Norton Shakespeare, ed. Stephen 
Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Suzanne Gossett, Jean E Howard, Katharine Eisaman Maus, 
and Gordon McMullan, 3rd. ed. (New York: Norton 2016), 1.3.24-37. All subsequent 




knows and how she knows them remain as part of the play, in plain sight (or hearing) of 
the audience. 
 The above are but two of many examples. In this dissertation, I explore multiple 
types of evidence and knowledge practices in English commercial drama ranging from 
the 1590s to the 1620s. My reasoning for selecting drama as opposed to metaphysical 
poetry or the prose of writers such as Francis Bacon who explicitly engage with ways of 
knowing comes down to two major factors. The first in drama’s widespread appeal and 
audience. Commercial drama allows for us to see popular conceptions of science and 
learning that were available to a wider audience than what was available for printed or 
manuscript documents. With the Globe and other commercial theaters boasting 
estimated capacity of 3000 spectators per play,6 commercial plays offered mass 
entertainment that goes across social strata.  
 The second factor relates to drama as form. English drama itself was a form of 
poetry in its own right. The classical model of poetry drawn predominately from 
Aristotle’s Poetics after all situates tragedy and comedy in the midst of other mimetic 
works. Major English works of poetics, including George Puttenham’s The Arte of 
English Poesy and William Scott’s recently rediscovered The Model of English Poesy, 
confirm this separation.7 Moreover, if that were not enough, several early modern plays 
                                                 
6 Ann Jennalie Cook, “Audiences: Investigation, Interpretation, Invention,” in A New 
History of Early English Drama, ed. John Cox and David Scott Kastan (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), 314. 
7 George Puttenham, The Art of English Poesy, A Critical Edition, ed. Frank Whigham 
and Wayne A. Rebhorn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); William Scott, The 




are composed in part if not entirely in verse. This identification as poetry allows for 
drama to use the same techniques as poesy for making meaning. Yet drama is also 
distinct from poetry in this period due to its performed nature. Acting verse or prose 
adds visual and kinesthetic modes of knowing, allowing for multiple, potentially 
competing epistemologies.  
 While this project is certainly inspired by the work of historians of science, what 
I am doing is not specifically history of science per se. In his foundational work, Thomas 
Kuhn offers an alternative to teleological progress in the form of successive 
“revolutions.” But what he also does is illustrate a theme crucial not only to his own 
intervention in the history of science, but to my work in thinking about his argument’s 
effects in the early modern period. He notes that “effective research scarcely begins 
before a scientific community thinks it has acquired firm answers to questions” about the 
composition of the universe and how we may study and interact with that matter.8 Kuhn 
explains that “At least in the mature sciences, answers (or full substitutes for answers) to 
questions like these are firmly embedded in the educational initiation that prepares and 
licenses the student for professional practice. Because that education is both rigorous and 
rigid, these answers come to exert a deep hold on the scientific mind.”9 Kuhn’s 
statements here are intended to reflect the state of scientific inquiry in his own time, but 
what he says, I contend, holds true for the early modern period as well. Even in the face 
                                                 
8 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 4-5. 




of change or emerging possibilities, the early modern thinker relies heavily on 
knowledge gained through the educational system as the primary framework for 
interpreting the world around them.  
 But most importantly, for the early modern period, what we understand today as 
“science” as a category or genre did not exist. Drawing from its Latin root, scientia, for 
the early moderns, science is literally “knowledge,” and was thus conceived more 
broadly as a knowledge practice, or a way of knowing rather than a specific set of 
disciplinary practices. A brief examination of the term “science” in printed books of the 
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century reveals that earlier uses tend to present 
“science” as a synonym for knowing, whereas later usage pairs “science” with a 
particular practice like astronomy or music. 10 However, this earlier usage—“science as 
knowing”—still remains even as late as 1640 in a masque by William Davenant, 
Salmacida Spolia. 11 In an early song between two characters, Concord and the Good 
Genius of Great Britain, the allegorical Genius beseeches Concord to remain in Britain, 
if only for the sake of wise Philogenes. Concord concedes before lamenting: 
And much I grieve, that though the best 
Of Kingly science, harbours in his brest, 
Yet tis his fate, to rule in adverse times, 
                                                 
10 See, for example: Anthony Askham, A treatyse of the state and disposition of the 
worlde (London: Wyliyam Powell, 1550). ; Thomas Becon, The iewell of ioye. (London: 
J. Daye and W. Seres, 1550). 
111640 refers to the publication date of Salmacida Spolia’s quarto. The actual 




When wisedome must awhile give place to crimes.12  
“Science” here broaches the two meanings in order to reveal that little actual slippage in 
the term’s use from the 1550s to the 1640s. “Kingly science” works simply as “Kingly 
knowledge” with the term serving as a synonym, but it also works to identify a specific 
kind of knowledge on par with other types of learning.  
This is not to say that practices that would come to be associated with the 
physical and social sciences were not available during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Far from it. Related to “science-as-category,” the disciplinary identities 
codified in the university system that we necessarily lean on for validation and, indeed, 
survival, also did not exist as we now know them. Once again, the practices themselves 
are still there: the early modern English are still using mathematics, reading books, and 
learning through trial and error that certain things that they ingest may cause or relieve 
pain. A select few even attended university, and a good many men and some women 
received education according to a standardized curriculum. Overall, looking for 
“science” as we understand it proves to be anachronistic as even the processes that 
would become associated with science had not been fully codified yet as “scientific.” 
The early modern world is, therefore, a place that is simultaneously familiar and foreign.  
My aim, therefore, is not to “find” science or early science practices in literature, 
nor is it to state that works of Renaissance natural philosophy are literary. Like Stanley 
                                                 
12 William Davenant. Salmacida spolia A masque. Presented by the King and Queenes 
Majesties, at White-Hall, on Tuesday the 21. Day of Ianuary 1639. (London: Printed by 




Cavell who reiterates that “the burden of my story in spinning the interplay of 
philosophy with literature is not that of applying philosophy to literature, where so-
called literary works would become kinds of illustrations of matters already 
independently known,”13 this dissertation illustrates the imbrication of different strands 
of knowledge that appeared within the some of the period’s most popular drama. My 
project therefore is less about the “history of science” and more aligned with its sibling, 
the “history of ideas” and the scholars that blend historical and literary inquiry more 
commonly. The scholars that I am particularly indebted to—Katherine Eggert and 
Elizabeth Spiller—speak to challenges of responding to epistemological flux, each 
arguing in her own way that in order to understand the rising emphasis on empirical 
practices that would become science and the overabundance of information, early 
modern writers used ways of knowing from their past education and practical, lived 
experiences. 
Throughout her work, Spiller contends that “art”—specifically, human practices 
associated with making—served as a mediating influence between medieval 
scholasticism and early empiricism, and indeed, was an accepted epistemological mode 
itself. During the early modern period, modes of making and human creation were 
previously categorized under Aristotle as “praxis (prudential decision-making)” and 
“poesis (mechanical construction, craft” as opposed to “scientia (certain knowledge of 
                                                 
13 Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare, Updated 
Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 179. This particular idea comes 




the teleological purposes of things.”14 In the early modern period, this distinction 
collapses, creating “a distinctively early modern model of knowledge…a belief that 
knowledge is constructed, made, or created through acts of human invention, rather than 
found or discovered.”15 Though Spiller does not discuss it at length—her focus is on the 
oft-neglected craft knowledges of metal workers, cobblers, and other makers—this 
epistemology is the same as the one espoused by the rhetorically-driven humanists who 
saw the world as contingent upon humans to make even natural knowledge legible. From 
Spiller, I consider how dramatic art and artifice work to shape how knowledge is 
presented and complicated before an audience as part of larger process of negotiating the 
many competing forms of knowledge in the European ether. 
As Spiller argues that early moderns used practical knowledge at their disposal in 
order to explore and transition into new epistemologies, Eggert likewise suggests that the 
educated turned to other prior knowledge to make sense of their changing world. In her 
recent and foundational work on knowledge practices, Eggert explains that, at the turn of 
the sixteenth century, the humanist educational system that focused on knowledge and 
forms from rediscovered ancients was insufficient in achieving its goals to produce 
good, moral citizens. She says: “In this long interval of time England saw humanism, 
with its faith in how classical letters could shape moral and civic virtue, becoming less 
and less credible. But despite calls by the likes of Francis Bacon to sweep aside 
                                                 
14 Elizabeth Spiller, “Shakespeare and the Making of Early Modern Science: Resituating 
Prospero’s Art,” South Central Review 26, nos. 1/2 (2009): 27. 




antiquated learning and start fresh, there was nothing to replace humanism—not yet.”16 
Eggert goes onto argue that the practices associated with alchemy were used as a 
mediating tool for this transition. In essence, early modern English men and women 
looked to a past that had the hybridity of mysticism, symbolic literature, and the 
practical skills of early chemistry to understand the ever-changing world around them.  
 Underlying much of early modern thought (certainly in England and across the 
continent) was the Renaissance-humanism-inflected school system. Sixteenth-century 
schools emphasized a curriculum based on the classics with the ultimate goal of 
imitating them in manner and in content. As Peter Mack explains, the grammar school 
curriculum was centered upon learning Latin, which was supported by rote 
memorization and linguistic play, reading Latin literature, and composing short texts in 
Latin that imitated select authors who were assumed to be the epitome of their genre.17 It 
is perhaps unsurprising for the scholar of early modern literature to learn that these 
authors included Terence, Virgil, Cicero, Horace, and Ovid: even Shakespeare, who had 
“little Latin and less Greek” not only deployed allusions to these schoolboy samples, but 
also outright rewrote well-known classical and contemporary stories and myths. As a 
result of their shared education, creativity for writers of the era came not so much from 
original ideas and stories (as we have come to expect from the Romantics), but rather 
                                                 
16 Katherine Eggert, Disknowledge: Literature, Alchemy, and the End of Humanism in 
Renaissance England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 2. 
17 Peter Mack, “Humanism, Rhetoric, Education,” in A Concise Companion to 




from the skill of deconstructing the several rhetorical, poetic, and conceptual parts of one 
text and transform them into another. 
Drawing from both Spiller’s and Eggert’s major premises and the claims that 
early moderns reached elsewhere for methods of understanding newer methods and an 
abundance of information, I question what methods beyond mysticism and artisanal 
practices were used in thinking through a period of epistemological uncertainty. For 
playwrights, the answers lie predominately in their rhetoric gained from a shared 
humanist education and their craft as dramatic poets. For the most part, the knowledge 
practices that playwrights exhibit in their plays appear quite familiar. The actual acts of 
acquiring information, whether that be from reading a book, observing an action, hearing 
a report from a credible source, or performing a controlled experiment, are really not that 
different from what we would experience today. Indeed, of the types of evidence that I 
discuss in this dissertation, only divine-knowledge where knowledge is simply implanted 
in the mind of an individual through a divine or even demonic presence—whether it was 
one or the other was not always easy to tell in the early modern period, hence the danger 
of such knowledge—may strike some as unfamiliar.  
 Early modern playwrights, I argue, adapt strategies of mixed method verification 
and use their dramatic art as the overarching structural component as a way to unite 
oftentimes competing modes of knowledge. Across all the plays I discuss, 
epistemologically speaking, playwrights are not concerned with any particular method’s 
validity; rather, they are obsessed with human error and intervention. Ultimately, this 




changes such as the advent of Protestantism, affected everything, and its death throes 
were marked by emerging disciplinarity or modes of thinking that re-categorized and re-
emphasized methods of fact-finding, truth-telling, and creation. This process was slow, 
recursive, and not entirely deliberate. Each chapter examines the myriad ways 
playwrights represent knowledge within dramatic literature. Because of its dual lives as 
lived, present performance and readable material, drama is particularly capable of toying 
with epistemologies, mixing not just genres (as Philip Sidney complained of in his 
Defense of Poetry) but also empirical and humanist methods of learning, creating, and 
sharing knowledge. 
The plays that I discuss in this dissertation tend to rely heavily on embedded 
knowledge, most notably trusting the audience to remember who knows what at any 
given time for maximum dramatic irony. The major idea that I continually return to 
throughout this dissertation is the concept of “verification” and the overwhelming desire 
for early modern plays to provide evidence that supports (or contradicts, depending) 
what the audience witnesses. This dissertation first investigates sensory knowledge 
(hearing in Chapter 2; seeing in Chapter 3; both seeing and hearing in Chapter 4) before 
turning to divine and historical knowledge in Chapter 5.  
 In my chapter, “‘That which you hear you’ll swear you see’: Reporting and 
Doubt in Hamlet,” I analyze the use of multiple verbal reports and testimony as methods 
of verification and skepticism in Hamlet. In early modern drama, a report, unless coming 
from a source that openly declares to the audience that they are not to be trusted (say 




truth. Reports, by dramatic nature, are reliable evidence that the audience may use to 
ground themselves in the action. However, as I argue, Shakespeare exploits this 
expectation throughout his plays, establishing the report not solely as a method of truth-
telling but a method of doubt. In Hamlet, he uses reports to establish not Hamlet as a 
reliable source of information, but the murderer Claudius.  
My next chapter compares two seemingly unrelated plays—Shakespeare’s 
Othello and Middleton and Rowley’s The Changeling—and their relationship to ocular 
proof. The term “ocular proof” evokes for most early modern scholars a scene from 
Othello where the eponymous Moor, distraught at his ensign Iago’s insinuation that his 
(Othello’s) bride Desdemona has been unfaithful, insists that Iago provide visible 
evidence of her infidelity. However, given the nature of infidelity and the fact that 
Desdemona is innocent, conclusive visual evidence is hard to come by. Othello’s desire 
for ocular proof is only met through ekphrastic descriptions and symbolic meaning. 
Ekphrasis, alongside other humanistic modes like the syllogism, combine with empirical 
notions of establishing truth through probability and visual, replicable evidence. 
Through this clashing of intellectual methods, Shakespeare reveals how his 
contemporaries wrestled with an emerging empirical analysis, ultimately revealing that 
while a rational, inductive approach may be desirable for determining truth, humanist 
habits of mind and the absence of conclusive proof render that approach untenable.  
In contrast, The Changeling stages an abundance of sensory proofs, with the 
audience hearing or seeing the nearly all the same actions that the characters do. 




uncritically on first sight. They put their protagonist, Beatrice-Joanna to the test, quite 
literally, by incorporating a quasi-scientific experiment where she must take a potion in 
front of her husband to prove her virginity. Beatrice-Joanna becomes the early empiricist 
by mixing several modes of knowledge—a priori, reading, experimentation, and 
performance—in order to fool Alsemero. Both plays stage the dangers of ocular proof, 
albeit in two strikingly different ways. Whereas in Othello, ocular proof is desired but 
not physically obtained, in The Changeling, multiple ocular proofs are provided, but the 
evidence being offered has been tampered with.  
In my fourth chapter, I turn to Ben Jonson’s Bartholomew Fair to discuss proper 
methods of knowledge acquisition, at least according to Jonson himself who has more 
than a little invested in what audience members say and do about his plays. During the 
play’s induction, Jonson’s mouthpiece, a Scrivener standing-in for the playwright, 
identifies several rules as part of a contract between the playwright and the audience 
dictating what the audience can or cannot do when responding to the play. These rules 
called the “Articles of Agreement” include remaining for the play’s duration, basing 
one’s interpretation on the evidence before them rather than relying on what other’s 
around them say, and refusing to read the play allegorically. The stipulations, of course, 
mirror quite clearly Jonson’s professional life as a writer of satirical plays. 
I argue, in this chapter, that Jonson draws on his humanist education to present 
Justice Overdo as a negative exemplum of uncritical interpretive practices, both as a 
reader and as a viewer of plays. In rapid succession, Overdo, who is in disguise in order 




promptly punished by the playwright by being beaten, arrested, and cuckholded. Overdo 
fails as an interpreter, continually getting not only his readings of Horace wrong, but the 
visual and aural evidence he sees before him.  
My fifth chapter turns from sensory knowledge of hearing and seeing to divine 
and historical knowing in Shakespeare’s chronicle history plays. Specifically focusing 
on the first tetralogy (that is, 1-3 Henry VI and Richard III), this chapter explores the 
many mantic references in the plays and their relationship to a larger project of historical 
knowing evidenced in their chronicle sources. These references, including prophecies, 
auspicious dreams, curses, and oaths, all work together to create spaces of temporal 
disjunction and unity. Through consistent appeals to the future alongside the audience’s 
prior (historical) knowledge and the action occurring in a real-time present before them, 
Shakespeare creates thick temporal spaces where the audience is invited to verify and 





CHAPTER II  
“THAT WHICH YOU HEAR YOU’LL SWEAR YOU’LL SEE”: 
REPORTING AND DOUBT IN HAMLET 
 
To say that Hamlet is a play about knowledge and its many attendant problems is 
stating the obvious.18 Yet what Hamlet has to say about knowledge more often reflects 
the reader’s personal relationship to thinking in their own time rather than necessarily 
what Shakespeare would have thought. Scholars have long noted Hamlet’s obsession 
with knowing and in turn have propagated their own claims about kinds of knowledge 
and its uses in both the play and the early modern period. 19 For many of these 
researchers, the intellectual crux of the play—what Stanley Cavell dubs “Hamlet’s 
burden of proof”—is Hamlet’s testing of Claudius through the play-within-a-play. This 
point, while certainly important in considering how Shakespeare uses information, 
                                                 
18 All parenthetical citations to Hamlet refer to Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor, eds., 
Hamlet, The Arden Shakespeare Third Series (London: Arden Shakespeare—
Bloomsbury, 2006), unless otherwise noted. 
19 See, for instance: Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of 
Shakespeare, Updated Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); James 
Hirsch, “Hamlet and Empiricism,” Shakespeare Survey 66 (2013): 330-43; Steve Roth, 
“Who Knows Who Knows Who’s There? An Epistemology of Hamlet (Or, What 
Happens in the Mousetrap),” Early Modern Literary Studies 10, no. 2 (2004); Eric P. 
Levy, Hamlet and the Rethinking of Man (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University 
Press, 2008); and “‘Things standing thus unknown’: The Epistemology of Ignorance in 
Hamlet,” Studies in Philology 97 (2000): 192-209; and Douglas L. Peterson, 
“Shakespeare and ‘the new philosophy’: Theatrical Illusion and Epistemological Crisis,” 




evidence, and irony in the play, obscures other types of knowledge acquisition that 
introduce similar kinds of skepticism, if only we know to pay attention.  
While not the first to discuss the connection between Hamlet’s knowing and 
knowing writ large, T. S. Eliot’s “Hamlet and His Problems,” is perhaps the most 
famous to engage with this issue from a literary critic’s standpoint.20 Called “the Mona 
Lisa of criticism” by Howard Marchitello,21 Eliot’s essay endeavors to tie the “objective 
correlative” (which Hamlet lacks) with the emotional impact of the text. For Eliot, 
emotion requires an exigence rooted in discrete sensory experiences. Such sensory 
experiences are but one way of knowing and of learning, but such is the mode that Eliot 
homes in upon. Yet this primary mode of knowledge-acquisition is problematic, as both 
Don Parry Norford and Marchitello elaborate in two very different discussions. For 
Norford, the issue at stake is not that Hamlet lacks the so-called “objective correlative,” 
but that certain kinds of sensory knowledge are more reliable than others and in turn, 
have interior and exterior correspondences. Indeed, “Hamlet,” Norford writes, “is 
fascinated by the stage because this disjunction between inner and outer, reality and 
appearance, is most perplexing there…: here the shapes of grief are genuine, yet 
correspond to no true inward reality.”22 There is insubstantiality here, albeit located 
within the play world.  
                                                 
20 T. S. Eliot, “Hamlet and His Problems,” in Selected Essays (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Company,1932), 121-126. 
21 Howard Marchitello, The Machine in the Text (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 51. 
22 Don Parry Norford, “‘Very Like a Whale’: The Problem of Knowledge in Hamlet,” 




Visual appearances play a significant role in Hamlet and its abundant criticism. 
This tendency is not surprising given the prevalence of seeing as a primary source of 
knowledge throughout the play. 23 In the play itself, for instance, in The Mousetrap 
scene, Hamlet announces that he will observe Claudius’s reaction to the dumb show. 
Bernardo, Marchellus, Horatio, and Hamlet watch for the Ghost of Old Hamlet. Once 
Hamlet dismisses her to the nunnery, Ophelia laments, “O woe is me / T’have seen what 
I have seen, see what I see” (3.1.159-160). Hamlet demands that Gertrude “look here 
upon this picture, and on this” (3.4.51) of her husbands. With so many examples of seeing, 
it is unsurprising that questions of sight, its reliability, and its relationship to knowledge 
formation have intrigued critics.  
A key issue that underlies much of these discussions of knowledge and where 
information comes from is the question of Hamlet’s reliability as an active protagonist, 
particularly in regards to his infamous indecision in seeking vengeance on his father’s 
murderer.24 Knowledge studies seems to be yet another way to answer that question. 
What might it mean then to investigate knowledge in Hamlet by considering the overall 
ethos of the deliverer of evidence? Put another way, is it possible to use the ambiguity 
                                                 
23 For more on visual imagery in Hamlet, see Richard Meek, Narrating the Visual in 
Shakespeare (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), especially 81-116; Misako Matsuda, 
“Devotional Emblems and Protestant Meditation in Hamlet,” English Studies 98 (2016): 
562-584; Michael O’Connell, The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm and Theater in Early 
Modern England (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), especially 132-135.  
24 See: Harden Craig, “Hamlet as a Man of Action,” Huntington Library Quarterly 27, 
no. 3 (1964): 229-37; Vivaswan Soni, “Believing in Ghosts, in Part: Judgment and 
Indecision in Hamlet,” in Shakespeare and Judgment, ed. Kevin Curran (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 45-70; and Bernard J. Paris, “Hamlet and His 




surrounding Hamlet-the-character’s mental states in order to illuminate how reporting 
works in an early modern context?  
Drawing from Michel de Montaigne who locates the failure of sensory 
knowledge within the tool itself—that is, the sensing body—Marchitello instead turns to 
the developing popularity of experimental practices. He argues that “Hamlet stages the 
collision of two narratives[:]…the collapse of the perceptual body and its resulting 
disqualification as a means to knowledge [and]…the emergence of the practices of 
experimental science deployed in order to recuperate sense perception and re-establish 
the very possibility of both experience and knowledge.”25 Ultimately, he suggests that 
experimental science practices recover Montaigne’s failures of the perceiving body. 
Moreover, Marchitello makes explicit that, at this point in late sixteenth-century 
England, thought processes that were previously thoroughly intertwined were beginning 
to unravel and become more distinct as the disciplinary practices we are familiar with 
today.  
While epistemologies of experimentation and visual knowledge are particularly 
useful for interrogating Hamlet, the play is certainly not limited to just those two. In the 
following chapter, I turn my attention to another kind of knowledge: that of reporting 
and its relationship to other forms of knowledge acquisition. Reporting throughout both 
Hamlet and Shakespeare’s larger corpus not only provides the extremely practical 
function of revealing crucial information to the audience or reader, but also serves as the 
                                                 




means, when placed in conjunction with other knowledge-making acts like experiments, 
actions, dialogues, and even other reports, to reveal the ultimate reliability of a character. 
In Hamlet, I argue, the content of the report, alongside the level of interpretation 
provided by the reporter, reveals a continuum of the speakers’ reliability; this reliability 
does not necessarily correspond with their morality. Moreover, in addition to working as 
an ethical barometer, acts of reporting themselves blur the distinctions between the 
wholly aural and the wholly visual to suggest that the reliability of the report as a 
method is only as good as its fellow epistemological methods of visual acquisition, 
experimentation, and interpretation.  
If we consider reporting a more purely rhetorical form of knowledge that relies 
just as much on the audience and its deliverer as its actual content, we might move one 
step closer to understanding the imbricated forms of early modern knowledge as well as 
reveal a kind “rhetoric in practice” that was not necessarily theorized at its initial use, 
but still informs much of how early moderns came to know through a variety of 
competing techniques, evidence, and stimuli. A play like Hamlet is therefore particularly 
well-suited to this extended investigation as it contains an “all of the above” scenario 
while being firmly situated in its genre as a revenge tragedy and work of (potentially) 
historical fiction cum murder mystery. By examining acts of reporting in Hamlet in 
conjunction with other epistemological acts like seeing, I suggest that we may better 






Reporting in Shakespeare & His Contemporaries  
 
As we should suspect, reporting serves a practical purpose in any play. 
Shakespeare, along with his contemporaries, dramatizes reportage throughout his 
works.26 Particularly in opening scenes where the plot and background must be quickly 
established, early information is often provided by a less-important character and is 
directed either to a crowd (that includes the audience as a whole) or the protagonist, who 
is meant to stand in for the audience. In Titus Andronicus, for instance, Marcus’s 
opening speech identifies several key plot elements needed for comprehending the fast-
paced scene to come. Directing his address to both the crowd and to the audience, he 
states: 
Know that the people of Rome, for whom we stand 
A special party, have by common voice 
In election for the Roman empery 
Chosen Andronicus, surnamed Pius 
For many good and great deserts to Rome. 
.................................................................... 
Ten years are spent since first he undertook 
This cause of Rome and chastised with arms 
                                                 
26 While my focus is on Shakespeare’s dramatic output, reporting also serves a clear and 
significant function in his poetry, particularly the longer poems like Venus and Adonis 




Our enemies’ pride; five times he hath returned 
Bleeding to Rome, bearing his valiant sons 
In coffins from the field.27  
That Marcus delivers all this information aurally works on a practical level—there 
simply isn’t time to dramatize Titus’s five campaigns. What we (the audience) need to 
know is placed upfront and is then reinforced as needed in subsequent lines and actions. 
This information, while crucial to the audience, is not the same as what the actual crowd 
of Romans would need to know. Given that Marcus’s opening speech covers the last 
decade of Titus’s career with remarkable alacrity and efficiency, his referencing serves a 
highly practical purpose. Audiences and readers need this level of knowledge of Titus’s 
devotion to Rome and the death of his sons on the battlefield in order to understand his 
quick decisions to ignore Tamora’s pleading to spare her elder sons from the sacrificial 
pyre. Reporting, therefore, efficiently allows the audience access to necessary 
knowledge that places them on par with the characters.  
 Another example of reporting that is popular to early modern drama is the 
Chorus. Spoken by a character specifically identified as a Chorus, Prologue, or 
something similar, the Chorus often provides background information crucial to the 
narrative in addition to providing a brief summary of the plot. The Prologue in Romeo 
and Juliet, for instance, offers only a small amount of actual background reporting, 
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namely, “two households, both alike in dignity / in fair Verona, where we lay our scene” 
(Prologue 1-2). In contrast, Rumor’s Induction in 2 Henry IV is almost exclusively 
located in the past as he reports the events of 1 Henry IV. This choice makes a fair bit of 
sense as Rumor is not precisely a Prologue (the character or the event), he is closer to an 
embodied spirit who practically links the first part of Henry IV to the second in order to 
remind the audience of what they had already seen and to get the newcomers up to speed 
on what’s at stake in the sequel. 
 As with any dramatic or fictional construct, we should consider the veracity of 
the prologue and its constituents. Some critics hold that the prologue is intended to be 
something we can take at face value—that the prologue is ultimately a reliable source of 
information. Richard Levin, for instance, offers a continuum of reliability, placing 
speakers with indisputable reliability on one end (such as prologues, epilogues, and the 
chorus) and completely untrustworthy speakers at the other. Of the former, he explains:  
We regard [them], not as individuals, but as spokespersons for the 
playwright…They are therefore authoritative in both senses, which means that 
we assume that the speakers have no personalities or motives of their own, and 
that their only purpose is to give us the information that the author wants us to 
have about the preceding or following action and, sometimes, to indicate how we 
should fully react to it. It follows, then, that the audiences were expected to rely 
on them completely.28 
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But can audiences rely on these initial speakers completely, as Levin suggests? As 
Rumor from 2 Henry IV and the Chorus from Henry V indicate, these seemingly reliable 
sources are not always trustworthy. Rumor is the more overt example not simply by 
being rumors but by explicitly acknowledging its falsehood: “From Rumor’s tongues / 
They bring smooth comforts false, worse than wrongs” (Induction 39-40). What this tells 
us is that while we may assume that on some level, unless the falsehood is explicitly 
acknowledged, there is an unspoken agreement between the audience and paratextual 
speakers who comment on the play but do not participate in it.  
These examples are but some of many, suggesting that all drama welcomes 
introductory reporting regardless of dramatic genre (tragedy, history, or comedy). While 
there are counterexamples throughout Shakespeare’s plays of the thing preceding 
information about the thing (The Taming of the Shrew comes to mind—we actually do 
encounter Katherine before any report of her is given), the prevalence of an early report 
does crucial work for the dramatic medium that has limited time and practical means for 
performance. A certain amount of backstory is not only expected, but required in order 
for the audience to situate themselves in the ongoing plot.  
Characters themselves also participate in reporting. Certain scenes were 
incapable or impractical to be produced on the early modern stage whether at the Globe 
or an indoor theater like the Blackfriars. Several of these scenes, unsurprisingly, are 
battle scenes. While death was not taboo onstage (a revenge tragedy that lacked a 
proliferation of bodies at its conclusion is not a real revenge tragedy), whole armies of 




precursor, The Spanish Tragedy. Attributed to Thomas Kyd, this play relies heavily on 
reporting from the deceased Don Andrea who narrates backstory, his death, and his 
passage into a pagan afterlife to several testimonies from an unnamed General to 
Villuppo to the lying Viceroy who relates the true (to someone) events of the pre-play 
battle that haunts the remainder of the narrative. Standing in contrast to Hamlet’s 
soliloquies and reports—which tend to be interrupted by questions or additional 
commentary—many of the major reports in The Spanish Tragedy are lengthy, standalone 
pieces that provide extensive detail that are later verified by other reports. Clara Calvo 
and Jesús Tronch note that “the highly descriptive report of battle,” like the General’s 
lengthy speech describing an offstage battle, “is a conventional set piece in Elizabethan 
drama; this long and declamatory Senecan narrative is crammed with detailed facts.”29 
Reporting, therefore, is a standard and expected practice, particularly for plays with 
heavy classical influences.  
 Occasionally, reporting happens in early modern drama for thematic reasons 
rather than pure practicality or to provide background information. The Winter’s Tale 
provides a particularly pertinent example of this type of reporting near the end of the 
play where the long-lost Perdita is reunited with her father, Leontes. But rather than 
actually stage the event, Shakespeare goes out of his way to have three separate 
characters report the reunion: a Gentleman, Rogero, and Paulina’s Steward. All three 
present different levels of evidence with the Gentlemen highlighting what he has seen 
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and heard, Rogero providing third-hand knowledge of the bonfires that proclaim that the 
prophecy has been fulfilled, and the Steward who references all sorts of visual evidence 
of Perdita’s parentage including:  
the mantle of Queen Hermione’s; her jewel about the neck of it; the letters of 
Antigonus found with it, which they know to be his character; the majesty of the 
creature, in resemblance of the mother; the affection of nobleness which nature 
shows above her breeding, and many other evidences. (5.2.32-7) 
Given these multiple layers of evidence, we may wonder why the reunion and the 
verification of Perdita’s lineage is not actually staged. Why report it? As the Steward 
remarks, perhaps coyly, when Rogero admits he did not actually see the reunion: “Then 
you have lost a sight which was to be seen, cannot be spoken of” (5.2.41-2). Of course, 
the joke is that the scene was spoken of, that is, reported.  
 Although the final reported scene is most well-known, several other scenes from 
The Winter’s Tale are also only spoken about rather than actually staged.30 That 
Shakespeare opts for dialogue representing the event here strikes me as deliberate. 
Several scholars ranging from David Bevington to the nineteenth-century critic William 
Harness have attempted explain Shakespeare’s choice to employ narration in the scene 
as a way to better emphasize the spectacle of the final transformation scene of Hermione 
from statue to woman. Holger Syme explains this line of thought: “critics have 
frequently argued that the true explanation for the apparent cop-out is to be sought in 
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Shakespeare’s playwrighting savvy: he fails to stage Leontes’ and Perdita’s recognition 
scene, the argument goes, in order to avoid upstaging the play’s true theatrical coup, the 
resurrection of Hermione.”31 The visual is allowed to predominate in a way that the 
verbal is not. This general argument works as one of the many practical reasons for 
reporting. In pitting the verbal against the visual, different layers of knowledge can be 
presented and privileged.  
The structure of this scene may also be informed by classical convention of the 
messenger-character that were inherited by the early modern theater. Levin points to the 
classical dramatic convention of the nuntius, or a messenger, a stock character whose 
sole purpose is to deliver information directly to the audience. The nuntius-character 
allows for scenes that cannot be staged such as events in the past or violence that exists 
outside of the capacities of performers. Moreover, the character is trustworthy as Levin 
explains: “The sole purpose of a nuntius is to inform the other characters and hence the 
audience about events that took place off stage. We therefore regard him as a reliable 
narrator, since he cannot have some personal motive…to mislead his onstage auditors by 
falsifying his report.”32 Therefore, those who function as nuntii, whether they actually 
turn out to be reliable or not, are initially shielded from scrutiny that is not normally 
afforded to other characters. 
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As a rule, messengers perform a significant function throughout Shakespeare’s 
works. Gary J. Scrimgeour identifies no less than seventy-five messengers in the plays of 
Shakespeare’s first and second periods, with the majority in the histories and tragedies as 
opposed to the comedies.33 Many of these envoys function similar to the classical form 
that Levin discusses: anonymous, one-off characters that are known solely by the title of 
“messenger.” Yet, as Scrimgeour is careful to note, Shakespeare deploys the messenger-
trope in named characters like the Nurse in Romeo and Juliet or the Bastard in King 
John. Scrimgeour confidently concludes:  
In Shakespeare’s hands, the messengers are the most versatile of dramatic 
devices, and the range of difficulty in the problems they solve is correspondingly 
wide…utterly passive and neutral in their own natures, they offer no resistance to 
the audience’s perceptions or the dramatists desires, and Shakespeare knows how 
to use them either as instruments or as weapons, to hold them in close restraint or 
to exploit their every quality in the solution of almost any problem in dramatic 
communication.34 
While the final statement of the messenger’s “passive and neutral” nature seems to not 
hold when messenger functions are attributed to characters beyond the classical nuntius, 
Scrimgeour’s assertions confirm Levin’s earlier argument that these characters are 
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imbued, at least classically, with an aura of trustworthiness that the apt dramatist can 
exploit.  
 Reporting also tends to work in tandem with other forms of knowledge that, 
ultimately, do not always reinforce the expected hierarchy of reliability with seen, 
primary experience at the top and further-removed representations of experience at the 
bottom. Responding to David Bevington’s, Meek asserts, “While Shakespeare’s works 
often seem to imply the immediacy of the visual, they also point to the ways in which 
seeing itself can be ambiguous, contested or deceptive…Shakespeare carefully draws 
our attention to the potential deceptiveness of appearances, and even suggests that what 
we see can be reliant upon narrative.”35 Specifically discussing Hamlet’s opening scene 
above, Meek’s argument illustrates the complete inversion of what we may expect with 
what we see with our eyes may not be as reliable as what we hear told from other 
sources. In other cases, the hierarchy is, if not collapsed, then flattened. In The Winter’s 
Tale, Schott Syme argues, “what’s at stake…is the relative authority of the visual and 
the verbal, presence and representation, and the body and the word….the play does not 
conclusively resolve any of these apparent binaries but maintains a fine balance, 
portraying each pair of terms as mutually supplementary to each other.36  
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The Internal and External Ethos: Early Play Reports, Horatio, Claudius, and 
Hamlet 
  
Acts of onstage reporting are thus imbued with a sense of trustworthiness that is 
derived from centuries of dramatic tradition as well as dramatic necessity. A nuntius, a 
messenger, or Gentleman 1 often is a one-off character who appears in his or her scene 
and then leaves once the report is concluded. However, what happens when the reporter 
is not only named but present in multiple scenes throughout the play? What happens if 
information provided by the reporter is somehow contradicted or called into question? 
Below, I explore the answers to both these questions in the first several scenes of Hamlet 
where Shakespeare uses reporting not only to establish the proper background and 
context for his audience, but also to introduce skepticism on the reliability of the 
protagonist, the Ghost, and the murderer. Ultimately, the more anonymous the source of 
the report, the more reliable the report tends to be as we have no reason to see the 
speaker a s a character so much as a mouthpiece. a report’s—and the reporter’s—
reliability come into the question the further we get from anonymity and the more 
information provided to verify or refute the report itself.  
In Hamlet, the nuntius-function and first report manifests in Horatio’s discussion 
with the guards Barnardo and Marcellus where, upon seeing the Ghost of Old Hamlet, 
Horatio relates the relevant background material detailing Old Hamlet’s conflict with 
Old Fortinbras of Norway (both of whom are now deceased) and setting up a potential 




prior knowledge, “Our last King, /…was as you know by Fortinbras of Norway /…dared 
to the combat, in which our valiant Hamlet /…Did slay this Fortinbras” (1.1.79, 81, 83, 
85, italics added for emphasis). This act of reporting does next to nothing for Barnardo 
and Marcellus; Horatio even acknowledges that the guards are more than aware of the 
current situation by stating “as you know.” The benefit of such a speech is exclusively 
for the play’s audience, highlighting the necessity of acts of reporting as a tool for 
conveying information, even if that information as we shall see later, is up for additional 
scrutiny. At this point early on in the play, all is well. Horatio is functioning as one 
might expect a character to function in a play’s initial scenes by providing background. 
His speech, as far as we can tell, is reliable both in terms of his rhetorical agility and his 
dramatic role. Lacking all other knowledge, the audience must trust Horatio at this point 
and Shakespeare certainly gives us no reason not to.  
As we may expect, Horatio’s introductory report is confirmed by Claudius 
shortly after. In his lengthy speech, Claudius confirms some of the information that 
Horatio has provided in an earlier scene, namely that Old Hamlet is indeed dead—
“Though yet of Hamlet our dear brother’s death / The memory be green” (1.2.1-2)—and 
that some sort of negotiations is underway with Norway and Fortinbras— “we have here 
writ / To Norway, uncle of young Fortinbras — / Who…scarcely hears / Of this his 
nephew’s purpose” (1.2.28-30). These brief confirmations assure the audience that the 
events reported on Scene 1 have indeed transpired and establish Horatio (retroactively) 
Claudius (currently) as credible sources of information. Such initial credibility allows for 




audience, information that is a bit more local and relevant to understanding the play’s 
psychological exploration of Hamlet and the role knowledge acquisition plays 
throughout.  
The placement of old information following new information rather than vice 
versa confirms the information itself as well as provides credibility to the previous 
speakers. Moreover, the variety of presentation gives the audience a better chance to 
absorb the information and see its larger imbricated connections. Claudius’s speech 
confirms Horatio’s report on the dealings with Old Fortinbras and Old Hamlet. But he 
does not confirm this immediately. Rather, the potential invasion is only mentioned after 
Claudius explains that Old Hamlet is indeed dead (which we know from not only 
Horatio’s speech, but also from Marcellus and Barnardo’s dialogue), and that Gertrude, 
the once and future queen, has married her former brother-in-law. That Claudius 
confirms Horatio slightly later and not immediately (in contrast to Gertrude’s report on 
Ophelia’s death being questioned shortly after by the Gravediggers, as we shall see 
further) can be explained by a variety of factors. On a practical level, Claudius exhibits a 
fairly common transitional strategy. He provides new information before linking back 
explicitly to old information in order to illustrate their relationship. This move more 
fully integrates information and more smoothly allows for the audience to catch up on all 
the important material that they need to understand in order to make sense of Hamlet’s 
melancholy, the Ghost’s testimony, and the experiments put forth by not only Hamlet 
but Claudius and Polonius as well. Moreover, on a less practical level, the space between 




Such initial credibility allows for the audience to absorb the new information that 
he provides in the speech for the listening audience, information that is a bit more local 
and relevant to understanding the play’s psychological exploration of Hamlet and the 
role knowledge acquisition plays in his story. He remarks on Hamlet’s grieving, publicly 
enjoining him to lighten up and join the party, as it were. Such a speech opens up an 
ongoing plot point of Claudius and Polonius’s general ignorance about just what is 
bothering Hamlet. Their lack of knowing and, indeed, a general play-wide lack of 
knowing serves as a major crux of the play, as Steve Roth elaborates: 
Unlike all previous revenge tragedies (Elizabethan and classical)…in Hamlet 
nobody even knows that the primal murder has occurred. Claudius knows, of 
course. Hamlet knows (sort of). And Horatio knows (even more sort of). But no 
other character knows that King Hamlet was murdered—even (especially) at the 
end of the play…In all those [other] plays, the characters’ knowledge of the 
murder is the driving force of the drama. In Hamlet it is exactly the opposite.37  
This lack of knowing stands at odds with the knowledge available to the audience. Of 
course, this technique is nothing more unique than dramatic irony, but in Hamlet the 
distinction seems to be all the more important. To return to Claudius’s initial report, we 
will eventually come to know what’s eating at Hamlet, whereas Claudius and Polonius 
are unable to uncover any truth through their experimental and speculative means.38  
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At the end of the first act, Claudius’s reliability as a speaker has not yet come 
under question for the audience. The Ghost has not formally accused him yet, nor has 
Hamlet verbally suggested any wrongdoing outside of an understandable hostility 
towards his uncle for marrying his mother. Hamlet himself does not say anything until 
about thirty lines after Claudius makes his report. As with later reporters, Claudius 
begins his time with the audience as a neutral party: We have no reason to doubt his 
report on previous events or his descriptions of the perennially mopey Hamlet. Indeed, 
given that much of his information is later confirmed by other means (including 
Hamlet’s own soliloquies and Horatio’s observations), Claudius’s intrinsic ethos at the 
play’s outset is reliable.  
This reliability may be somewhat surprising given that audience members then 
and now readers, already know that Claudius is guilty of regicide. Due to the play’s 
canonicity and sheer popularity, a twenty-first century reader is more than likely to know 
all the “spoilers,” but this bit of knowledge is available to us outside of the confines of 
the play’s temporal trajectory. Shakespeare plays with similar concepts in his history 
plays where his audience knows the major story beats already. We know because we 
already know what is going to happen, and this foreknowledge is often taken for granted. 
But Shakespeare himself does not reveal this information until much later with 
Claudius’s actual admission of guilt.  
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At this point, we should wonder what an early modern audience may know about 
the plot of Hamlet, and whether or not they came with the same foreknowledge that 
Claudius murdered the previous king. Hamlet scholarship appears to be in agreement 
that Shakespeare drew from the original Danish Amleth through an intermediary, most 
likely Thomas Kyd’s Ur-Hamlet.39 But how much of these preceding sources could an 
early modern audience know or remember? William Witherle Lawrence contends that: 
The Elizabethan audience were not as familiar with the plot of ‘Hamlet’ as we 
are today, if indeed most of them knew it at all. The story had been earlier 
dramatized by Kyd, and some of Shakspere’s auditors may have seen the older 
play, but Shakspere can hardly have assumed such acquaintance with the plot. He 
wrote for people who were seeing an absorbing story developing before their 
eyes, and who were not sure what turn events would take next.40 
Even if we do not take Lawrence’s word, the early modern audience for Hamlet was 
wide and varied. While some theatergoers may have indeed seen the Ur-Hamlet or might 
have been familiar with Saxo Grammaticus’s Historia Danica or its French translation, 
Histoires tragiques, by Belleforest,41 it doesn’t seem like familiarity with the plot and 
with Claudius’s guilt were remotely as common as it is with readers and viewers today.  
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Nevertheless, whether an audience may not have foreknowledge of a character’s 
motivations or actions, a playwright like Shakespeare can manipulate these expectations 
through language. The links between a character’s reliability as a speaker and their 
reported speeches deserve some more theorized consideration here, both in terms of 
rhetoric and in terms of knowledge-making. As an epistemological practice, reporting 
most heavily draws on conventional rhetoric as a means to produce knowledge. This 
reliance on rhetoric stands in some contrast to other modes of knowledge acquisition not 
because other modes like experimentation lack their own rhetorics, but that the rhetoric 
involved in reporting so clearly maps onto an Aristotelian model as a communicative act 
between two parties. It is worth unpacking these rhetorical situations and examining the 
status of the senders and receivers in addition to the content as we have already been 
doing.  
 At its core, rhetoric relies on five major components in order to achieve meaning. 
These include the message itself (identified most with logos), the deliver or speaker of 
the message (ethos), the receiver(s) of the message (pathos), the surrounding context 
(kairos), and the intention or purpose of the message (telos). While the audience 
(whether in the pit, onstage, or reading), message, and situation are certainly important 
when considering acts of reporting in Hamlet, the ultimate determiner of whether a 
report may be reliable or not is the deliverer. This emphasis on the deliverer may strike 
current rhetoricians as odd as twenty-first century rhetoric relies far more heavily on 
either the power of the audience or the prevalence of context as the driving force behind 




a work of dramatic fiction. Drawing from a history of rhetoric, modern rhetorical theory 
holds that the rhetorical situation consists of multiple elements, each of which is 
privileged in turn depending on the rhetorician performing the analysis. 
 Aristotle’s rhetorical situation is not as fully enmeshed in exigence (or purpose 
and motivating context) as the modern rhetoricians like Lloyd Bitzer.42 It wouldn’t be—
exigence, time, and place were more the domain of the Sophists, a group of rhetoricians 
that, at least while under Plato’s tutelage, Aristotle would not have openly agreed with.43 
Rather, Aristotle is far more concerned with the means by which a speaker may achieve 
persuasion through the now-famous Rhetoric 101 appeals: ethos, pathos, and logos. 
Ethos, or the appeal to character is the most important here. In the second chapter of On 
Rhetoric, Aristotle explains ethos in the following manner:  
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so 
spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and 
more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and 
absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This 
kind of persuasion…should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what 
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people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true…that the 
personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of 
persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective 
means of persuasion he possesses.44  
Here, Aristotle describes the concept of an ethos isolated in a moment in time: an 
intrinsic ethos that is generated through the rhetor’s speech. Moreover, that “we believe 
good men more fully and more readily” is a commonplace. Hamlet grapples with these 
points: the connection between a rhetoric of reporting and an ethical imperative and 
complicating it through the introduction of the speaker’s unreliability post the initial 
delivery.  
Claudius is a particularly apt example for exploring the connections between 
ethos and trustworthiness due in no small part to the outside knowledge that modern 
audiences and critics bring to a play like Hamlet. Claudius’s ethos is a difficult one to 
articulate because, insofar as these initial speeches are concerned, he has done nothing 
truly objectionable, so far as the audience yet knows. Sure, he and Gertrude could have 
perhaps waited a little longer to wed, but even with Hamlet’s bile, Shakespeare does not 
portray Claudius in these earliest scenes as a particularly evil or even really 
untrustworthy. He openly admits to marrying Gertrude (we do not learn this information 
solely from Hamlet) in the wake of Old Hamlet’s death, even remarking that “The 
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memory be green, and that it us befitted / To bear our hearts in grief, and our whole 
kingdom / To be contracted in one brow of woe” (1.2.1-3). Even if there is an internal 
part of Claudius that does not openly grieve for his brother, his actual words reflect the 
appropriate, kingly response to Old Hamlet’s death. To search for interiority on the basis 
of Claudius’s words alone in this scene is beside the point. While an actor and director 
may have Claudius reflect some interior feeling: genuine grief, solemn stoicism, or even 
a lasciviousness directed at Gertrude, these choices only come into being after the play 
has been read and interpreted. That is to say, an actor or director makes these decisions 
after already knowing about Claudius’s confession and his actions by the end of the play. 
If we focus simply on the text at hand, without the interpretative guidance of the actor or 
director, there is nothing to indicate that Claudius cannot be acting as a reliable source of 
information. While all this becomes complicated later, that we start at this unassuming 
space makes sense as it offers some genuine surprised at Claudius’s revelation.  
 What follows after Claudius, Gertrude, and the peripheral characters exit is yet 
another report, but this time from the Danish prince himself. Discussing the two months 
following his father’s death, Hamlet, like Claudius, builds upon the two previous reports, 
simultaneously confirming bits of previous information and providing additional 
evidence and interpretations of events that the audience is now already aware of. 
Hamlet’s counter (or perhaps parallel) narrative, set in juxtaposition with Claudius’s 
report, provides us with background, yes, but the possibility of multiple reports and 




 Hamlet’s speech continues to build on the previous information, but instead of 
focusing on the threat of Fortinbras as Horatio and Claudius do, he instead turns his 
attentions to more interior concerns: his mother’s “hasty marriage” to his uncle and how 
he feels about it. Hamlet’s report is far less “report-like” than other reports in the play so 
far: while he does confirm the prior knowledge given to us by Claudius, he spends far 
more time interpreting the facts of the report. Indeed, if we take Hamlet’s initial thirty-
line speech and cut his commentary out of the scene, we are left with four full lines and 
seven half lines that repeat the same point: 
That it should come thus: 
But two months dead—nay not so much, not two— 
So excellent a king… 
………………………………………………….. 
And yet within a month 
………………………………………………….. 
A little month, or e’er those shoes were old 
With which she followed my poor father’s body, 
Like Niobe, all tears. Why, she— 
………………………………………………… 
—married with my uncle, 
My father’s brother… 






She married. (1.2. 137-143, 145-156) 
From Hamlet, we learn that Gertrude, previously married to Hamlet’s father, has married 
Hamlet’s uncle in quick succession after her husband’s death, and Hamlet is not happy 
about it. As Claudius confirms Horatio’s earlier report so does Hamlet confirm Claudius 
albeit in understandably more petulant terms. Yet in contrast with both Claudius and 
Horatio, Hamlet’s reporting takes a backseat to his commentary on the matter at hand. 
Though he ostensibly reports, the report itself is limited to repetition of words relating to 
the time elapsed since his father’s death and mother’s remarriage.  
 If we look a bit closer even at this abridged speech, we see that while Hamlet is 
repeating the same key word “month,” the implied timeline changes noticeably with 
each iteration. Initially, Hamlet explains that his father is “but two months dead” before 
immediately correcting himself to “nay not so much, not two.” This subtle shift is not 
too big of an issue. It does still confirm what Claudius states at the beginning of his 
speech that “the memory be green” of Old Hamlet’s death, after all. Hamlet keeps 
distorting the time frame between the death and marriage. He moves from “two months” 
to “within a month…a little month, or e’er those shoes were old” (1.2.145, 147) within a 
short frame as he presents his memory of the events in question. What does this tell us? 
At one level Hamlet may just be “being Hamlet.” He exaggerates to make a point or 
perhaps just makes a mistake in remembering. Yet I would argue that Hamlet’s temporal 
slippage is an indicator of potential unreliability. At this point in the play, this 




major concern. As the play progresses, more evidence of an unreliable Hamlet comes to 
the fore while, in contrast, more evidence of a reliable Claudius appears.  
 We receive additional evidence of Hamlet’s reliability (or lack thereof) just prior 
to the dumb show. Hamlet—pretending to be mad—still cannot let go of the brief 
amount of time between his mourning and marriage to Claudius. He remarks to Ophelia, 
“For look you how cheerfully my mother looks, / and my father died within’s two hours” 
(3.2.119-20). Ophelia corrects him, “Nay, ‘tis twice two months, my lord” (3.2.121). 
Hamlet’s initial remark can easily be attributed to him engaging in hyperbole. It fits 
within his character, regardless of whether or not he is supposed to be mad in this scene. 
Ophelia’s response, however, opens up some additional interpretative possibilities 
regarding not just the time frame of Old Hamlet’s death and Claudius and Gertrude’s 
hasty marriage. Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor take Ophelia and Hamlet at their words, 
suggesting that at this point in the play two months have passed since Hamlet’s initial 
complaint.45 While there is precedent for this (Shakespeare does jump through time and 
acknowledges his jumps in time throughout his corpus), I find that Ophelia’s correction 
does more than suggest that two months have passed between Acts 1 and 3. I contend 
that Ophelia’s line here functions just as the previous examples of reporting do: as 
additional evidence that alludes more to the credibility of previous speakers rather than 
the actual passage of time. Astute readers and audience members will take Ophelia’s 
correction as further evidence of Hamlet’s untrustworthiness.  
                                                 




What we see in the above examples above is that Hamlet is concerned with the 
process of verification through multiple modes of evidence. An event (Old Hamlet is 
murdered; Hamlet pretends to be crazy and frightens Ophelia; Ophelia drowns; 
Fortinbras plots offstage to invade Denmark) is reported on by one or several characters 
and that event is subsequently either verified or modified by future conversations or 
actions. This process stands in contrast to what Amir Khan calls “necessity.” He explains 
the difference:  
Verification occurs within the unfolding of the play. Necessity, on the other 
hand, occurs outside or beyond the play and is established by acts of criticism 
after the fact. Only we as readers require necessity; Hamlet has not the luxury of 
demanding it. He merely requires that the Ghost’s testimony be verified, and we 
are happy to go along with him as he seeks verification. However, we (and in 
hindsight) additionally require that the delay make sense—that it attest to 
something, either thematic about Hamlet or about the character Hamlet that is 
necessary.46 
Khan makes the distinction that two different processes occur whether an individual is in 
the moment, ideally viewing the play, or whether the individual is able to contemplate 
the internal logic of the play and to look beyond its textual boundaries. While it is 
possible for an individual to experience Hamlet the play in the initial manner by simply 
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relying on what is written, that experience is simply not available to those who have any 
familiarity with the western literary canon.  
 While Khan does not explicitly deal with this issue—he is more concerned with 
parsing the what the audience knows and Hamlet’s infamous delaying—his points about 
verification and necessity force us to consider the myriad ways narrative testimony or 
reporting work in this play. The challenge is that we, through centuries of criticism and 
culture, have absorbed Hamlet as an entity unto itself. We know Claudius is guilty. We 
know Ophelia goes crazy. We know that Horatio is a good guy. We know that Hamlet is 
the intelligent, brooding hero. Yet what examining reporting does for us is to scrutinize 
these assumptions and perhaps offer additional interpretations that may be closer to 
readings that occur before the scrutiny of necessity.  
 As the above examples illustrate, a character’s ethos is generated by both the 
words that they speak and the level of verification that character receives in support of 
their speech. At the play’s beginning, Shakespeare establishes both Horatio and Claudius 
as potentially reliable sources of information as their information is verified and 
presented in a manner (depending on the staging with Claudius in particular) that 
encourages us to take them at their word. Hamlet, perhaps surprisingly, is established as 
far more unreliable in contrast. The implications for the rest of the play are fairly clear: 
we should be wary of whatever Hamlet says, particularly when it stands in contrast to 
other characters. This is not to say that Hamlet cannot be truthful or that his information 
cannot be valid; rather, we should be wary of taking Hamlet solely at his word, at least 




Ekphrasis and Verification 
 
All verification is is the reinforcement of some claim that had already been 
presented prior. A simple way to think about this phenomenon in fiction is in 
descriptions of characters. For instance, a young woman describes herself as “clumsy” in 
the first chapter of a young adult novel. Then in the second chapter she accidentally trips 
and destroys her aunt’s priceless breakable object. The action of accidently breaking an 
object due to some physical instability is therefore verification of our heroine’s 
clumsiness. Of course, verification does not necessarily have to provide evidence for a 
given claim—it can actually provide counter-evidence just as easily. To return to our 
heroine, in addition to describing herself as clumsy, she also claims that she is plain and 
generally unobservable. However, later events in the narrative have multiple characters 
continually not just noticing her but also remarking on her unique beauty to each other or 
in compliments to the heroine. 
In plays, verification is doubly important as it reinforces the rules that govern the 
playworld. We may think of the commonplace that successful fiction, particularly 
performed fiction, feels satisfying to many audiences because of its verisimilitude. We 
do not have to see every individual detail—and certainly early modern audiences seemed 
to required far less verification of how an imagined world operates than we do—but we 
do need enough information to judge the fictional world according to its own internal 
logic. On a deeper level, specific to Hamlet, verbal verification of events that occur prior 




comprehend the sudden appearance of a ghost and why Hamlet is acting sullen at his 
mom and stepdad’s party.  
Verification of reports becomes all the more complicated when the level of 
spoken (or written) detail in the report rivals what we might see onstage. We might think 
briefly of the earlier examples from The Winter’s Tale or The Spanish Tragedy where 
key scenes such as the reuniting of Perdita and Leontes and the opening battle where 
Don Andrea is killed are narrated in stunning and curious detail. Hamlet too contains 
multiple instances of highly visual speeches that are worth additional scrutiny, 
particularly in the way each speech draws attention to the veracity of the speaker. The 
overriding technique in these speeches is the rhetorical practice of ekphrasis: detailed 
verbal description. Below, I detail ekphrasis’s role in Gertrude’s speech describing 
Ophelia’s death, Ophelia’s description of Hamlet entering her closet, and the Ghost’s 
speech recounting his death. All three paint a vivid, affective picture, though the level at 
which their ekphrasis is truly effective is directly related to their ultimate credibility both 
within their reports and in the scenes that surround them that serve to verify or deny 
what they report. 
As a literary term, ekphrasis is, as Meeks remarks, “shifting and unstable,” 
particularly how the term would have been understood during Shakespeare’s time versus 
now.47 Drawing from more modern understandings of the term as defined by Leo Spitzer 
                                                 




when describing Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn,”48 Catherine Belsey suggests that 
“ekphrasis may be defined as the representation in words of a pictorial representation” 
though she quickly acknowledges that such a definition may be wanting.49 Rebecca 
Olson uses even fewer words: “the verbal representation of visual art.”50 Yet this 
definition, despite its popularity, does not capture the classical or early modern meanings 
of the term and how it was understood by Shakespeare and his contemporaries. In her 
extensive survey on the origins of ekphrasis as a classical term, Ruth Webb offers a 
broader meaning that highlights the importance of vivid language and the term’s 
relationship to general reporting or narration. Webb explains, “What distinguishes 
ekphrasis is its quality of vividness, enargeia, its impact on the mind’s eye of the listener 
who must, in Theon’s words, be almost made to see the subject…Narration is a simple 
account of what happened while an ekphrasis includes the details that tell one how it 
happened, how it looked (one might add also how it sounded and felt.”51 Ekphrasis 
therefore is a rhetorical tool that is not merely limited to the visual arts, though they are 
related, and may instead be understood as subset of the reporting that I have already 
been discussing. With this broader (and more ancient) definition, we can better see how 
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ekphrastic passages work throughout Hamlet and how they provide additional links to 
the speaker’s ethos. 
Shakespeare’s knowledge of ekphrasis is often exemplified in his narrative poem, 
The Rape of Lucrece, where the titular Lucrece focuses on a painting of Troy, vividly 
aligning herself with Hecuba and finding visual expression for her own pain and struggle 
after being assaulted and raped by Tarquin. Hauntingly, Belsey queries, “How else but 
by describing an imaginary picture could Shakespeare import as visible entities into 
Lucrece’s spotless domesticity the grimy secretions of the Greek troops as they lay 
mines to bring down the topless towers? How else could he compare the ruin of his 
Roman heroine with a moment of tragic destruction from an even older antiquity?”52 
How else, indeed. By uniting the visual with the spoken, ekphrasis readily invites layers 
and multiplicity of meaning. In Lucrece’s case, the ekphrasis allies her with Rome’s with 
fraught history, and the level of power this comparison holds depends on the reader’s 
knowledge.  
While examples of ekphrasis exist throughout early modern English written 
literature, particularly in the poetic works of Spenser and Sidney, 53 this particular 
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rhetorical device finds a ready home in drama. Due in no small part to drama’s 
simultaneous identification as poetry in the Aristotelian sense and its oral dimension, 
ekphrasis works as a useful tool that visually illustrates scenes that may not be readily 
presented on the stage.  
 Ekphrasis, then, has quite a bit to do with reporting, particularly in Hamlet where 
several of the actual reports are deeply ekphrastic: working backward, Gertrude’s 
description of Ophelia’s death, Ophelia’s description of Hamlet’s antic disposition, and 
Old Hamlet’s description of his poisoning. In this next section, I analyze more closely 
the effect of ekphrasis on reporting and the reporter’s ethos before later turning to the 
competing forms of verification that each woman’s speech ends up highlighting.  
In the “willow speech” (4.7.164-81), Gertrude waxes poetic about Ophelia’s 
death, providing an example of ekphrasis so strong that critics suspect that she must have 
had a hand in the drowning of her potential daughter-in-law. Emphasizing what some 
scholars call a voyeuristic gaze on the madwoman, she figuratively paints the scene, 
describing the brook and its flora before even identifying where Ophelia is: 
There is a willow grows askant the brook 
That shows his hoary leaves in the glassy stream. 
Therewith fantastic garlands did make 
Of crowflowers, nettles, daises and long purples, 
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That liberal shepherds give a grosser name 
But our cold maids do dead men’s finger call them. 
There on the pendent boughs her crownet weeds 
Clambering to hang, an envious sliver broke, 
When down her weedy trophies and herself  
Fell in the weeping brook. (4.7.164-173) 
In the remaining portion of the speech, Gertrude describes how Ophelia’s skirts 
“mermaid-like awhile…bore her up” (4.7.174) and she sang “snatches of old lauds” 
(4.7.175) before her clothes became too heavy and sank her below the water’s surface. 
The speech is so vividly descriptive that some question how physically close Gertrude 
was to Ophelia and why they did not attempt to rescue her as she sank into the water. 
Stephen Ratcliffe suggests two possibilities for Gertrude’s proximity: “It may be that 
Gertrude was told about Ophelia’s death by someone who witnessed it, someone whose 
words she is now paraphrasing. It may also be that Gertrude herself witnessed Ophelia’s 
death, and so is now reporting what she saw firsthand, with her own eyes.”54 The play 
does not give us an indication either way, though it is curious that Shakespeare gives the 
description of the drowning to the named Gertrude as opposed to an unnamed messenger 
who could have delivered the same message to Gertrude, Claudius, and Laertes. Had the 
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messenger been anonymous, the questions of the source of testimony and how they 
acquired such knowledge on Ophelia’s death would not be as pressing.  
 On the other hand, by giving Gertrude the report on Ophelia’s death, 
Shakespeare opens the audience up to skepticism on both women. Gertrude’s report on 
Ophelia’s death almost immediately becomes subject to question in the following scene 
between the two clowns who argue whether or not Ophelia merits a “Christian burial.” 
The two reports, as Hanna Scolnicov elaborates, present a contradiction as Gertrude 
rules Ophelia’s death as an accident due to her madness whereas the gravediggers (and 
later the priest presiding over Ophelia’s burial) contend that her death was a suicide. 
Scolnicov holds that the gravediggers’ take is the correct version of events as she 
explores how various film adaptations take on the challenge of presenting Gertrude’s 
speech.55  
In contrast, Ophelia’s death and its verification serve as a counterpoint to Old 
Hamlet’s death. We never see Ophelia die—we only receive a rather detailed account by 
none other than Gertrude. How Gertrude beheld the event in question is not really clear, 
but her poetic report is nevertheless welcome. Ophelia’s death is later verified, if only 
obliquely by the two grave diggers debating whether her death was a suicide or an 
accident, both interpretative possibilities of the evidence available to the audience at this 
point. Gertrude’s report, we should note, does not attribute much conscious agency to 
Ophelia after all. As with Old Hamlet’s demise, the circumstances surrounding 
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Ophelia’s death are intentionally oblique, calling into question once again the reliability 
of the reporters. Do we trust Gertrude’s poetic elegy or are we to take the grave diggers’ 
interpretations as fact? The play itself, while certainly opening these possibilities (along 
with those of Old Hamlet’s salvation), is less willing to provide a direct answer based on 
reporting alone.  
Scholars have continually expressed doubt regarding the trustworthiness of both 
the Ghost and Gertrude. This skepticism is due in no small part to the ekphrastic quality 
of their speeches. Despite (or perhaps because of its deeply visual quality), ekphrasis 
ultimately warrants this skepticism as Claire Preston explains:  
Ekphrastic description…because it purports not simply to borrow the visual but 
to be it, deliberately designs and compels scrutiny, carefully directing that 
attentiveness away from narrative sequence and toward precise interpretative 
responses to obtruded and ostentatious physical facts which encode abstract 
meanings. 56 
In order words, ekphrastic description calls attention to itself. Gertrude’s decision to wax 
poetic about Ophelia’s death and to provide a level of detail that has inspired several 
visual representations of the event ends up working against Gertrude’s credibility in 
much of the critical conversation. Her speech becomes the event so much that it replaces 
the potential event itself. Moreover, the artifice of ekphrastic speech allows for it to 
encode and represent multiple possibilities rather than be limited to one visual proof.  
                                                 




While it is fairly clear that the ekphrastic elements in Gertrude’s report evokes 
distrust among critics definitely and to a lesser extent to a general audience, what might 
we make of Ophelia’s earlier descriptive testimony to Laertes? Ophelia vividly describes 
how Hamlet wandered into her private quarters, silently touched her, and wandered off. 
Yet no one seems to doubt her report. In contrast to the death reports, Ophelia’s 
description follows Hamlet’s announced intentions to feign madness whereas Gertrude 
and the Ghost are the first to announce new evidence. In a curious manner, the initial 
moment of knowledge acquisition is the one up to most scrutiny, at least after-the-fact.  
My lord, as I was sewing in my closet 
 Lord Hamlet, with his doublet all unbraced, 
 No hat upon his head, his stockings fouled, 
 Ungartered and down-gyved to his ankle 
 Pale as his shirt, his knees knocking each other, 
 And with a look so piteous in purport 
 As if he had been loosed out of hell 
 To speak of horrors, he comes before me. ( 
In the first half of the report, Ophelia provides little overt interpretation in favor of rich 
description. Citing George Stubbes’s 1736 Some Remarks on the Tragedy of Hamlet 
Prince of Denmark, Meek identifies the first part of Ophelia’s speech as an example of 




face of a (sometimes imagined) individual.57 While I suggest the rhetorical move is 
closer to effictio which encompasses the entire body rather than merely the face, the 
nature of the description is nevertheless ekphrastic. Ophelia verbally paints the picture to 
the point that it has become part of the play’s visual tapestry. Indeed, Ophelia’s 
encounter with Hamlet, as Thompson and Taylor note, “is described, not staged, in all 
three texts, but some productions (and films) presented it in dumb-show, and it became a 
popular subject for illustration.”58 In its earliest forms Shakespeare opts for a report but 
as with other incredibly vivid reports like the Ghost’s description of his death and 
Gertrude’s vivid depiction of Ophelia’s drowning, the report itself is imbued with 
enough visual significance that it easily translates to visual representation whether on 
stage or in art.  
 Criticism, particularly feminist criticism, has long considered Ophelia vis-à-vis 
Hamlet with scholars including Lacan articulating the pair’s link and, arguably, 
Ophelia’s subordinate position.59 Yet as Sandra K. Fischer succinctly states, “Ophelia is 
actually a muted structural pivot, a Braille rendition of the hero’s own progress.”60 
Ophelia’s structural significance allows us to consider additional ways in which she may 
reveal epistemologies and practices distinct from Hamlet’s. Moreover, these revelations 
may potentially serve as sites of critique. Whether as a marker of a woman oppressed by 
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the patriarchy or as sign of her “basically weak personality,”61 as Carroll Camden would 
have it, Ophelia’s propensity to describe what is going around her rather than explicitly 
interpret it invites us to consider the epistemological value of the report in contrast with 
the more interpretative heavy-hitters like her (former) boyfriend and (late) father.  
At its core, Ophelia’s report on Hamlet is reliable because the audience trusts that 
Ophelia will represent events without molding them into a pre-conceived interpretation 
as Hamlet and Polonius are wont to do. Moreover, Ophelia’s reliability is confirmed in 
subsequent scenes where the audience witnesses Hamlet acting in a manner consistent 
with Ophelia’s testimony. In addition, Ophelia’s report does its own work of confirming 
Hamlet’s earlier comment where he announces his intention to pretend to be mad. 
Ophelia’s testimony is also later verified whereas Gertrude’s report is almost 
immediately undermined by the Gravediggers in the next scene who confirm that while 
Ophelia is quite dead, her motivations for death were less clear.  
Ophelia’s report and Gertrude’s report, while differing in how their information 
is later confirmed by other speakers, at their core, are remarkably similar in their 
deployment of ekphrasis. Their reports center on a figure (Hamlet and Ophelia, 
respectively) who has been acting strangely, whether intentionally or due to madness, 
and their inappropriate reactions to a situation. Moreover, Ophelia and Gertrude take 
multiple lines to describe their subject’s clothing, with their descriptions vividly 
capturing the terror of the scene. Yet, critically speaking, one is given a pass while the 
                                                 





other’s speech is treated with skepticism. I would contend that this skepticism is more 
the result of audience doubt generated from earlier scenes regarding Gertrude rather than 
the speech itself. Her descriptions are so vivid and terrifying not because she had a role 
in murdering Ophelia or was attempting to rewrite her death as an accident rather than 
suicide, but because she is creating an image of death that is intended to affect the 
audience beyond the moment she speaks. By using ekphrasis, like Ophelia in generating 
terror and tension by describing Hamlet’s disheveled clothes and unnerving silence, 
Gertrude achieves a level of rhetorical finesse and effect on an event that carries enough 
emotional impact on the audience and Laertes to merit space.  
 
Testing the Ghost’s Report  
 
While interesting to think about, Ophelia and Gertrude’s reliability as reporters 
does not drive the plot as much as the Ghost of Old Hamlet. The Ghost, who appears 
before Hamlet even knows of his existence, is the first to charge Hamlet to revenge his 
death on Claudius. The remainder of the play follows Hamlet attempting to do just that, 
but he wants to be absolutely sure that his vengeance is justified and will result in 
Claudius receiving the most severe of posthumous punishments. The chain of knowledge 
beginning with the Ghost’s report of his own death and concluding with Claudius’s 
confession with a detour in Hamlet’s theatrical experiment, The Mousetrap, draws our 
attention specifically to a reporter who, by all accounts, really should be unreliable. 




(mostly), but that truth is verified solely for the audience rather than by any measures 
Hamlet takes to discern it. This strategy works as a kind of “reverse Claudius”: Claudius 
is initially framed as a reliable source of information but ends up being in the moral 
wrong, whereas the Ghost is immediately distrusted by the characters (with the 
exception of Hamlet) and is then proven reliable. 
At the play’s onset the audience—and Hamlet himself—has no idea that Old 
Hamlet was actually murdered. For certain, we know that he is dead by way of Horatio’s 
reporting of backstory and the fact that Barnardo, Marcellus, Horatio, and, later, Hamlet, 
all attest that the Ghost wandering about looks an awful lot like the deceased king. The 
Ghost’s true purpose, of course, is not revealed until later when he directly speaks to 
Hamlet, reporting and revealing his poisoning. Up until this point even the gloomy 
Hamlet does not verbally articulate any foul play; rather, his report of recent events at 
Elsinore focuses on his anger at his mother for marrying his uncle so soon after his 
father’s death. Indeed, Miriam Joseph points out that one of the key reasons of the 
Ghost’s “dramatic success” is due to the fact that “he reveals major antecedent events 
otherwise undiscoverable which become the essential spring of the action.”62 The “major 
antecedent events” referred to here are, of course, the events surrounding his death. 
These events are later confirmed beyond a shadow of a doubt for the audience but for the 
actual cast, less so.  
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The play itself invites early skepticism of the Ghost. As Horatio, Marcellus, and 
Barnardo whisper in hushed voices, they imply that the Ghost may not be Old Hamlet 
himself but an apparition that simply looks like the deceased king. Early on, when the 
Ghost appears, Barnardo states for both the newly arrived Horatio and the audience, “In 
the same figure like the King that’s dead. / …/ Looks ‘a not like the King?” (1.1.40, 42). 
Later, Marcellus repeats this language of figures and liking once again, asking Horatio to 
confirm, “Is it not like the King?” (1.1.57). While Horatio does quickly confirm 
Marcellus and Barnardo’s suspicions in the immediately following lines, neither guard 
quite leaves off of referring to the Ghost as anything but an apparition that resembles 
Old Hamlet. Sarah Outterson-Murphy suggests that “such language emphasizes the 
Ghost’s status as not only potentially a demonic trick but also, inevitably, a theatrical 
representation. The more lifelike this Ghost looks, the more it must seem both real.”63  
 We can see this paradox at play in the interpretations of the Ghost and how he is 
represented verbally by those who witness him. While Marcellus and Barnardo, as noted 
above, continue to refer to the Ghost as being “like the King,” Hamlet and Horatio, the 
other two who visibly witness the Ghost, view him as the King.  
While Horatio does claim that he believes that the Ghost is the deceased king, he 
nevertheless warns Hamlet away from following him: 
 What if it tempt you toward the flood, my lord, 
 Or to the dreadful summit of the cliff 
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 That beetles o’er his base into the sea, 
 And there assume some other horrible form 
 Which might deprive your sovereignty of reason 
And draw you into madness? (1.4.69-74) 
Hamlet, of course, refuses to listen to Horatio and presses onward. This spoken concern 
signals to the audience that we should be wary of the Ghost. As Stephen Greenblatt 
notes for modern audiences, while “there are occasional comic ghosts…the predominant 
theatrical figures of the dead are spirits from the underworld who, like the ghost of 
Thyestes in Seneca’s Agamemnon, long to see the stage run with blood.”64 When 
considering potential, initial reactions to the Ghost, Horatio’s warning seems to readily 
echo contemporary expectations. These expectations shape our understanding of the 
Ghost’s reliability in ways that may be counter to modern perceptions who already know 
what the Ghost says to be true.  
Old Hamlet’s testimony allows for the epistemological upheavals just as much as 
his spectral presence. As Shankar Raman explains, “the revelation of the elder Hamlet’s 
death as ‘foul and unnatural murder’…un-fixes the past, undoing what has been assumed 
to be known—and only thereby does the intervention begin to shape the future (the 
play’s and Hamlet’s).”65 This “un-fixing” that Raman notes corroborates with the 
instability of different modes of knowledge and evidence in play. There is no 
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teleological progression in terms of knowledge gain, much as Hamlet and perhaps we 
scholars may wish there to be. If anything, reports like the Ghost’s emphasize the 
fragility of knowing and its contingency on an array of rhetorical factors.  
What many modern readers struggle with in thinking about Claudius is the a 
priori knowledge of the play. Prior to his actual confession, we only have circumstantial 
evidence and testimony of Claudius’s role in the murder of his brother. Even Hamlet’s 
(not-so) clever idea of The Mousetrap doesn’t really work to “catch the nature of the 
king.” Several critics offer various interpretations of why Claudius rises and leaves. W. 
W. Greg suggests that Claudius did murder King Hamlet but not in the manner described 
by the ghost.66 J. Dover Wilson, in response to Greg, argues that Claudius doesn’t flee 
immediately from the dumb show because he does not realize the significance of the 
performance until an actor specifically mentions poison.67 Stanley Cavell further 
suggests that Claudius suppressed his response.68  
 The most convincing interpretation comes from James Hirsch who suggests that 
Claudius leaves the performance not because of any underlying guilt but because Hamlet 
is being intentionally difficult. Once Claudius neglects to have the appropriate reaction 
(flinching) in the face of the on-stage murder, Hamlet attempts to provoke him by 
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interrupting the performance and even identifying Lucianus as the nephew of the Player 
King. Hirsch explains: 
This initial premise of Hamlet’s experiment is later dramatized as invalid when, 
in response to the play-within-the-play, the King does not in fact proclaim his 
malefaction. But no sooner had Hamlet articulated his initial experimental 
premise in 2.2 than he revised it. Realizing how unlikely it would be that the 
King would proclaim his guilt, Hamlet immediately and drastically lowers the 
bar of proof.69 
Yet even Claudius’s confession remains in doubt for some scholars like Ratcliffe who 
suggests that because Claudius’s speech lacks the sensory detail of his brother’s 
narrative, Claudius’s testimony must somehow be false:  
Claudius gives no details that would place him at the scene of the crime that 
afternoon—no orchard, no sleeping brother, no poison poured into his brother’s 
ears. When he seems to place his body at the scene of the crime, he does so in a 
syntactic construction whose hypothetical logic casts more shadow of doubt than 
light of certainty over what he is actually saying.70 
Ratcliffe is right to observe that Claudius’s confession is indeed spare, particularly in 
comparison to some of the more detailed testimonies that we have seen earlier; however, 
we should be aware that ekphrastic detail tends to implicate falsehood rather than 
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alleviate it. Indeed, part of what causes some readers to doubt Gertrude’s description of 
Ophelia’s death is her level of too much ekphrastic detail.  
 Nevertheless, what I suggest isn’t that Claudius is attempting to hoodwink the 
audience by engaging in some complex metatheater, but that the audience may instead 
feel a sense of surprise that he was indeed the murderer all along. This surprise may be 
hard to fathom, especially now when even grammar school students know that Claudius 
is guilty of fratricide before they ever (if ever) read Hamlet. But given the three who are 
most concerned with Old Hamlet’s murder—the Ghost, Hamlet, and Claudius—
Claudius himself consistently comes across as fairly trustworthy whereas the Ghost and 
Hamlet are compromised by links to the infernal and to madness. The issue at hand is 
best summarized by Ann Jennalie Cook: “To scholars, Shakespeare’s drama is so 
familiar that they bring a full knowledge of what happens in the play to each reading or 
viewing. It becomes harder and harder—perhaps even impossible—not to interpret each 
successive event in terms of what one knows is yet to come.”71 We can trust Claudius’s 
confession not simply because it agrees with the Ghost’s testimony or Hamlet’s wishful 
interpretations of Claudius’s response to The Mousetrap, but because Claudius has 
established himself as consistently reliable.  
 It is Claudius’s strong ethos that makes this scene such a shocker for an audience 
that is unfamiliar with the Hamlet mythos. As with Mercutio’s death in Romeo and Juliet 
where the comic plot suddenly turns tragic, Claudius’s confession marks a turning point. 
                                                 





What can we do with an ostensibly reliable narrator who is also a confessed murderer? 
For the time being we must separate the two—Claudius can be morally reprehensible 
while still being reliable much as how Hamlet can be morally responsible while still 
being completely unreliable.  
 At this point we should also consider who actually hears Claudius’s confession. 
As Khan helpfully reminds us, Hamlet never actually hears Claudius admit guilt; only 
the audience does. Responding specifically to A. C. Bradley’s question of Hamlet’s 
inaction, Khan states, “It is perfectly reasonable, upon first reading or viewing, to go 
along with Hamlet’s doubts, to demand as he does verification of the Ghost’s testimony, 
to wonder whether the Ghost is a ‘spirit of health or goblin damned.’”72 Once again, we 
are invited to consider not simply the content of a speech but the reliability of the 
speaker and the factors that contribute to whether or not an audience member or reader 
may trust the speaker at any given time. Although the Ghost ends up being proven 
“right” in identifying his murderer to Hamlet, the play takes careful steps to ensure that 
up until the confession itself, his testimony is under scrutiny whereas Claudius faces a 
comparable lack of ethical scrutiny except from an increasingly unreliable Hamlet.  
Relying on the testimony of his father’s ghost as well as his own intuition, 
Hamlet actively orchestrates an elaborate ruse via a staging of The Mousetrap performed 
by a conveniently visiting acting troop. Prior to the performance, Hamlet professes that 
he will “observe his [Claudius’s] looks” (2.2.531) and later enjoins Horatio to also 
                                                 




“observe mine uncle…For I mine eyes will rivet to his face / And after we will both our 
judgements join / In censure of his seeming” (3.2.76, 81-3). At this point in the narrative 
Hamlet has accepted Old Hamlet’s report of his untimely death (the lines that I have 
omitted above certainly indicate that he fully anticipates that Claudius will react in the 
appropriate guilty manner), but he still seems to be intent on sensory proofs that are 
confirmed by an additional observer.  
Of course, we would do well to note that Hamlet’s reasoning is slightly faulty. 
Although Claudius does indeed perform in a manner consistent to Hamlet’s expectations 
(that is, he gets uncomfortable and leaves), the play’s audience receives confirmation of 
Claudius’s guilt through his own admission via soliloquy in a later scene. In the text 
itself, Hamlet is not privy to this confession although adaptations and theatrical 
interpretations may allow for him to be listening in. Nevertheless, some sort of 
confirmation seems to be required in order to fully validate the initial reports. That 
validation may come from experimentation as well as further testimony from a particular 
source suggests that sensory proof may also be of questionable veracity despite its 
predominance throughout the play.  
 Regarding Hamlet’s predecessor, Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy, Douglas Green 
suggests that the final multi-lingual performance of Soliman and Perseda provides an 
additional level of evidence, albeit a literary one. He explains, “The staging of the 
literary precedent serves, like evidence adduce din the courtroom, to substantiate and 




guilty their self-incrimination.”73 Such would seem to apply to Hamlet and his 
Mousetrap insofar as we are used to reading this scene. As he attempts to construct his 
own experiment to “catch the conscience of the king” and verify the Ghost’s earlier 
testimony, Hamlet relies on Claudius’s affective response to the dumb show and the 
play.  
 This reading, however, faces one major issue as Green explains for both The 
Spanish Tragedy and for Hamlet. Namely, he elaborates, “We are shown the evidence, 
but it does not speak for itself; there is no immanent voice corroborating what we 
obviously think we know.”74 This lack of explicit direction for the audience has troubled 
scholars particularly as, if we look at the text itself, Claudius’s response doesn’t seem to 
quite fit with Hamlet’s expectations. James Hirsch points out the absurdity of Hamlet’s 
play-experiment:  
This initial premise of Hamlet’s experiment is later dramatized as invalid when, 
in response to the play-within-the-play, the King does not in fact proclaim his 
malefaction. But no sooner had Hamlet articulated his initial experimental 
premise in 2.2 than he revised it. Realizing how unlikely it would be that the 
King would proclaim his guilt, Hamlet immediately and drastically lowers the 
bar of proof.75 
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While it is unclear that Hamlet actually expects Claudius (and perhaps Gertrude) to 
immediately confess with wailing and gnashing of teeth, he does point to the affective 
power of drama. He says to Horatio: 
 Hum, I have heard 
 That guilty creatures sitting at a play  
 Have by the very cunning of the scene 
 Been struck so to the soul that presently 
 They have proclaimed their malefactions. (2.2.523-7) 
Hamlet shortly after announces that he will be looking for whether Claudius’s face “do 
blench” (2.2.532) and asks Horatio to observe with him. As Hirsch indicates, there is a 
wide gulf between spontaneous proclamations of guilt (which would seem to be a fairly 
clear visual and aural proof of guilt) versus the subtlety of flinching or blanching in the 
face of a murder scene, particularly a murder scene of a king. But amusingly enough, 
although Claudius may indeed “blench” depending on the production of the play, 
Hamlet’s running commentary—he’s “as good as a chorus” (3.2.238), as Ophelia 
observes—gives no indication of such a reaction. He does not specifically remark on 
Claudius at all while the performance is underway. Rather, Ophelia is the one who notes 
when Claudius rises after Hamlet helpfully explains what is going on and how “You 
shall see anon how the murderer gets the love of Gonzago’s wife” (3.2.256-7). Hamlet, 
of course, takes Claudius’s exit as irrefutable proof of his guilt. An audience not as 




actually being a murderer but by simply being accused of murder by his nephew and 
heir.  
 The question is then: what does all this have to do with the Ghost’s report and the 
ethos of the reporter? In The Mousetrap scene and in Hamlet’s preparation leading up to 
it, we learn far more about Hamlet’s reliability than we do about the actual murder. That 
actual bit of knowledge only comes later and not as the result of careful experimentation. 
Such seems to be the challenge of not only Hamlet but of other revengers as well as 
Green illustrates: “The theatrics of Shakespeare’s revengers allude to truth, but also 
reduce the evidence to mere illusion—and expose the very grounds of truth as variously 
a fabrication, a private fiction, a hidden assumption, and a way of seeing.”76 Evidence 
which may seem to be reliable is limited not simply by its actual propensity to truth but 




It is well-known that Shakespeare stages ambiguity. Hamlet is hardly an 
exception to the rule. But although Shakespeare does give us some closure in having 
Claudius admit to his murdering of Old Hamlet, this little bit of confirmation is amid a 
sea of evidence that is not so clearly verified. Reporting therefore serves as a potentially 
unreliable form of evidence acquisition; however, sometimes this form is the only way 
                                                 




to acquire any information, particularly in the speech-heavy medium of theater. In 
Hamlet in particular, evidence frequently first comes in the form of a report and that 
report is either confirmed, denied, or complicated through additional evidence, 
sometimes through additional reports, other times through character actions, general 
dialogue, or acts of audience interpretation.  
Much of the rhetorical and epistemological power of the report, as with other 
kinds of evidence provided throughout the play, rests on this final idea of interpretation. 
In staging interpretations from potentially (or just patently) unreliable speakers like 
Claudius, Hamlet, and Polonius, we are asked to be skeptical of those who have not 
necessarily provided a reason for us to be skeptical. The ethos of the reporter has as 
much to do with the subsequent evidence of the reporter’s credibility as it does with his 
or her initial report. As we are asked to call previous evidence into question in light of 
new evidence, we are presented with the very challenge that Hamlet faces throughout the 
play and that Claudius and Polonius also experience, if to a lesser degree: what is 
knowable when new knowledge simply introduces more questions? 
Ultimately, an investigation of reporting practices in Hamlet reveals an intimate 
connection with other epistemological moves that, rather than consistently providing 
confirmation of any particular method’s validity, instead highlight the uncertainty of 
knowledge-making methods in general. As Hamlet dies in the final scene, he implores 
his friend: “Horatio, I am dead. / Thou livest: report me and my cause aright / To the 
unsatisfied” (5.2.322-324). Yet the report that Horatio ostensibly provides (that being the 




Horatio, the person who has managed to survive Hamlet’s unsuccessful interrogation of 
knowledge and epistemological practices, and who may have been the narrator all along? 
We should certainly be willing to make the attempt to believe what he—and in the turn 





PROBLEMS WITH OCULAR PROOF IN OTHELLO AND THE CHANGELING 
 
First performed nearly two decades apart, Shakespeare’s tragedy Othello (1604) 
and Thomas Middleton and William Rowley’s tragicomedy The Changeling (1623), 
seem like strange bedfellows.77 Desdemona’s handkerchief did not, as far as we know, 
travel between productions; they share neither sources nor a location, though both are set 
abroad; and their plot structures are completely different with Othello following one 
major thread and The Changeling having two distinct plots that only briefly intersect. 
Despite their overt dissimilarities, these plays demonstrate an obsessive and times 
comical desire for visual proof, especially proof of something like virginity or marital 
fidelity that cannot be readily staged. They ask the question: how can we know by sight 
what cannot be seen?  
Knowledge and its shapers fundamentally drive the plots and characters of these 
plays, with the villains knowing more than the heroes, and thus actively attempting to 
keep the heroes or heroines from learning what they know. All the major characters, 
good or bad, operate under the assumption that if one manages to acquire and hold onto 
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all the required information, they will know the truth. This assumption, which reflects 
developing empiricist paradigms, ends up being violated in both plays; how and where 
the violation occurs, however, differs. In Othello, several characters remark on the need 
for overwhelming (ideally visual) proof in order to establish an accurate interpretation of 
the play’s events. Unfortunately for nearly every one of them, these proofs are 
impossible to come by. Even the infamous handkerchief is not a conclusive piece of 
evidence. Indeed, the only “real” visual proofs throughout Othello are ekphrastic, 
occurring solely within Iago’s speeches. These epistemological glitches—conclusive 
visual proof only exists verbally through rhetoric or symbolism—stand in contrast to the 
issues on display in The Changeling. In Middleton and Rowley’s play, the problem is 
not so much that the visual evidence is not physically there (if anything, the play has an 
overabundance of ocular proofs), it is that the evidence is so often fabricated—literally 
staged—in order to provoke a desired interpretation.  
The problem(s) with ocular proof that each play illustrates, I argue, are part of a 
larger continuum: in Othello, visual knowledge is substituted for rhetorical knowledge, 
and thus is subject to all the critiques of early modern rhetoric whereas in The 
Changeling, the rhetorical lesson is inverted and embodied in performance and in 
experiments. However, the excessive visual spectacle is no more reliable than the 
“ocular” proof of Othello, as all kinds of evidence are fabricated by human agents.   
 In this chapter I explore how early empiricist and late humanist paradigms 
collide in these two plays to illustrate two different yet related ways plays engaged with 




reliable proof, and how these challenges are embedded in the play’s poetics and 
structure. First, I provide an overview of the role of vision in Othello and The 
Changeling, noting the overwhelming presence of the language of seeing as well as each 
play’s philosophy of vision and how that relates to its overall purposes. I then transition 
to the play’s opening scenes where I show how Shakespeare, Rowley, and Middleton lay 
the groundwork for their thesis statements on ocular proof and its affective potential, 
with Shakespeare substituting visual descriptions and rhetorical moves for absent 
sensory experiences, and Middleton and Rowley illustrating the overt message to not 
trust solely in sight as it can overwhelm reason. Next, I focus on the two major 
epistemological set pieces of each play: Othello’s demand for ocular proof (with 
additional commentary on visual evidence like Desdemona’s handkerchief) in Act 3 and 
the virginity-test potion in Act 4. Finally, I conclude with a discussion on the importance 
of verification and where it lacks, particularly at the end of each play, where we finally 
see the murder of Desdemona after having most concrete visual proof withheld from us, 
but we do not actually see The Changeling’s equivalent of Beatrice-Joanna’s stabbing 
and the resolution of the madmen subplot.  
 
Visual Evidence in Othello and The Changeling 
 
As visual spectacles, plays cannot help but offer ocular proof. For The 
Changeling and Othello, this is especially so as these concerns are imbued within the 




prevails as the primary force with all its attendant uses and dangers.78 Word-wise, “eyes” 
and language of vision and seeing dominate the play’s lexicon as characters rely on their 
vision to gather evidence and make judgements on the scenes before them, as the chart 
below indicates.79 In the 1653 quarto of Middleton and Rowley’s play, “eye” and its 
plural 30 times in the play;80 “see” and its variations appear 66 times; “look” and its 
variants 32 times; and “sight” 17 times.81 Rather than concentrate sight in one section, 
the terms are dispersed throughout the play and in both plots. Othello offers a similar 
snapshot. “See” and its variations including “sees,” “seeing,” and “see’t” appear 56 
times in the 1622 quarto edition and 64 times in the 1623 folio. “Eye” and “eyes” appear 
a total of 21 times in both editions, “look” and its variants 38 times in Q, 43 in F, and 
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interested in the thematic significance of puns and innuendo. See Christopher Ricks, 
“The Moral and Poetic Structure of The Changeling,” Essays in Criticism 10 (1961): 
290-306. 
80 One related compound, “eyesight” also appears in 2.1.19. In the line, Beatrice is 
referring specifically to “intellectual eyesight” and links to the “eyes of judgment” 
(2.1.13) as opposed to physical eye sight.   
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“sight” only four times in both. The infamous “ocular” appears only once, deployed 
purposely by Shakespeare via Othello. As with The Changeling, sight-related words 
occur throughout the play’s five acts and are spoken by a variety of characters, though 
unsurprisingly, Othello and Iago are the most concerned with vision-based language.  
Word The Changeling 
1653 
Othello 1622 Q Othello 1623 F 
See (and variants) 66 56 64 
Eye(s)(n) 30 21 21 
Look(s) 32 38 43 
Sight 17 4 4 
Ocular 0 1 1 
Table 1: Occurrence of sight-related words in The Changeling and Othello 
Othello and The Changeling offer two very different epistemologies of vision. 
While both emphasize the visual as a means of knowledge gathering, the majority of 
visual evidence in Othello is either only described using ekphrastic details or heavily 
imbued with an outside narrative rather than existing on its own merits. In contrast, The 
Changeling experiments with visual truth with Beatrice-Joanna’s testing of the virginity 
potion and Isabella’s uncovering of her two suitors in disguise. In the case of Othello, 
Shakespeare introduces continued uncertainty, using Iago to gaslight Othello, 
Desdemona, Emilia and the audience as well, and offer a comparatively certain 
conclusion, whereas in The Changeling, Middleton and Rowley provide the 




characters. However, The Changeling ends with uncertainty—with more and more 
important events not being staged, or in the case of Beatrice and De Flores’s murderous 
rendezvous in the closet, deliberately withheld from the audience’s gaze.  
What complicates this emphasis on seeing and its ultimate relationship to truth is 
the conscious use of lying and rhetoric on behalf of characters achieving some dubious 
end. Whereas Othello’s Iago points to the real dangers of a rhetoric-based humanist 
system where words may literally supply and supplant reality, The Changeling’s 
Beatrice, De Flores, Antonio, and Franciscus show that language still retains that ability 
to shape reality even in a more empirical system. In contrast to what we have seen in 
previous chapters, the characters in these plays deliberately recreate the world around 
them through lying and linguistic manipulation, opting to fabricate evidence like the 
handkerchief and the virginity potion experiment. The physical evidence—the ocular 
proof—is transformed into a rhetorical performance wherein interpretation is pre-
packaged by the rhetorician and then accepted as fact by the observer, despite the 
objections of other characters and the audience. Where the two diverge is that in Othello, 
all evidence is rhetorical whereas in The Changeling, Middleton and Rowley provide 
several other types of evidence to stand in contrast to the lying and performativity. The 
effects on the audience are therefore distinct—in Othello, the word-based evidence 
becomes subject to constant speculation and skepticism that is only resolved at the play’s 
climax and denouement whereas in The Changeling, the mix of “concrete” visual 
evidence blended with the deliberate verbal performance gives the audience the feeling 




The major difference between the treatment of ocular proof in Othello and The 
Changeling is that Shakespeare transforms what should be the ocular into the verbal and 
rhetorical and that Middleton and Rowley transform what is supposed to be verbal into 
the visual. In Othello, we (that is, Othello himself and the audience) want visual 
evidence, but what we more often get are rhetorical moves and spoken set pieces that 
create internal images rather than images on the stage. What is the visual proof that 
Othello successfully uses to defend himself against charges from Brabantio that he has 
used witchcraft to seduce Desdemona? The proof is in Othello’s speech, both his lengthy 
narrative of how he won over his bride through stories and how he establishes himself as 
a warrior rather than a rhetorician. Identities, especially those of Othello, Desdemona, 
and Iago, are constructed verbally—“honest Iago” resonates throughout the play due in 
no small part to Iago’s own insistence that he is honest. In contrast, The Changeling 
seeks to transform what is said into the visual action of the play. In his commentary on 
the scene where Beatrice-Joanna ostensibly agrees to pay De Flores’s price for his 
murder of Alonso, Christopher Ricks identifies a provocative question at the center of 
the play: 
Beatrice sums up the play at an elementary and moralistic level when she says, 
“Murder I see is follow’d by more sins” (3.4.164). One sin is inextricable from 
another. But how does Middleton convert his moral commonplace into a drama, 
into an enactment rather than a sententia?82 
                                                 




Ricks’s answer is “puns,” specifically double meanings. While I agree with Ricks’s 
answer, this question may also be addressed by how puns and maxims are performed 
throughout the play in addition to (or instead of) being spoken. Beatrice-Joanna’s 
exclamation, “Murder, I see, is followed by more sins,” states exactly what we (and she) 
will literally see in the coming lines. The sins, which include premarital sex, adultery, 
arson, and more murder, along with their after-effects and final judgment, are not just 
things that are spoken of, they are things that happen.   
This is not to say that the visual is unimportant in Othello or that the verbal is 
somehow lacking in The Changeling—these are still publicly performed plays, after all. 
Othello’s black body is a focal point that the play pivots around, and Desdemona’s white 
body lingers on stage for several lines after her death. The handkerchief prop is another 
particularly noteworthy image. Likewise, The Changeling deploys extensive wordplay 
and includes descriptions (rather than stagings) of important scenes such as when 
Jasperino tells Alsemero about De Flores and Beatrice-Joanna copulating in the next 
room or when Isabella informs her husband Alibius that his madhouse has been 
infiltrated by two noblemen attempting to seduce her.  
Ocular proof, regardless of whether it is verbally constructed or physically before 
a person, proves to be not just an inert “thing.” In keeping with larger early modern 
medical and performance theories, things seen have an affective power all their own, and 
this power ultimately pushes the tragic characters to their respective demises. Othello’s 
imagined horror prompts him to completely shift how he categorizes Desdemona and 




“love at first sight,” an affective move that causes them not to see the world as it actually 
is but how they would prefer it to be.  
The effects that these two approaches engender allow for two very different 
audience experiences. In Shakespeare’s play, the audience becomes like Othello himself, 
knowing yet not really knowing everything. In Othello, we are looking for evidence of 
an event that happened in the past, and hence the only evidence we truly have to go by 
are testimonies from reliable sources or circumstantial evidence like manifestations of 
guilt through dream confessions, the location of missing cloths, or the accused speaking 
highly for each other. How can know things that cannot be seen? In The Changeling, we 
are more akin to Beatrice-Joanna (or Isabella in her plot) where we know or think we 
know all the evidence because we quite literally see it. The difference between Beatrice-
Joanna and Isabella in this regard is that Beatrice-Joanna leaps to action based on her 
emotional states and then has to catch up with the physical consequences whereas 
Isabella is more controlled, opting not to manipulate the situation until she has acquired 
all the important evidence and confessions, before reporting her findings to the 
appropriate patriarchal authority. 
 
The Demand for and Distrust of Ocular Proof 
 
We may be tempted to begin in the middle of things—at the point where Othello 
demands “ocular proof” of Desdemona’s infidelity from Iago and where Beatrice-Joanna 




These two scenes act as synecdoche of the larger issues with vision, evidence, rhetoric, 
and knowledge that exist occur throughout the play. But though these scenes are the 
major set pieces, the plays each build to these moments and create worlds that blend 
visual and rhetorical epistemologies. Where we need to begin is at the plays’ openings 
where Shakespeare, Middleton, and Rowley quite literally set the stage for how 
knowledge will work and be manipulated for the remainder of the play.  
 Initially at least, both plays start with shared assumptions of visual proof—that 
is, evidence that one obtains through looking is reliable, regardless of who is speaking. 
Yet as the scenes continue, both Alsemero and Iago reveal a less idealized version of this 
kind of evidence.  Although Shakespeare saves the infamous “ocular proof” for later in 
the play, Othello exhibits the desire for visual evidence and its ultimate lack of real-
world importance within the first thirty lines. Surprisingly, the speaker who first evokes 
visual evidence is none other than Iago. Prior to the play’s beginning, Othello promoted 
Michael Cassio to lieutenant, an action that flusters Iago to the point where he seeks 
revenge. Iago, who presents Cassio as someone who neither “never set a squadron in the 
field / Nor the division of a battle knows / More than a spinster” (1.1.22-24), juxtaposes 
the new lieutenant with his (Iago’s) own active military service. Yet what is important 
about this military service is not simply that Iago has practical, real-world experience in 
comparison to Cassio who has read several books on the subject, it’s that Othello has 
seen Iago in action for himself, as Iago complains: “And I—of whom his eyes had seen 
the proof, / At Rhodes, at Cypress, and on other grounds, / Christened and heathen—




the term “proof” in the play, and here the proof is declaratively visual. Iago further links 
visual proof with military action, two items which he claims to value over what others 
have said in books. Othello has obtained visual evidence of Iago’s battle prowess, but 
this is not enough for him to win the promotion.   
 Middleton and Rowley’s opening lines of The Changeling are also just as 
resolutely visual, though the visions it presents differ from Iago’s musings. The play 
begins with Alsmero, a Valencian nobleman, reflecting on the first time he saw the 
beautiful Beatrice-Joanna at a Spanish temple. He remarks, “’Twas in the temple where I 
first beheld here, / And now again the same” (1.1.1-2). On the practical level, Alsemero 
informs the audience of the setting, albeit more subtly than say the Prologue of Romeo 
and Juliet or the Chorus of Henry V. He also illustrates immediately how affective a 
vision can be to the point that it consumes a character’s thoughts. Of course, in the lines 
that follow, Alsemero does not actually describe any of Beatrice-Joanna’s beauty and 
instead treats the location of their meeting as auspicious approval of their mutual 
affection. Visual proof and its effects are only valid, Alsmero acknowledges, when an 
outside legitimizing force (such as the Church) approves of it.  
Furthermore, Alsemero’s reaction to the sight of Beatrice-Joanna proves to be 
transformative in way that multiple concrete versions were not for Othello. Jasperino, 
Alsemero’s friend, notes this change, remarking that just the previous day he was in his 
typical haste to leave. He remarks, “I never knew / Your inclinations to travels at a pause 
/ With any cause to hinder it, till now” (1.1.26-28) and that Alsemero’s musing in the 




(1.1.43-44). These lines quickly reveal information about Alsemero and the affective 
power of sight that we do not see with Iago and Othello. In speaking of “yesterday,” 
Jasperino orients the audience to understand that Alsemero has not been pining after a 
woman he has known for some time—this is a woman that he has only recently met. He 
also reveals that sights are powerful and potentially dangerous in their ability to affect 
the individual viewer and overwhelm their reason. In this case, Jasperino further reminds 
his companion of his prior commitment to ration, stating that “Lover I’m sure you’re 
none, the stoic / Was found in you long ago” (1.1.36-27). This direct reference to 
Stoicism, which as Michael Neill explains, “taught the need to subject all emotions to 
the absolute control of reason,”83 further illustrates that a vision can overwhelm faculties 
that, prior to an affective sight, are resolutely rational. The Alsemero we first meet is not 
the same Alsemero that his long-time companion knows.  
The warning against the dangers of affective visions becomes abundantly clear 
later in the scene. Whereas Othello tends to show the audience the effects of rhetoric 
(especially in the trial scene) and its ability to create an internal visual, The Changeling 
opts for the more direct stating of the moral. After we see her meet for the first time on 
stage with Alsemero, Beatrice-Joanna cautions her new lover not to hold too much stock 
in what he sees: 
 Our eyes are sentinels unto our judgements, 
 And should give certain judgement what they see; 
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 But they are rash sometimes, and tell us wonders 
 Of common things, which when our judgements find, 
 They can then check the eyes, and call them blind. (1.1.71-76) 
As Beatrice-Joanna notes, vision is the primary way for an individual to intake evidence 
before making decisions or drawing conclusions. Ideally, eyes serve the superior Reason 
as part of an inductive, empirical mode of viewing the world. Of course, that is not 
always the case, for eyes sometimes surpass Reason and judge on their own, often seeing 
what they want to see or projecting more exciting images than the mundane object in 
view. Indeed, as Andrew Stott explains, “Vision was a censored sense in the second half 
of the sixteenth century. Iconoclastic destruction of Catholic church imagery, and 
Protestantism’s privileging of internalized religious meditation, meant that visual 
sensuality became closely associated with deceit and error.”84 The Changeling was 
composed after the Reformation raised these doubts about visual evidence; Beatrice-
Joanna’s warning echoes the potential double-edged sword of ocular proof and its 
dangers. 
Beatrice-Joanna’s relationship with physical versus intellectual or internal 
eyesight remains fraught for the remainder of the play, particularly with how she (quite 
literally) views her romantic suitors. Consistent with her warning to Alsemero to be 
wary of eyesight, Beatrice-Joanna reinforces the importance of judgment. However, as 
Alsemero justifies his affections by linking Beatrice-Joanna to holiness, purity, and the 
                                                 




church, Beatrice-Joanna reasons that her affection for Alsemero through other kinds of 
verification. Most notably, after sending Jasperino off with a message for her new lover 
(and hearing one line of dialogue from the friendly messenger), Beatrice-Joanna asserts 
that Alsmero has shown great wisdom in his choice of friends. She concludes, “It is a 
sign he makes his choice with judgement. / Then I appear in nothing more approved / 
Than making choice of him” (2.1.7-9). At first glance, her reading of the situation is 
reasonable enough. Alsemero associates with good people, and thus her choice is 
justified. Yet as Lois Bueler explains, “Beatrice Joanna’s conversation is from first 
almost to last an alternately self-congratulatory and frantic attempt to apply logic to her 
situation.”85  The logic that she wants to apply is inductive; in this moment, Beatrice-
Joanna attempts to build to a conclusion based her experiences and knowledge. But what 
she is actually doing is looking for evidence that already fits within her worldview. 
When she speaks about Alsemero’s judgment, she makes it less about his sterling 
qualities and more about her wisdom in choosing a lover.  
Beatrice-Joanna’s thinking on matters of intellectual versus sensory seeing is 
further complicated by her claims that, based upon the evidence that Alsmero has a 
friend willing to deliver letters between them, she loves with her reason rather than her 
emotions. She proclaims the superiority of reason and internal judgment over visual 
evidence while simultaneously making seeing into a metaphor for reason: 
Methinks I love now with the eyes of judgement, 
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And see the way to merit, clearly see it. 
A true deserver like a diamond sparkles— 
In darkness you may see him, that’s in absence, 
Which is the greatest darkness falls on love; 
Yet is he best discerned then 
With intellectual eyesight. (2.1.13-18) 
Despite her earlier admonitions that sight is particularly dangerous, she nevertheless uses 
metaphors of sight, eyes, and seeing to make her point about how she loves properly. 
Beatrice-Joanna distinguishes between eyes that conventionally see and eyes that see 
figuratively. Armed “with the eyes of judgement” (2.1.13) and “with intellectual 
eyesight” (2.1.18), our heroine claims that her love is more real and serious because it is 
not based on purely sensory information such as Alsemero’s attractiveness or clothing. 
Yet this reading is undercut by the abundance of additional language that emphasizes 
seeing even in-between the claims of reasonable eyeballs, as well as her repeated 
repulsion at De Flores’s physical form.   
 Shakespeare’s treatment of ocular proof is less didactic in terms of warning the 
audience not to trust what they see. Rather, he does not present any particular problem 
with visual evidence, per se. What he does is transform the visual into the rhetorical and 
the verbal and how other forms of evidence can tap into the affective power of vision 
without explicitly being seen by the audience or the characters themselves. 
Characters in Othello want certainty; they want replicable, visual evidence that 




humanist in that they quickly push aside these levels of certainty for something that 
appears the same but ultimately can only support possibility rather than actuality. 
Indeed, what counts as evidence comes into question early in the play during the scene 
where the Duke adjudicates between Desdemona’s father Brabanzio and her new 
husband, Othello. We learn two things from this scene regarding the use of evidence that 
will hold for the remainder of the play: firstly, proof need not fully confirm an 
explanation, only render it probable; and secondly, rhetorical, particularly narrative or 
ekphrastic, proof may replace sensory evidence.  
As the accuser, Brabanzio speaks first, arguing consistently that Desdemona has 
acted counter to her timid nature and thus was somehow ensorcelled by her new 
husband. Brabanzio’s narrative, which he repeats with varying levels of specificity three 
times throughout the trial scene, establishes Desdemona as “never bold, / Of spirit so 
still and quiet that her motion / Blushed at herself” (1.3.94-96) and “a maid, so tender, 
fair, and happy, / So opposite to marriage that she shunned / the wealthy curled darling 
of our nation” (1.3.66-68). Desdemona, as her father paints her, is overtly innocent, 
meek, and not normally governed by strong passions. Her elopement therefore is an act 
that is antithetical to her normal behavior and indeed her very nature. Brabanzio 
attributes her sudden change not to love or that Desdemona is an individual capable of 
making her own decisions, but to something unnatural or supernatural. This unnatural 
witchcraft, curiously enough, takes the form of “spells and medicines bought of 
mountebanks” (1.3.61) or “some mixtures powerful o’er the blood, / Or with some dram 




hoodwinking not a particular enchantment, demon summoning, or magic associated with 
Moors but to human-made potions that Othello did not even mix himself.  
The audience and the Duke adjudicating the debate between Brabanzio and 
Othello quickly see that the upset father has made an unconvincing argument. The Duke 
does not take Brabanzio’s accusation as appropriate evidence, stating that the entire 
accusation is simply improvable in its current state. He remarks, “To vouch this is no 
proof / Without more wider and more overt text / Than these thin habits and poor 
likelihoods / Of modern seeming do prefer against him” (1.3.106-9). Here the Duke, and 
by extension, the play itself acknowledges that not only are there multiple kinds of 
evidence but also that some evidence types have more weight than other types. 
Moreover, the Duke is already aware of Othello’s character and had summoned him to 
an ad hoc council in the middle of the night not to discuss his elopement or address 
Brabanzio’s accusations, but to deal with a Turkish naval invasion of Cypress. Othello’s 
ethos, established through his “services…done the signory” (1.1.18) and his lineage 
“from men of royal siege” (1.2.22), is also on the Duke’s mind when he hears 
Brabanzio’s complaint. We will see this again later in the play when Iago begins 
constructing an elaborate narrative for the investigation he and Othello will conduct in 
order to discover Desdemona’s supposed infidelity.  
This debate scene demonstrates that we are supposed to understand how certain 
methods of evidence—in this specific instance, testimony—can be more or less 
effective. Othello defends himself, using a set of rhetorical techniques that make his 




concrete. Indeed, Othello demonstrates his rhetorical agility before even beginning his 
actual testimony. Prior to Brabanzio’s testimony, Othello informs his listeners that he is 
a man of action and not a man of rhetoric who, until recently, has spent the bulk of his 
life on the battle field. “Rude am I in my speech,” he insists, “And little blessed with the 
soft phrase of peace, / For since these arms of mine had seven years pith, / Till now 
some nine moons wasted” (1.3.81-84). Yet in these lines and the monologue that 
follows, Othello’s speech is not coarse or common at all; in fact, it is downright 
eloquent. Several scholars have observed this strange juxtaposition and commented on 
what Othello may mean when he claims he is rhetorically inferior, while his actual 
speech conveys the opposite.86 Thomas Docherty remarks that Othello’s eloquence is 
related to his “directness”: “He claims to be untutored, uncivilized, given more to the 
directness of physical action and violence that he is to poetic or even duplicitous 
language, but his speech undermines such a claim, and does so precisely because of its 
directness.”87 Docherty would have us understand that Othello represents the contrast 
between words and deeds—Othello, so the logic goes, is all deeds, and his language 
reflects that.  
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Except for when it doesn’t. Othello’s rhetorical move is a classic understatement 
that exploits his audience’s expectations towards him as an outsider and a decorated 
warrior. Othello continually repeats that his previous actions have already established 
him as a credible and indispensable source to Venice. In response to Iago’s warning that 
Brabanzio will take him to court to force him to divorce Desdemona, Othello remarks 
assuredly, “Let him do his spite. / My services which I have done the signory / Shall out-
tongue his complaints” (1.2.17-19). Here Othello already anticipates the power of 
appealing to his deeds, and how those proofs serve as more compelling evidence than a 
verbal complaint. By aligning himself against ornamentation and professing that he is a 
less capable rhetorician, Othello exploits the audience’s (original and the listeners on-
stage) expectations that he is a warrior and a Moor in order to maintain his innocence. 
He is not the same as Brabanzio or the members of the Senate who use words to defend 
themselves—at least that is what he claims.  
Othello’s central challenge in this play is distinguishing particular things (res) 
from the rhetorical structures that define them (verba). This issue is not only particular to 
Othello, it is endemic to the play as a whole and how critics have often judged it. Marion 
Trousdale explains, “Othello represents in terms of stock, a Moor; in terms of place, the 
commander of an army for the Venetian state; in terms of figure, one who loved not 
wisely but too well. These all define him. They define him in terms of verbal categories 
that are places of invention as well as definition.”88 In his understated appeal, Othello 
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manages to lean into not just his on-stage audience, but the real audience as well. At first 
glance, Othello and his appeal to “rudeness” could easily be accepted by the original 
audience as a given. But what ends up happening is that the off-stage audience ends up 
needing to recontextualize what they thought they knew in light of new rhetorical proof. 
In addition to his ironic understatement establishing himself as simpler and 
therefore more honest, Othello relies on further testimony in order to make himself more 
credible to the Senate. Prior to his official testimony, even before he suggests that his 
language is somehow lacking, Othello insists that the court interview Desdemona, 
offering to forfeit his military position if her testimony reveals him to be “foul” 
(1.3.117). With this choice, Othello martials outside evidence and presents his 
confidence in his own innocence. It also gives Othello additional evidence to support his 
case. Whereas Brabanzio could only deploy his own testimony, Othello offers two 
testimonies along with subtle (yet explicit) control of his ethos.  
With all this buildup, Othello’s actual speech is a masterclass in storytelling and 
rhetoric, though its reliability, particularly with the references to cannibals and “men 
whose heads / Do grow beneath their shoulders” (1.3.143-44), may strike some modern 
readers as exaggeration or outright lying. However, that Othello evokes these odd 
creatures ends up easing his audience’s skepticism rather than exacerbating it. There are 
several reasonable explanations here for why Othello mentions these creatures. The 
reference may be literal—Othello, in his many journeys, has seen some things. The 
chest-faces themselves, called Blemmyae, have classical connotations and appear in 




Discovery of the Large, Rich, and Beautiful Empire of Guiana (1596) and the popular 
fourteenth-century The Voyages and Travels of Sir John Mandeville (printed in English 
in 1582). While I think the references are intended to be literal and that an early modern 
audience would certainly find such creatures strange but not necessarily fabricated, a less 
contentious explanation would be that Othello is fabricating for rhetorical effect. Having 
seen the effect his stories have on Brabanzio and especially Desdemona, it would make 
sense for him to continue embellishing in order to gain her affections.  
Despite any modern doubts we might have about the legitimacy of the details, the 
core of Othello’s narrative—that he won over Desdemona by telling her affective stories 
from his youth and travels that generated her sympathy—does not merit much suspicion. 
While the particulars of the story are never actually confirmed (Desdemona does not 
actually state whether or not she fell in love with Othello by pitying his difficult life 
experiences), Desdemona acts as if she is in a consensual partnership. Upon hearing 
Othello’s explanation, the satisfied Duke tellingly remarks: “I think this [Othello’s] tale 
would win my daughter, too” (1.3.170). In this moment, the Duke substitutes his 
daughter for Desdemona, reckoning them both in the same category as “young, 
unmarried women.” The Duke uses not his knowledge of Desdemona but that of his 
daughter to determine the probability of Othello’s claim that he won his bride through 
her sympathy for his pains and the quality of his tragic storytelling.  
Brabanzio attempts to follow the construction of the syllogism. This logical form 
consists of at least two premises, a major premise that states a general accepted truth and 




is about. The syllogism also contains a conclusion which links the two by using a term 
from each. The classic example of the syllogism is the following: 
All men are mortal. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.  
Following this form, syllogisms may be valid and/or sound. To test for validity (which is 
required to determine whether or not it is also sound), we must see if the conclusion can 
be derived solely from the stated premises, regardless of whether the premises are true. 
The above example is thus valid. If the syllogism is valid, we may test for soundness. To 
be “sound,” the premises of the syllogism must be true. The syllogism above, therefore, 
is sound.  
With this information, let us test Brabanzio’s reasoning. His arguments may be 
summarized as follows: 
Desdemona’s nature is of a meek, timid, and subservient daughter.  
Desdemona married the scary-looking Othello without her father’s consent or 
knowledge. 
Therefore, Desdemona acted counter to her nature.  
 
Desdemona acted counter to her nature by marrying Othello. 
Therefore, witchcraft. 
Let us take the first example. In this form, Brabanzio’s argument is neither valid nor 




Desdemona is just that, a claim about Desdemona rather than say, all (or no or some) 
daughters, Venetian women, or Shakespearean heroines. In each of his three speeches 
where he argues that Othello bewitched his daughter, Brabanzio continually refers 
explicitly to her. The argument also contains several premises, which if separated out, 
somewhat work as direct counters to the major premise on Desdemona’s nature. Still, 
while not a perfect syllogism by any means, Brabanzio attempts to appropriate the form 
as a way to understand what has just happened to him. The problem becomes when he 
jumps a few too many steps in determining what caused Desdemona’s alleged change of 
heart. There can be a variety of reasons for why a person may change their mind, even if 
we buy that anyone’s character is consistent to begin with as both Brabanzio and Othello 
do here and elsewhere in the play.  
 The Duke’s ready acceptance of Othello’s testimony may confuse a modern 
reader—there is not a lot of hard evidence to support Othello or his reluctant father-in-
law. However, as both Katharine Eisaman Maus and Barbara Shapiro note in their 
separate discussions of law in England during the early modern period, these types of 
proofs were acceptable in jury trials.89 Eisaman Maus explains the late sixteenth century 
English attitude toward evidence of crimes in comparison to the rest of Europe:   
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On the Continent, an elaborate set of rules strictly prescribed the kinds and 
amount of evidence necessary for conviction. Two eyewitnesses, or a 
confession—which could be obtained under torture—were ordinarily required for 
conviction. In England, by contrast, evidentiary rules remained loose, almost 
chaotic…English courts made no rules about the admissibility of evidence, no 
qualitative distinction among kinds of proof, until well into the seventeenth 
century. The power to convince the jury was all that mattered.90 
While Eisaman Maus is spot-on in her comparison, and I agree with her larger 
arguments on how the English system of law impacts Othello, the juxtaposition of the 
two systems implies that the Europe’s judges were operating within a more rigorous and 
therefore more just system. England’s seemingly haphazard approach makes more sense 
as a response to the calculated Continental system. As Shapiro explains, Continental law 
was the Roman-canon inquisition process that was run by professional judges rather than 
lay people. While the system nobly sought strong proofs and maintained high standards 
of proof, “proof” became a heavily quantified system:  
Continental procedure was based on rigidly specified rules as to the quality and 
quantity of proof. There were rules giving prescribed weight to testimony based 
on the number, status, age, and sex of the witnesses…Every evidentiary element 
was assigned a set value, which, when added together, either constituted or did 
not constitute a full proof. One “unexceptional” witness, for example, constituted 
                                                 




a “half proof”; a doubtful one, less than half. One doubtful and one unexceptional 
witness, therefore, added up to something more than a half-proof but not a full 
proof.91  
The English jury system sought to remove this formal accounting aspect of proof and 
instead focused other types of evidence that may not have been counted (but probably 
should have, given the circumstances). Of course, any system that leans too far one way 
by making the process either so mechanical that it’s easy to game the system with choice 
witnesses or so loose that all evidence becomes equal, will face problems. Othello 
represents this tension here in the trial scene and elsewhere where the man himself 
begins his own pursuit of a higher-ranked form of evidence but must eventually settle for 
circumstantial proof that is only proof because someone he trusted said it was strong 
enough. 
 
Making the Verbal Visual   
 
In both Othello and The Changeling, characters seek confirmation, though they 
attempt to do so in inverse ways, using deduction and induction, respectively. In the 
earlier acts of Othello, characters such as Othello and Brabanzio begin with overlying 
assumptions and establish mental evidence that supports those assumptions. They 
operate more on the probability, the likelihood of something being true rather than 
                                                 




relying on specific, concrete examples that they can witness. These internal examples are 
then placed in syllogistic systems that reinforce their power as truth, even when they are 
demonstrably false. This method is ultimately deductive, that is, Othello and company 
usually start with the overarching premise and read all subsequent evidence in light of 
that premise. In contrast, characters in The Changeling follow a more inductive mode of 
operations, relying on individual pieces of evidence to build to an interpretation.   
 Othello’s reliance on the deductive mode, rhetoric, and the mindset of late 
Renaissance humanism manifests itself most clearly in scenes where Iago presents 
multiple kinds of circumstantial evidence for Desdemona’s supposed infidelity. A 
common move in Iago’s playbook is to ask a question or make a quick comment on a 
given situation that implies that he knows more than he is letting on, and then 
immediately dismissing his comment as irrelevant or unimportant. When they happen 
upon Desdemona speaking with the disgraced Cassio, Othello asks two questions of Iago 
that he answers in the negative: 
IAGO. Ha! I like not that. 
OTHELLO. What dost thou say? 
IAGO. Nothing, my lord, or if—I know not what. 
OTHELLO. Was not that Cassio parted from my wife? 
IAGO. Cassio, my lord? No, sure. I cannot think it 
That he would steal away so guilty-like 




Iago simultaneously offers his read on the visual evidence (Cassio’s rapid departure after 
speaking with Desdemona once he sees Othello and Iago) while outwardly denying that 
he believes what he is implying. He frames himself as if he is either unsure of what he 
has just witnessed, cannot believe what he has just witnessed, or that he knew all along 
that Cassio was up to no good, and he’s upset that his good friend Othello must witness 
it. All of these options coexist in the lines where he denies that he understands what is 
going on, leaving Othello to parse out what he thinks Iago means. Iago’s choice to not 
overtly state what he thinks also works to give Othello the illusion of control; it lets 
Othello believe that he has drawn the appropriate conclusions himself rather than 
listened to someone else.  
Iago’s further reactions to the visual prompt of Desdemona and Cassio’s meeting 
along with his feigned reticence to provide his inner thoughts prove to be effective tools 
for establishing his credibility as Othello interprets these actions as ones born out of care 
and fear, and hence more “honest” than had Iago just outright told him that he suspected 
that Cassio and Desdemona were involved. The initial withholding of evidence also 
enables Othello to transform thought into something just as physical and visual as what 
he literally sees: 
 “Think, my lord?” Alas, thou echo’st me 
As if there were some monster in thy thought 
Too hideous to be shown. Thou dost mean something. 
I heard thee even now thou “lik’st not that” 




And when I told thee he was of my counsel, 
Of my course of wooing, thou cried’st “Indeed?” 
And didst contract and purse thy brow together 
As if thou then hadst shut up in thy brain 
Some horrible conceit. If thou dost love me, 
Show me thy thought. (3.3.105-115) 
Taking Iago’s words as evidence, Othello quotes Iago three times throughout this 
response, first directly repeating Iago’s preceding line (which was also repeating 
Othello), and then citing Iago’s reactions to information. Othello interprets Iago’s 
repetition as reticence to reveal information and his verbal and nonverbal reactions to be 
spontaneous and more accurate reflections of what Iago thinks. Then, Othello transforms 
Iago’s unspoken thoughts into visual images, describing them as a “monster… / Too 
hideous to be shown” (3.3.104-105), and asking Iago to literally “show me thy thought” 
(3.3.115). A person’s thoughts, if that person be trustworthy, can be evidence as strong 
as if one witnessed something with their own eyes. That the image is somehow also 
unseeable, literally “too hideous to be shown,” also adds to its mystique and, for Othello 
at least, its reliability. 
Indeed, what ultimately makes Iago’s arguments so convincing for Othello is that 
he does not start with evidence. Rather, he begins with insinuation and a framework that 
Othello adopts in examining the actions of Desdemona and Cassio. This insinuation is 
something always either somewhat true or at least of concern for Othello and thus 




much in his power…that he really can be honest in stating part of the truth, which causes 
Othello to trust him even more.”92 As he slowly leads Othello to suspect Desdemona’s 
marital fidelity, Iago is exceedingly careful not to offer any specific proofs and certainly 
not any concrete visual evidence. Rather, he spends his lines establishing his credibility 
as a like-minded individual who, while not perfect, only wants what is best for his friend 
and not to hurt him. He establishes his credibility through a variety of means, first by 
being resistant to reveal incriminating information, then by ascribing the flaws that he 
wishes to project on Othello to himself—he calls himself “jealous” and susceptible to 
dark thoughts in private. Iago also places the burden of proof on Othello, enjoining him 
to investigate Cassio and Desdemona for himself. Finally, he uses syllogistic reasoning 
by addressing Desdemona not as a person, but as a Venetian woman.  
In his description of Iago’s use of reason, Terence Hawkes identifies two major 
ways of reasoning and knowing for the Elizabethans, divided into ratio superior and 
ratio inferior.  Of the former, Hawkes explains, there is “no ratiocination is involved in 
it, and no discursive thought-process is required; all knowledge is infused in a moment, 
in an intuitive flash, and as a result of literally inspired vision of the Godhead and the 
life of the spirit is achieved.”93 This type of knowledge is akin to the prophetic 
knowledge discussed in Chapter 5—it is instantaneous, divinely sanctioned, and wholly 
unprovable by any other sense. It is simply certain and absolute. Drawing from John 
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Wilkins, Matthew Hale, Robert Boyle, and John Locke, among others, Shapiro outlines a 
schema of different kinds of knowledge. At the top is type of God’s knowledge and 
below are “three or four human categories” that included logic, sensory experience, 
beliefs, and opinions.94 These sub-categories, particularly those emphasizing logic and 
discursive reasoning, entail the ratio inferior that Hawkes identifies. This Aristotelian 
division serves as a distinction between an unchanging divine knowledge and a 
contingent human knowledge.  
In this second sense, Othello is a remarkably rational figure, both in terms of how 
collected he is at the beginning of the play, especially when dragged out in the middle of 
the night for a trial, and how he reasons through different events. Yet his reason quickly 
cracks in the face of any uncertainty or contradiction to his overall perception. And this 
need for absolute certainty is at odds with the late Renaissance world which noted the 
discrepancies between appearances and realities, as Susan Schreiner notes, places 
Othello at risk for Iago’s manipulations as “Othello could not endure doubt and 
skepticism. Othello demanded certainty at all costs.”95 Iago, who thrives at being what 
he is not has no problem with discrepancies or when lived experience does not match 
expectation.  
Iago exploits Othello’s rationality and reliance on logical reasoning to a 
terrifying degree. He takes the logically tight proof structures of syllogisms and provides 
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a series of circumstantial pieces of evidence that can be read in light of the premises he 
promotes. Hawkes elaborates on the potential danger of this type of reasoning and how 
Othello manifests that danger: 
The “lower” [sensory and rational] reason…does little more than place an 
“explicable” and predictable pattern of its own over certain events (the 
eavesdropping scene is the climax of this process). The world that such a reason 
reveals is not the true world, but is a product of the reasoner; it cannot compare 
with, or explain the whole cosmos that Othello's and Desdemona's love involves 
in itself. Nevertheless, in the grip of Iago’s reasoning, Othello slips into easy 
categorization; Desdemona becomes for him the familiar “Venetian wife,” the 
“super-subtle Venetian” that Iago had said she was.96 
In other words, Iago encourages Othello to think in terms of larger premises and uses 
pieces of explicit evidence (testimonies, staged meetings, and planted evidence) to serve 
as verification of that premise. Hawkes’s above reading of Iago’s persuasion matches 
with other interpretations of Iago’s rhetorical finesse. James Hirsh in particular links this 
type of reasoning to syllogistic logic, identifying “a double syllogism: (1) Venetian 
women are deceptive; Desdemona is a Venetian woman; therefore, Desdemona is 
deceptive; (2) Desdemona deceived her father; people are consistent; therefore, 
Desdemona is deceptive.”97 People are incapable, in Othello’s eyes at least, of being 
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wholly consistent in their appearances and actions. Iago knows this, and uses Othello’s 
unshakable faith in this form of knowing to both persuade Othello of Desdemona’s guilt 
and Iago’s honesty.  
Proof and what counts as proof continues to be a concern for the remainder of the 
play, and nowhere is this clearer than when Othello demands that Iago literally bring him 
visual evidence. Ocular proof of something like infidelity in an age before camera, 
however, is hard to come by. Othello does not call for explicit proof until after Iago has 
planted the conclusion into his head, and for a moment, it seems like he may have seen 
through Iago’s scheme: 
 Villain, be sure thou prove my love a whore; 
 Be sure of it! Give me the ocular proof 
 …………………………………………. 
 Make me to see’t, or at the least so prove it 
 That the probation bear no hinge nor loop 
 To hang a doubt on, or woe upon thy life! (3.3.356-7, 361-63) 
Othello’s call for evidence is aggressively visual—he demands “ocular proof” and to 
“see’t”; however, even in these quick lines, Othello considers backtracking from visual 
evidence and would be content with the removal of any doubt. With this 
acknowledgement, Othello’s epistemological grip starts to slip. The only way for him to 
know for sure that Desdemona is cuckholding him is to see the action. Proving the 
negative (that is, that Desdemona and Cassio are not having dalliances) is impossible 




As he torments Othello in the third act, Iago articulates this challenge while 
simultaneously creating ekphrastic images that substitute for visual proof. The image 
begins with a simple question: “Would you, the supervisor, grossly gape on, / Behold her 
topped?” (3.3.400-401). Othello, realizing that visual evidence of the event would mean 
actively witnessing his cuckolding, lets out a distressed exclamation as Iago illustrates an 
even more graphic and less likely scenario likening Desdemona and Cassio to animals 
and fools: 
 It’s impossible you should see this, 
 Were they as prime as goats, as hot as monkeys, 
 As salt as wolves in pride, and fools as gross 
 As ignorance made drunk. (3.3.407-10) 
In these lines, Iago simultaneously illustrates the impossibility of seeing the act—
Othello would not want to see it, and even if he could; but he also, in good Iagian 
fashion, gives Othello a rhetorically constructed visual. That is, Iago uses ekphrasis, or 
the verbal creation of a particularly vivid and affective image as a clever simulacrum for 
what Othello demands. The image seems to be more than sufficient for Othello to 
believe Iago though he never literally sees any of the things Iago describes with his 
physical eyes, though he does seem to have trouble ridding himself of that vision evoked 
in his mind’s eye. We can tell because of the later, less concrete proofs that Iago 
provides as well as Othello’s shift from requiring absolute certainty of Desdemona’s 




pivots on the double meanings of Othello’s demand for satisfaction: that is, the 
satisfaction of knowledge and sexual satisfaction. Marjorie Pryse elaborates:  
Othello feels as if he were beholding Cassio and Desdemona, and thus finds, in 
his fantasy, the mental satisfaction or “ocular proof” that he demands; at the 
same time, Iago’s mental picture is so vivid that it also cuts Othello completely 
from sexual satisfaction. Iago turns Othello into his own wife’s voyeur.98 
Pryse’s reading further illustrates the challenge of ocular proof and the creative way that 
Shakespeare incorporates it within the play. The effect of Iago’s verbal description 
reflects the affective potential of the physical sight itself, thus granting Othello the worst 
of both worlds. He visualizes but does not see; he suffers and it was all description. The 
result is certainly sad for Othello himself and thought-provoking for an audience who 
both feels Othello’s anguish and may question on the larger level how reliable another 
person’s word is. 
As James Knapp suggests, the knowledge practices staged within Othello are 
ultimately rhetorical: “the stories…possess a peculiar emphasis on the visible, a category 
that is identified (by the characters) with the language of objectivity grounded in a 
material, empiricist epistemology, but which the play reveals to be a category 
discursively constructed to suit the narrative logic of the characters.”99 The importance 
of ocular proof in Othello is not that it actually proves anything. Rather, the play 
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emphasizes that something that is seemingly concrete and material may nevertheless be 
adapted and shaped to other uses, depending on the needs, desires, and thoughts of the 
characters who encounter such materials. 
Iago’s description of Desdemona and Cassio actively having sex is not his only 
example of rhetorically-driven sensory proof. Immediately after Othello asks for “a 
living reason she is disloyal” as opposed to “being made to see’t,” Iago turns to other 
proofs that, even if they had been true, are hearsay. Iago reluctantly (but not really) 
describes a dream that Cassio had when they last shared a bed together: 
   I lay with Cassio lately 
 And, being troubled with a raging tooth, 
 I could not sleep. There are a kind of men 
 So loose of soul that in their sleeps will mutter 
 Their affairs: one of this kind is Cassio. 
 In sleep I heard him say, “Sweet Desdemona, 
 Let us be wary. Let us hide our loves.” 
 And then, sir, would he grip and wring my hand, 
 Cry, “O sweet creature!” then kiss me hard 
 As if he plucked up kisses by the roots  
 That grew upon my lips; laid his leg o’er my thigh, 
 And sighed, and kissed, and then cried, “Cursèd fate, 




Iago’s description of Cassio’s dream and confession serves multiple requirements for 
proof. Prior to the actual description, Iago reiterates his love for Othello as well as his 
own honesty, thus allying himself with his listener as he has done elsewhere. He also 
frames the encounter to subtly pre-dispose Othello to believe that what the imaginary 
Cassio says is true and the reflection of an inner thought. In a move reminiscent of Lady 
Macbeth’s sleepwalking, Iago’s Cassio provides the equivalent of a confession by both 
naming Desdemona and the crime that Othello most fears: “Let us hide our loves,” and 
concluding with a direct reference to Othello as “the Moor,” just to ensure that he was 
not talking about a different Desdemona. As a confession, there is little one could do to 
make it clearer other than have Cassio literally remark that he enjoyed the last time they 
had relations.  
Ironically, speaking a scene in the dark makes it far more visual, at least to 
Othello, than it would have been had he actually been there. Iago achieves this effect 
through other sensory input, including the imaginary senses of hearing, touch, and, 
depending on Othello’s imagination, taste. Cassio, according to Iago, outright confesses 
to desiring Desdemona, though he does not explicitly state that they have had sex. The 
actions that Iago describes, with himself substituting for Desdemona, certainly imply a 
level of erotic intimacy. Cassio kisses Iago twice, once “hard / As if he plucked up kisses 
by the roots / that grew upon my lips” (3.3.418-420), and then “laid his leg o’er my 
thigh” (3.3.420). Michael Shurgot reads this scene as explicitly homoerotic, explaining 




him in a situation that Iago wishes would actually occur.”100 Bruce Smith, in contrast, 
takes this scene and others where Iago remarks on the sexual form of another man to be 
representative of a threat to the homosocial order of which he is part. Smith contends, 
“In…the play’s verbal images we witness, not Iago’s repressed homosexuality, but his 
male bondedness. Whatever homoerotic feeling he manifests arises, not out of any 
‘repressed’ desires that set him apart from other men, but out of his self-definition as a 
man among men, as a solider among soldiers.”101 Regardless of Iago’s sexual attractions 
(and how these unrequited attractions affect his character and motivations), this moment 
strikes me more as a chance for Iago taunt Othello with the “things” (his is wife and his 
subordinate) that Cassio has supposedly usurped from him as opposed to Iago taking a 
moment to speak out an inner fantasy. By substituting his body, imagined or otherwise, 
with Desdemona’s in this narrative, Iago pretends to render himself vulnerable, and this 
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The Overabundance of Ocular Proof 
 
 By contrast, in The Changeling visual evidence is provided even where it was not 
expected or even desired. Upon reporting to Beatrice-Joanna that he has murdered 
Alonso, De Flores proffers Alonso’s ring finger and ring to her, an act that surprises her 
and reveals the material consequences of her demands: 
 BEATRICE-JOANNA. Is it done, then? 
 DE FLORES.   Piracquo is no more. 
BEATRICE-JOANNA. My joys start at mine eyes; our sweet’st delights 
 Are evermore born weeping. 
 DE FLORES. I’ve a token for you. 
 BEATRICE-JOANNA.   For me? 
 DE FLORES. But it was sent somewhat unwillingly: 
 I could not get the ring without the finger. 
 BEATRICE-JOANNA. Bless me! What hast thou done? (3.4.24-9) 
The questions bookending this passage—“Is it done, then?” and “What hast thou 
done?”—reveal Beatrice-Joanna’s two distinct mindsets. When she first probes De 
Flores, Beatrice-Joanna indicates to the audience that she truly wanted Alonso dead and 
that she owned her part in his death. However, once faced with the literal remnants of his 
corpse, Beatrice-Joanna reacts less with certainty and more with disgust and surprise. In 
hiring De Flores, she had intended to distance herself from both the physical reality and 




the severed ring finger and his demand for her virginity in payment for his services.102 
Edward Engelberg argues that “the main action of The Changeling ensues from 
Beatrice’s defective sight, her impulsive responses to the world which she can see but 
never visualize.”103 While I would disagree that Beatrice-Joanna’s sight is “defective”—
if anything it seems to be working a bit too well—Engleberg’s point about being able to 
see but not visualize holds considerably well for this scene. Although she had fully 
intended to have Alonso murdered, she had not thought about the reality of murder. 
Moreover, this scene emphasizes the power of visual proof: in theory, De Flores could 
have taken Alonso’s ring and proffered a finger (Alonso’s or another corpse’s) and let 
Alonso flee—and Beatrice-Joanna still would have believed him.  
 Alonso’s severed finger serves the same affective purpose as Iago’s descriptions 
of Desdemona’s and Cassio’s supposed coupling. Though one is literal and visible, and 
the other imaginary and visualized the effect is the same. Neither Othello nor Beatrice-
Joanna can bear to witness these sights, literally gasping and turning away. What makes 
the sights unbearable has to do with the bodies (or body parts) in question. The abject 
horror of the physical body, whether imagined or explicitly seen, works as a particularly 
effective piece of evidence that drives Othello and Beatrice-Joanna to more willingly 
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accept what they are being told, regardless of whether the claim they were given was 
true or not.  
 Alonso’s ring finger and Desdemona’s handkerchief serve parallel purposes in 
their plays. Both represent (accurately or not) a reprehensible crime that triggers the 
downward spiral of several characters, whether innocent or guilty. Where the two differ 
is the amount of context and knowledge the audience brings when interpreting these 
props, and how that knowledge compares to what the on-stage interpreters (Othello and 
Beatrice-Joanna) know. In The Changeling, Beatrice-Joanna knows that she has asked 
De Flores to kill Alonso; indeed, she expects the murder. However, she does not expect 
to confront that reality until De Flores reveals the severed digit. The audience, in 
contrast, does not need the body horror to prove that De Flores is a murderer, for they 
have already seen or read the previous scene where De Flores kills Alonso and cuts off 
his finger. The prop then serves as a catalyst for Beatrice-Joanna to begin coming to 
terms with her own role in the murder as well as a practical device for aligning Beatrice-
Joanna with the information that audience already knows from seeing the previous 
scene.  
 In Othello, the handkerchief operates similarly to Alonso’s severed finger. The 
handkerchief means two very different things for the wounded husband and the 
observing audience. The dramatic irony just happens to be more pronounced, with the 
horror coming not from dismemberment, but from the audience’s growing concern for 




attending both to its symbolic and material circumstances.104 In a series of escalating 
statements, Othello attributes more and more significance to this strawberry-spotted 
prop, first claiming that it was his first gift to Desdemona (3.3.441), an enchanted cloth 
given by an Egyptian charmer to his mother (3.4.53-58), and finally, after he has 
murdered Desdemona, “an antique token” that his father gave to his mother (5.2.223-
24).  
However, before he even informs the audience of the handkerchief’s 
significance, Othello sees the supposedly sacred artifact and tells Desdemona to leave it 
on the floor. After confessing to Iago that he does not trust his wife, a distraught Othello 
speaks faintly and complains of a headache (induced by his imagining of cuckold’s 
horns growing on his forehead). Desdemona, suggesting that his man pain comes from 
lack of sleep, offers to bind his head, presumably with her handkerchief, though that 
direction is not clear to a reader until a few lines later: 
DESDEMONA.   Why do you speak so faintly? 
Are you not well? 
OTHELLO. I have a pain upon my head here.   
DESDEMONA. Why, that’s with watching; twill away again. 
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Let me bind it hard, within this hour 
It will be well.  
OTHELLO. Your napkin is too little. 
Let it alone.  
[They drop the handkerchief.] 
Come, I’ll go in with you. 
DESDEMONA. I am very sorry that you are not well. 
 Exeunt. 
EMILIA. I am very glad I have found this napkin: 
This was her first remembrance from the Moor. (3.3.280-289, brackets 
original) 
Several modern editions, including the two most recent Norton editions and the 
Riverside Shakespeare, as well as some earlier eighteenth-century editions insert a stage 
direction indicating that the handkerchief falls, placed after Othello’s line that 
Desdemona’s “napkin is too little.” How exactly the dropping occurs or who’s 
responsible varies from edition to edition. The Norton’s addition (quoted in full above), 
for instance, “They drop the handkerchief,” keeps the details vague and presumably up 
to the director and actors, whereas the Riverside’s “He puts the handkerchief from him, 
and it drops”105 calls for Othello to actively resist the handkerchief, either dropping it 
himself or pushing it away so that Desdemona drops it. A London edition from 1771 
                                                 





places all the onus on Desdemona, asserting that “She drops her handkerchief.”106 
Although the stage direction is not include in any of the seventeenth-century editions, 
which include the 1623 folio and quartos from 1622, 1630, 1655, 1681, 1687, and 1695. 
The lack of stage directions here is not particularly odd, given that Shakespeare’s printed 
playbooks tended to lack all but the bare minimum of stage directions such as entrances 
and exits. Nevertheless, the emendation that editors have made post-1700s makes 
absolute sense. The handkerchief must be dropped so that Emilia can immediately pick it 
up.  
The manner in which the handkerchief is dropped may lead to several 
performances, some emphasizing Othello’s deliberate rejection and others seeing the 
initial loss and incidental to both Desdemona and Othello as they have other things on 
their minds. Harry Berger reads Othello’s command to “let it alone,” that is, leave the 
cloth on the floor, as “a double rejection. In his rejection of her offer to soothe him, she 
hears the message that she does not deserve and should not have the handkerchief. 
Dropping it may be read simultaneously as an act of obedience and as a contestatory 
gesture rejecting his rejection—he doesn’t deserve the love and fidelity her possession of 
the handkerchief symbolizes.”107 However, the actual reasoning for why both 
Desdemona and Othello do not really think about the significance of the dropped 
handkerchief, I suggest, is far simpler. At the moment the handkerchief drops in the 
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play, the audience does not know its significance. Even Othello doesn’t realize its 
significance, or he really does not care as he is distracted by his growing jealousy. The 
handkerchief only becomes an object of interest because of Iago’s attention to it. It is an 
object that takes on meaning as the play progresses rather than beginning with any 
importance beyond personal attachment.  
Iago’s ocular proof takes the form of two rhetorical constructions: ekphrastic 
descriptions of sex and setup for future interpretations of visual evidence. The ekphrastic 
sex includes lines where Iago compares Desdemona and Cassio to goats, monkeys, 
wolves, and fools whereas his setup includes his narrative surrounding Desdemona’s 
handkerchief and interactions between Desdemona and Cassio that Othello sees but does 
not hear. These constructions, thoroughly intertwined, operate as functions of each other. 
In the former, Iago fabricates visual evidence with his words, painting a picture that 
implants in Othello’s mind and refuses to be dislodged for most of the play. In the latter, 
Iago uses words to provide a framework for upcoming visual evidence, a framework that 
like the image, Othello cannot or will not look beyond. Both are fundamentally 
rhetorical, though what makes them so effectively convincing for Othello is their close 
association with visual evidence. For Othello, seeing is proof, regardless of how the 
thing seen is created or framed.  
Alsemero, on the other hand, operates under different epistemological 
frameworks than Othello and Iago once he suspects that Beatrice-Joanna may not be 
entirely virginal. Like Othello, he learns about his bride’s infidelity through the 




one, the play gives us no indication that Jasperino should not be trusted; he’s not Hamlet 
whose information gets contradicted or twisted, he’s not Justice Overdo who cannot 
parse a popular Latin tag correctly, nor is he Iago who literally tells the audience that 
he’s up to no good. Secondly, Jasperino reports not just a rumor but what he himself has 
secretly overheard. He uses a kind auditory ekphrasis, yes, but he does not paint pictures 
with his words to illustrate sex or misconstrue meaning like Iago does. Combined, these 
two things lead to Alsemero logically being skeptical of his bride and desirous to use the 
convenient virginity test he already has prepared. Rather than Othello who asks for 
ocular proof but accepts ekphrasis and probability of infidelity, Alsemero wants and has 
the means to obtain ocular proof.  
Middleton and Rowley present a convenient, visual way to prove a woman’s 
virginity that reports to be certain, less invasive for the woman, and, at least for the man, 
potentially less traumatizing than seeing his lover with another. Ocular proof in this play 
takes many forms, most famously, the virginity potion test. In her new husband’s private 
cabinet, Beatrice-Joanna discovers two potions labeled Vial M and Vial C, which, 
according to a manuscript book, purport to tell whether a woman is a virgin or pregnant. 
Vial M, once imbibed, promotes several visual effects, as Alsemero’s book describes: 
Give the party you suspect the quantity of a Spoonful of the water in the glass M, 
which, upon her that Is a maid, makes three several effects: ‘twill make her 
incontinently gape, then fall into a sudden sneezing, last into a Violent laughing, 




Ultimately, the potion makes something invisible—virginity—visible. Cognizant that the 
potion is already prepared and in the private possession of her husband who has dog-
eared the page, Beatrice immediately decides that she must test the potion for herself to 
see if it actually works. She takes on the role of the empiricist when she tests the potion 
on her maid, Diaphanta, whom Beatrice-Joanna suspects is not a virgin—“I fear you 
may be too quick to be a maid” (citation)—and herself. The test reveals otherwise. 
Diaphanta does all three things: yawn, sneeze, and laugh whereas, as Beatrice notices, 
the draught “stirs [her] not a whit” (4.1.111). The potion proves to be revelatory, 
allowing for each woman’s virginity status that was ostensibly invisible to be rendered 
visible.  
 The virginity test, as written, also illustrates not just an empiricist paradigm but a 
rhetorical one. Bueler calls Mizaldus’s test “a hypothetical proposition or hypothetical 
syllogism, the formula of the logic of cause and effect.”108 The same rhetorical quandary 
that Othello finds himself in (If all Venetian women are unfaithful, and Desdemona is a 
Venetian woman, then Desdemona is unfaithful) serves as the setup for Alsemero to 
interpret the potion. To place the situation in syllogistic terms, if a woman drinks the 
potion and exhibits the stated effects, she is a virgin. Beatrice-Joanna (and Diaphanta in 
Beatrice-Joanna’s earlier experiment) drink the potion and gape, sneeze, and laugh. 
Therefore, they are virgins. The difference between Othello’s syllogism and Alsemero’s 
comes largely down to how the second premise is obtained and interpreted.  
                                                 




 How Alsemero interprets the visual results of the virginity test links to his initial 
desire to justify strong response to Beatrice-Joanna when he first saw her. He seeks 
validation of his beliefs through the potion and Mizaldus as an authority. Alsemero’s 
reading on Beatrice-Joanna’s chastity, at least midway through the play, is supported not 
just by the virginity test, but by her very performance of virginity. Indeed, he does not 
seem to have any distrust of his wife until Jasperino tells him otherwise. Jasperino 
overheard Beatrice and her lover De Flores together in a private room next to one he was 
in. Like Othello, Alsemero resolves to obtain his own personal proof by means of Vial 
M. However, Beatrice who already knows what the potion is supposed to do from her 
previous tests, fabricates the results, in essence creating a false positive for her virginity.  
When considering this infamous virginity test, earlier critics largely felt that the 
scene was unnecessary and unrealistic.109 This particular potion, as Tanya Pollard 
asserts, is “the only one of its kind in the period’s drama.”110 Recent years, however, 
have been kinder to the scene, taking it and many of its antecedents as referencing a 
contemporary event: Frances Howard’s semi-public pelvic examination in order to prove 
that her marriage to her husband had never been consummated and her later involvement 
in her (former) husband’s murder along with her lover/new husband.111 Recent readers 
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have also further contextualized the scene by considering early modern anatomy theaters 
and texts including far-fetched tests on making the virgin body legible.112 Such readings 
in the distant and closer pasts reveal just as much about the state of literary criticism as 
they do The Changeling. From a structural standpoint, devoid of its seventeenth-century 
contexts, the scene is a little wacky. Why in the world would Alsemero, a sailor who 
should be out sailing at this time, randomly have a cabinet filled with ready-made 
potions tailored explicitly toward reading women’s bodies? Why would he have a 
written text detailing how they work? Moreover, how and why does the potion work? 
And why is it so easily replicated? From a modern standpoint, it doesn’t make much 
sense at all.  
 From an early modern (and indeed, narrative) standpoint, however, the scene 
makes plenty of sense. Bizarre potions with very specific effects occur throughout 
Renaissance drama, after all. Both Romeo and Juliet and Cymbeline contain sleeping 
draughts that mimic death,113 and a description of just such a potion appears in Folger 
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MS X.d. 393, a manuscript miscellany that primarily chronicles major battles during 
Elizabeth’s reign and her death. Toward the end of the manuscript codex, among 
mathematical calculations and accounts, appears a recipe for “A Dormant drink,” which 
promises to “bereave the sense with colde numbness, et mortify the Patient by an houre, 
slumbring for 2 daies et by no meanes waking.”114 Whether or not this particular draught 
was used, the manuscript does not say, but the text implies that the idea of a potion 
having these seemingly miraculous properties was at least within the realm of possibility 
in the early seventeenth century. Furthermore, even assuming that the early modern 
audience either would have been able to suspend disbelief or assume that The 
Changeling’s virginity and pregnant test potions were plausible, we should also be aware 
of the narrative function of these potions. Dale B.J. Randall reminds us of two things: 
“[Middleton and Rowley’s] time is not ours”115 and the virginity test must be able to be 
reproduced on-stage. Several scholars, including Randall, Sara Luttfring, and Mara 
Amster have uncovered multiple instances of available virginity tests, the majority of 
which required drinking something and then testing the color and scent of urine while 
others produce longer effects. These traditional results, regardless of their accuracy (they 
were not particularly reliable, as even their contemporaries could attest), were not 
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dramaturgically effective for the stage, a medium that needs clear and immediate effects, 
as Randall explains: 
For the test to be effective onstage it must cause symptoms that members of an 
audience can readily observe, and it must do so promptly so as to juxtapose 
unmistakably the drink and its effects, as well as keep the play moving. It cannot 
call for the player acting Beatrice-Joanna to urinate or fall asleep for twelve 
hours. And the three required actions in sequence—gaping, sneezing, and 
laughing—are in aggregate far more convincing than any single one of them 
would be alone. The test as we have it is very much in touch with tradition but 
modified to be stageworthy.116 
Middleton and Rowley therefore invite us to see this scene as an exaggerated pastiche of 
virginity tests and the anxiety surrounding the determination of female virginity. More 
importantly, staging the scenes as they do allows for the audience to have concrete 
access to all available evidence that they do not necessarily have in Othello. By literally 
staging the experiment, Middleton and Rowley ensure that the audience knows how the 
potion works and that Beatrice-Joanna is fabricating the results when it is used upon her.   
The certainty that Middleton and Rowley create in The Changeling by choosing 
to stage the majority of the action or to relay and verify any off-stage events by credible 
sources, differs considerably from the ambiguity on display in Othello. Due in no small 
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part to its emphasis on the more humanist rhetorical mode of knowing, Shakespeare 
evokes uncertainty in characters and audiences alike, effectively gaslighting them.117 
Thomas Moisan attributes the creation of uncertainty to the back-and-forth relationship 
between interrogation and repetition of key themes and words, arguing that “the play of 
repetition and questioning simultaneously evokes a dissonance that challenges our 
understanding of what the play enacts and, more to the point, challenges our ability to 
know and make judgment about what we have experienced.”118 I would add that the 
deliberate disorientation also comes from the extended meditation on the ubiquity of the 
damaging power of rhetoric within the play.  
We have seen this kind of uncertainty before in Hamlet, where Shakespeare 
mirrors Hamlet’s uncertainties and hesitancy in the audience. Millicent Bell boldly 
asserts that “Othello…is the most intellectual of all Shakespeare’s tragedies, including 
Hamlet.”119 Arguing the “intellectual-ness” of any play strikes me as an unproductive 
move, particularly as the qualities associated with that term are always going to be 
contingent on the contexts that the play was composed, performed, read, and seen. I 
would revise Bell’s argument and instead claim that Othello is the most classically 
rhetorical of the plays. Indeed, Othello is about as active as the Danish Prince, opting 
only to kill at the end of the play. Both also pretend to empiricist strategies, calling for 
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evidence that supports charges of murder and infidelity. The major difference here is that 
Hamlet does not have an Iago that plays upon his doubts and character flaws—he seems 
to do that well enough on his own.  
We may return for a moment to Amir Khan’s question about Claudius’s verbal 
admission of guilt in Hamlet: “what if we, as an audience, had not heard Claudius’s 
confession?”120 Staging that moment of clarity for the audience justifies Hamlet’s 
hitherto unreasonable actions—whether or not Hamlet actually knows Claudius has 
committed regicide is beside the point. The audience knows, and thus can sympathize 
with Hamlet’s plans. What if we were to apply this same line of thinking on Iago? What 
if Iago did not overtly state that he “is not who he is?” If we were not aware that Iago 
was the machiavel working in the shadows the entire time in order undermine Othello, 
we too may act like Othello does throughout the play—completely trusting and more 
willing to accept visual proof that is not actually physically present.  
Operating as it does in epistemological flux, Othello ultimately cannot escape its 
humanist origins. Evidence in the play is largely rhetorical, whether narrative or 
ekphrastic, and when evidence is concrete, it is misread. What causes the misreading is 
not so much a faulty system, but faulty premises. Othello and Iago alike share this type 
of thinking, as do other characters in the play. When it comes to proof, Othello shows us 
the dangers of relying too fully on essential categories of what is easy to believe or what 
we already assume. It also displays the dangerous and beautiful power of rhetoric, for 
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while there is some visible action in the play—the body count alone in the final scene is 
verification enough for that—much of the erotic content is limited to charged visual 
descriptions. 
The Changeling uses a different framework in relation to the audience. Whereas 
Othello (and indeed, many of Shakespeare’s plays) treat the audience almost like they’re 
a character, embedded in the plot and the action, Middleton and Rowley treat the 
audience as a spectator observing a theatrical experiment. Until the play’s final scenes, 
the audience has witnessed everything—Alsemero’s and De Flores’s attraction toward 
Beatrice-Joanna, Beatrice-Joanna-Joanna’s plots to do away with her fiancé and to swap 
her virgin maid Diaphanta for herself on her wedding night with Alsemero, De Flores’s 
murder of Alonzo, Tomazo’s cries for revenge for his brother, the disguises of the two 
noblemen in the madhouse, Isabella’s awareness of their plot. The audience, seeing both 
plots, knows more than any individual character. While The Changeling opts to let its 
audience in on most of its secrets, the play takes a deliberate turn for the uncertain at its 
conclusion, where scenes that would have been staged at earlier moments are kept 
hidden from the audience. There are four key moments where things are not staged that 
are worth considering: Jasperino’s revelation that he overheard Beatrice-Joanna and De 
Flores having sex, the bed trick with Diaphanta and Alsemero, Isabella’s revelation to 
her husband that there are two noblemen pretending to be mad, and Beatrice-Joanna and 
De Flores’s entrapment in Alsemero’s closet, which I will take in turn.  
The first instance of where Middleton and Rowley opt not to stage and instead 




The choice to not visually portray Jasperino overhearing Beatrice-Joanna and De Flores 
in bed serves a few ends. For one, the audience already knows that Beatrice-Joanna has 
agreed to copulate with her late fiancé’s murderer as payment for his services. We don’t 
need the additional ocular proof that they are literally in bed together to make that clear, 
especially as Beatrice-Joanna and De Flores both confirm it in speech.  
Similarly, the bed trick of Act 5 is also not explicitly staged—Diaphanta and 
Alsemero are copulating either off-stage or obscured from the audience’s view behind an 
on-stage door or barrier—while Beatrice-Joanna frets.121 Early modern plays do not tend 
to stage intercourse, though they certainly allude to it. What is more important here is 
that for both these scenes is that who is sleeping with whom is already known to the 
audience before the scene even happens—what the audience needs to know in these 
scenes is how Alsemero and Beatrice-Joanna react to their partners coupling with 
another person. In other words, Middleton and Rowley are judicious with their evidence 
and typically opt to focus the visual scene on having the audience acquire new evidence 
rather than confirm what they already know. Confirmation, in The Changeling, is 
relegated to verbal evidence referencing events going on off-stage.  
The third important instance where events off-stage are told rather than shown 
occurs in the play’s denouement, when Isabella reveals the resolution of the parallel 
story in Alibius’s madhouse and the exposure of the two noblemen in disguise. Aside 
from the moment where both plots converge at the end of the play, the characters from 
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the madhouse plot do not appear in the final act. That Isabella, Alibius, Lollio, Antonio, 
and Franciscus appear at that exact moment is not particularly noteworthy. After all, the 
two plots should ideally interact at some point. What is noteworthy, however, is that 
between the moment where we last see them at the end of Act 4 and when they appear in 
Act 5, Isabella reveals what she knows about Antonio’s and Franciscus’s disguises to her 
husband. Somewhere on the road to Vermandero’s castle, she tells Alibius everything. 
We the audience are not privy to it. The party’s encounter with Vermandero is also not 
staged. 
 Why would Middleton and Rowley not include this information? From a 
practical standpoint, providing an interlude where the audience witnesses Isabella telling 
her husband about the errant madmen, and in turn, everyone informing Vermandero, 
who then assumes that Antonio and Franciscus are behind Alonso’s murder would only 
interrupt the bed trick action and Alsemero’s tragic realization. The audience is given the 
same amount of information in a few short lines as it would in a lengthy scene. Or, 
perhaps this scene was written at some point, but was cut due to length and lost before it 
ever had the chance to be printed.  
The third example of Rowley and Middleton deliberately opting not to stage 
anything also occurs at the end of the play: Beatrice-Joanna and De Flores’s entrapment 
in Alsemero’s closet. This is not an event that can be immediately explained by posthoc 
reporting; rather, not showing precisely what happens in the closet is a deliberate 
obfuscation on the part of the playwrights. This choice offers several thematic options 




relationship. Are they having sex? Is the sex rape? Is Beatrice-Joanna’s stabbing a 
murder or a suicide? All these options work. If De Flores and Beatrice-Joanna are having 
sex in the closet (coerced or otherwise), not staging the scene would follow the 
precedent set by the previous two lovemaking scenes not being staged. More 
importantly, not visually showing the audience what is occurring inside the closet forces 
us to use other interpretive modes to figure out what happened. Throughout the play, the 
audience may act like an impartial observer, watching and collecting evidence. In the 
other instances of references to events that occurred off-stage, the audience knew full 
well what was going on. But here, there is no actual agreement, no confirmation other 




 Ultimately, The Changeling and Othello present two very different yet still 
related takes on the adaptation of ocular proof in dramatic structure. For Othello, the 
ocular proof is always provided after-the-fact, when other types of proofs have been 
introduced and a framework has been established. The only way for ocular proof to skip 
this constraint is if the visual becomes verbal through a particularly vivid or ekphrastic 
description. Although those descriptions may not be in any way true or accurate, they 
nevertheless are imbued with the same affective power that causes Othello and the 
audience to feel moved to great emotional heights. Indeed, the audience itself joins 




that Desdemona’s interactions with Cassio are entirely innocent. Even what should be 
concrete visual evidence is ultimately subject to rhetoric and the rhetorician in Othello.  
At the other end of the spectrum, The Changeling offers an abundance of visual 
evidence for its characters and for its audience. With the exception of a few key scenes 
which I have discussed, the play stages most of its evidence, allowing the audience to 
“play the empiricist” and take in the sensory proof. However, by the play’s end, the 
audience and the tragic characters, do not actually know everything, introducing 
ambiguity to a space where we thought there was none. The play’s larger moral on the 
dangers of sensory proof acts as a sententia made manifest, as like Overdo in 
Bartholomew Fair, the characters become different exempla of the larger theme. 
Beatrice-Joanna and Alsemero especially embody the dangers of uncritical trust of the 
visual, whether in their presentation or interpretation of visual evidence. 
In both plays, the problem with ocular proof comes down to problems with 
people—and, problems with sights possessing their own affective power that can 
manifest in actual sensory experiences or in imagined ones. The dangers of rhetoric that 
Shakespeare explores in Othello are ultimately the same dangers of empiricism that 
Middleton and Rowley stage in The Changeling. Whether through outright lying, 
performing, or fabricating the results of an experiment, the human source of evidence 
undermines the success of the intellectual endeavor, regardless of the methods the 
gatherer may use. Beyond that, these playwrights adapt the method into their poetics and 
staging, creating spaces of critique that invite the audience not simply to watch or listen 




follow along with the uncertainty of Othello, seeing what he sees precisely because it’s 
described to us, and only reach a conclusion in death. Likewise, we follow Beatrice-
Joanna’s certainty until it is obscured for the audience at the play’s conclusion. In both 
cases, the playwrights provide a mixture of methods embedded in the plot and structure 
of the dramatic text, ultimately revealing that while a rational, inductive approach may 
be desirable for determining truth, humanist habits of mind and the absence of 





CHAPTER IV  
EVIDENCE OF ENORMITY AND THE EXAMPLE OF OVERDO 
IN JONSON’S BARTHOLOMEW FAIR 
 
At first glance, Ben Jonson’s Bartholomew Fair does not seem like the kind of 
play that engages with epistemological debates on methods of early modern knowledge 
making.122 The cast contains several Poloniuses where we would expect a Hamlet. 
Moreover, as the Scrivener describes in the play’s Induction, the play was “made to 
delight all, and to offend none—provided they have either the wit or the honesty to think 
well of themselves” (Ind 74-77), signaling that Bartholomew Fair is intended to be 
popular fare rather than something more intellectually challenging like Jonson’s 
substantially more academic Sejanus. Given this stated popular audience along with its 
several foolish characters and hijinks that occur throughout the play—including a puppet 
show debate where the puppet reveals its (lack of) sex organs—criticism has focused its 
attention on what the play can tells us about contemporary London politics and living, 
including its sights, sounds, and commercial ventures. Nevertheless, Jonson’s 
Bartholomew Fair also engages explicitly with epistemological concerns: the playwright 
offers instruction on the precise ways to interpret his play and a warning of what 
happens when an errant spectator or hearer fails to follow the rules. 
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Scholarship on Jonson’s poetics ranging from earlier structural analyses of the 
consistent form of his plays to more recent considerations of how Timber or the 
Discoveries comfortably conclude that Jonson has a humanist-inspired view of poetry 
and the poet who makes it.123 At the core of this philosophy is the Horatian dictum: the 
aim of the poet is to teach and entertain. Although Philip Sidney further popularized the 
Horatian ideals in The Defense of Poetry, they were already well-known and understood 
by the classically-educated Jonson who likened himself to Horace in Poetaster.124 This 
blending of instruction and delight directly relates not only to Jonson’s views of poetry 
but to larger, ongoing shifts in privileged modes of thought in the seventeenth century. 
Certainly, Jonson’s biography suggests a personal reason why he would explicitly direct 
the interpretative strategies of his audience. Even more interesting and more relevant for 
the period, however, are the ways that Jonson adapts methods of Renaissance humanism, 
instilled in him and his contemporaries, alongside with the methods of what would 
become to be known as empiricism. In blending these competing modes of thinking 
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(humanism and empiricism), Jonson reveals the productive, if uneasy ways these two 
intellectual movements cohabited the same public and dramatic spheres.125 In attempting 
to call for more personal, empirical evidence, Jonson evokes past genres and past modes 
of reading and interpreting in order to make his point.  
 Jonson negotiates web of Renaissance humanism and empiricism by 
simultaneously encouraging the power of sensory proof, exhorting his audience to judge 
for themselves the quality of his play, and staging an exemplum of what happens when 
an individual fails to exercise their judgment appropriately or carefully, thus drawing 
from popular earlier examples of other exempla like Plutarch’s Lives or The Mirror for 
Magistrates or even Foxe’s Book of Martyrs. He achieves this aim through a 
combination of explicit instruction in the play’s Induction and his characterization of 
Justice Adam Overdo, on his own and in contrast with his many foils. These multiple 
methods, as I will show, exist in an uneasy tension brought on by both epistemological 
uncertainty endemic to the period as well as Jonson’s tumultuous relationship between 
his audience, his ideas of literature, and his conception of what it means to be an author. 
I argue that Jonson uses Overdo as an exemplum of the uncritical interpretative practices 
that Jonson criticizes in the play’s Induction, ultimately revealing that misinterpretation 
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lies not within a faulty practice like sensory acquisition but with the fickle individual 
who does not take the time to critically pursue any given line of inquiry.  
To illustrate how Jonson accomplishes the task of blending Renaissance 
humanism and empiricism, I first define what humanism and empiricism were at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, including their methods and how they coexisted. 
Then, I turn to Bartholomew Fair and analyze the lengthy legal-sounding contract put 
forth in the Induction called the “Articles of Agreement.” Afterwards, I follow Adam 
Overdo, a justice of the peace who spends the majority of the play in disguise as a 
beggar in order to infiltrate the titular fair and discover “enormities,” or crimes usually 
associated with dishonesty. Though the two are not explicitly connected—although 
“justice” is mentioned once in passing by the Scrivener—the Induction shapes our 
expectations and strategies for interpreting the characters similar to the ways a print 
paratext like a dedicatory epistle or poem deliberately shapes our reading of the printed 
text it is affixed to. As I will later discuss in detail, the Articles of Agreement provide 
multiple stipulations on what the audience may or may not do as they watch and judge 
the play. The Articles, in effect, presume to govern the audience using comic yet 
seemingly earnest language. Overdo, the major representative of (ineffective) law in the 
play at-large, stands as the ideal character to analyze according to the rules that the 







The Blending of Late Humanism and Early Empiricism 
 
As Isabel Rivers succinctly explains, “A humanist was a classical scholar with 
two complementary aims: to recover the moral values of classical life, and to imitate the 
langue and style of the classics as a means to that end. He hoped to unite wisdom 
(sapientia) and eloquence (eloquentia).”126 By Jonson’s schooldays, Renaissance 
humanism had been well-absorbed into English schools at all levels. The curriculum, 
developed by Erasmus, had begun to be accepted in English schools as early as the 
1520s. On a practical level, the early modern English schoolhouse taught children 
through exempla of moral, civic, literary, or grammatical virtue. Texts, language, and 
rhetoric thus played crucial roles in shaping generations’ understanding of the world 
around them. Peter Mack describes the rhetorical skills that grammar school students 
were intended to develop: “School pupils were trained to extract moral sentences from 
their reading and use them in their writing, to analyse and compose moral narratives, to 
collect historical examples illustrating ethical principles, to compose letters and themes, 
to amplify and to recognise and use various figures of rhetoric.”127 Successful students 
learned not simply to read and write but were indoctrinated into becoming state-
approved moral citizens.  
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Working in response to medieval scholasticism, which emphasized less the 
original text and more what accepted thinkers (typically Church fathers like Augustine 
and Jerome) said about a given passage, the English grammar school curriculum 
represented a call for individuals to “return to the text,” and to use commentary as a 
supplement or paratext.128 Moreover, humanist epistemologies emphasized the learning 
of an individual, which contributed to the reading and interpreting practices that 
developed on the Continent and later in England.129 Due in no small part to religious 
concerns, the modes of thought adapted in Northern Europe are termed “Christian 
humanism” with Erasmus as one of its great thinkers. This term, while used 
predominately in theological discussions of humanism and the important developments 
in religious thinking of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, is not commonly used to 
describe related modes of thought in early modern science and literature.130 Modern 
scholars focused on content not explicitly tied to religion tend to use the more secular 
“Renaissance humanism.” I have opted to do to the same for this essay. 
As Renaissance humanism responded to scholasticism, so too did empiricism 
respond to humanism. Empiricists valued knowledge based not on written texts but on 
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replicable, sensory evidence. As with humanism, “empiricism” as a descriptor occurred 
after the fact, but I have opted to keep these anachronistic terms because they are 
understood in today’s scholarship and offer a clear terminology. While empiricism and 
its methods would be developed more in the later seventeenth centuries, particularly with 
philosophers like Thomas Hobbes and the members of the Royal Society, early forms of 
an early modern empiricism can be found in Francis Bacon.131 At its core, empiricism is 
an inductive method of reasoning, meaning that one must build a conception of the 
universe through individual, discrete experiences. This approach stood in direct contrast 
with the deductive methods of late humanism, which derived truth and meaning from a 
written source and retrofitted the universe around that base. 
Another key component in the transition between humanist and empiricist 
schools of thought was the changes in the conception of rhetoric, which was 
foundational to the Renaissance humanists’ intellectual project.132 Due to various 
influences (most notably Peter Ramus’s), rhetoric, which consisted originally of five 
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distinct canons or processes related to the generation of ideas for argument, their 
organization, and finally their delivery, were separated into two distinct categories called 
logic and dialectic. Logic was comprised of the two processes used for the creation and 
organization of thought (inventio, literally “finding” of the argument and evidence; 
dispositio, or the organization/arrangement of the things discovered in the first stage for 
greatest effect). In contrast, the three remaining canons focusing on the actual verbal-
visual presentation of the ideas and arguments (elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio) 
became the base for dialectic. Dividing the canons into an internal, more “intellectual” 
track and the performance-based track resulted in the same effects we may see in our 
profession with practitioner/researcher divides, with solitary, intellectual labor receiving 
more credence than social, performed labor. Of course, the divide also reinforced the 
conception that finding and organizing information is more objective and less affected 
by the subjectivity of language whereas the dialectic relies heavily on language and its 
manipulation in order to achieve its desired effects. The malleability of language leads it 
to be capable of untruth and subject to if not outright distrust, at least concerned 
skepticism. 
 At its core, Renaissance humanism was about classical knowledge. Responding 
to the very real terror that ancient knowledge was lost (and not always acknowledging 
their debts to the Islamic intellectual world for safeguarding much of the surviving 
knowledge), the early humanist sought to secure and maintain as much classical 
knowledge as possible. Unfortunately (for humanism at least), its strengths would prove 




fluency, scholars who initially had to rely on what others had said could begin to judge 
for themselves the accuracy of the claims of the ancient world and their applicability to 
(early) modern life. 
As intellectual movements, early sixteenth-century Renaissance humanism and 
seventeenth-century empiricism could not be any more different in their priorities and 
methods of establishing knowledge. On the surface, at least. Though it is easier to 
conceive of these two worldviews as completely distinct from each other like 
teleological stepping stones, the fact that remains that as humanism fell out of favor, it 
took considerable time before empiricism became the preferred intellectual mode. This 
conflation of methods, as Katherine Eggert argues, is common to early seventeenth-
century England. While Bartholomew Fair does not immediately conflate literary 
methods with methods from other fields, Jonson’s other comedies like The Alchemist 
(1610), which uses alchemical processes and materials as the base of his plots, and The 
Magnetic Lady (1632), which uses the occult properties of magnetism, do. Bartholomew 
Fair nevertheless engages in the larger epistemological debates for a desire for more 
concrete, replicable proof while acknowledging that acquiring that proof has its own 
challenges.  
 All of this is to say that the humanist-educated Jonson was an active participant 
in this fluctuating world where the text-based, rhetorically-driven knowledge system was 
struggling in response to real challenges. Furthermore, as Julian Koslow explains, “The 
pedagogy through which Jonson was taught, deriving as it did from the rhetorical 




bodies, exerting a charismatic hold over readers and serving as models for a pedagogy of 
imitation which was often imagined in terms that were as much those of ethical 
demeanor as of literary style.”133 How does one reconcile the epistemological problem 
where two different points-of-authority (a classical text versus a sensory experience) 
contradict? Eventually, seventeenth-century intellectuals would overcorrect in their 
response, privileging modes of thinking and learning that would become associated with 
science, and devaluing epistemological modes that would become associated with the 
arts, including rhetoric; still later thinkers and creators would continue to see-saw. These 
questions, as we will see, were not simply the purview of intellectuals writing for other 
intellectuals. Jonson and his contemporary poets and playwrights would weigh in on this 
confusing transition, albeit not necessarily providing definitive answers.  
 
Sensory Experience and Bartholomew Fair 
 
As a form, drama is particularly worthwhile for analyzing the transition between 
empiricism and humanism because it relies so heavily on both methods. Theater is, 
above all else, both a sensory experience and a rhetorical one. Although an audience 
member may have some familiarity with a play’s narrative, whether through knowing a 
source text or seeing the play performed before, the early modern audience member 
tends to experience drama through all their senses. And Bartholomew Fair is full of 
                                                 




sensory experience as it creates not only a visual and aural spectacle but a spectacle 
reliant on scent and taste. 
First performed in 1614 at The Hope Theater in London and again the next 
evening at court,134 but not published until the 1640 edition of Jonson’s Workes, 
Bartholomew Fair has received considerable attention, especially in terms of the sounds 
and smells of the city, whether Smithfield as referenced in the Induction or to London in 
general. In his extensive study on sensory experience and Jacobean city comedies, 
Hristomir A. Stanev demonstrates that dramatists like Jonson were significantly 
interested in using the senses on stage, due in no small part to vast political, social, and 
material changes at the turn of the century: 
A considerable demographic and material flux, endemic to the late Tudor and 
Stuart period of London’s development, was beginning to alter the experiential 
dynamic of the urban terrain and was affecting the sensibilities of the inhabitants, 
who…registered change perceptible through a number of daily routines that 
“every man doth behold.”135 
Coupled with the “demographic and material” shifts that Stanev identifies, we may also 
include the nascent development of scientific inquiry, insofar as it is beginning to be 
codified. The shift in how an early modern person, particularly a Londoner, experienced 
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the world, was, according to Stanev, readily apparent in day-to-day-living. This change 
then was ripe for exploration for an incredibly topical genre like the Jacobean London 
city comedy, of which Bartholomew Fair is a part.  
 Scholars have also been interested in the sensory experience of sound throughout 
the play, especially in relationship to language. James E. Robinson, one of the many to 
analyze the urbane language of Jonson’s city comedies, helpfully describes the comedy’s 
rhetoric as “a composite of a brass-tongued justice of the peace, the rant of a hypocritical 
Puritan, the roar of a noisy horse-trader, and assorted idioms as those of a Middlesex 
moron, a Northern clothier, and an Irish bawd.”136 These several voices made by several 
characters all on stage at once, particularly in the concluding scenes of each act, create at 
best, confused, lifelike noise, and at worst, indiscernible cacophony. Yet the majority of 
scholars contend that this noise is thematically significant. R. B. Parker explains, “This 
nuisance value of noise, of words divorced from meaning…suggests that one of 
[Jonson’s] basic concerns was to expose and explode aggression, the atavistic readiness 
of adrenalin which is no longer useful in a settled society.”137 Noise also works to 
establish a more realistic environment of a local street fair, even if, as the Stage-Keeper 
informs the audience in the Induction that the play-scene is not an exact replica of the 
actual Fair.  
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 Sensory observation also finds its way into discussions about the law and 
evidence in the play. This connection makes all the more sense if we consider the 
development of the jury trial and the methods used by judges and juries to ascertain guilt 
or innocence.138 These methods include testimonies under oath and confessions. 
Bartholomew Fair becomes the space where the audience may both bear witness to 
various events and judge them, morally and aesthetically, for their enjoyment. Indeed, 
Andrew Brown argues that “the choreographed staging of the play establishes a richly 
visual arena in which various methods of seeing and knowing, from the strictly legal to 
the broadly social, are put to the test…Bartholomew Fair works to create a distinctively 
spatialized forum of participatory inquiry and response.”139 Thus, acts inherent to 
theatrical performances like staging and stage design work to create this space of 
judgment for the spectators.  
While Bartholomew Fair has long proved fertile ground for gaging sensory 
experience, it is less apparent how the blending of real-time sensory experience works in 
conjunction with Jonson’s poetic aims. Koslow argues that Jonson’s earlier play 
Poetaster (performed 1601) “demonstrates [his] appreciation for the way that the theater, 
by virtue of its ability to give his texts a physical—visual, aural, gestural, embodied—
life, could help him manifest the pedagogical power promised to poets by humanism.”140 
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Something very similar, I argue, occurs in Bartholomew Fair, wherein Jonson uses 
theater to visualize an amusing lesson in interpretation. He completes this objective by 
staging the lesson but not before explicitly outlining the moral in the play’s Induction. 
The moral ultimately allies with privileging empiricist methods of knowing (that is, 
relying on one’s sensory evidence to inductively develop a reading of the play) but by 
using traditionally humanist methods in order to instruct the audience how to use their 
sensory knowledge appropriately.  
As I explore in more detail below, the stipulations presented in the Induction 
establish a key theme of individual reliance on sensory experience which then serves as 
a major argument that is explored in the play’s scenes. This approach, as Lawrence 
Levin explains, is typical of Jonson, who “uses the repetition of one or two basic 
concepts in a theme-and-variations technique. Rather than include diverse, contradictory, 
and qualifying shades of perspective, Jonson states an initial thesis and reinforces it 
through varied repetition.”141 Jonson’s thesis, or admonition to trust in the actual 
experience in front of you rather than rely on one’s predisposed prejudices or the 
interpretations of those around you, is echoed to humorous effect for the remainder of 
the play.142 
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The Articles of Agreement, or, Jonson’s Guide to Proper Dramatic Interpretation 
 
Prior to the play’s first scene, Jonson stages a brief Induction featuring a stage-
keeper, a book-seller, and a scrivener who briefly allude to future plot points and set 
forth a set of rules governing how the audience may properly react to the play. These 
rules, called the Articles of Agreement, contain five major stipulations governing not so 
much the viewing audience’s enjoyment of the play but rather their reactions to it. In 
exchange for Jonson’s play, “merry and as full of noise as sport, made to delight all and 
to offend none—provided they have either the wit or the honesty to think well of 
themselves,” (Ind. Ind. 61-62) the Scrivener announces that the audience (1) agrees to 
stay and watch the play for its duration, (2) critique according to the amount they paid 
for admission, (3) judge the play for themselves rather than rely on the assertions of 
those sitting nearby, (4) not expect a literal representation of Smithfield (the real-world 
setting of the very real Bartholomew Fair), and (5) not read into what individual 
characters, items, or events “represent” in the real world. 
As part of establishing the primacy of wit, the Articles home in on the 
importance of personal judgment informed by primary evidence. The first article, we 
should note, insists that the audience “agree to remain in the places their money or 
friends have put them in, with patience, for the space of two hours and an half and 
somewhat more” (58-60). Traditionally (and understandably so), scholars have focused 
on the length of time Jonson proposes for his play, seeing this statement as affirmation 




the longest commercial play at 4344 prose lines, could not have been performed in 150 
minutes. Richard Dutton estimates that “even if we believe that Early Modern actors 
may have spoken faster than they do today—[the play] could hardly be performed in less 
than four hours and might well take five.”143 These points are relevant for dramatic 
criticism as a whole, but as far as the play itself is concerned, the actual duration is not 
important. In the first covenant, Jonson establishes the importance of primary evidence 
when passing judgment. Requiring the audience to remain in the same space for the 
entire play ensures that, at minimum, people who are inclined to censure or pass 
judgment on Bartholomew Fair, at least encounter the entirety of the performed text 
themselves.  
The second article, which limits the strength of an audience member’s censure by 
what they actually paid in order to see the play, reads to me as a prickled playwright 
responding to overblown critiques by individuals who did not lose much, economically 
speaking, by watching a play. Indeed, as Peter Stallybrass and Allon White comment, 
“the juxtaposition of judgement and money is curious, though, a reminder that the 
author, for all his contempt, is a bought man, depend for his success upon the applause 
of conflicting social groups.”144 In contrast, Robert N. Watson writes that “before the 
play really even begins, it invites us to question whether the authority of money is 
legitimate, through a contract the stage-keeper offers the audience allowing them to 
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judge the play proportionately to how much they paid for their tickets.”145 This reading, 
however, seems to miss the overall point of the Induction, which is to critique the 
viewing audience members themselves, particularly those who would be censorious of 
Jonson’s dramatic material. The joke is on individuals who complain about their 
entertainment without actually paying for it. The passage in question reads as follows: 
It shall be lawful for any man to judge his six penn’orth, his twelve penn’orth, so 
to his eighteen pence, two shillings, half a crown, to the value of his place--
provided always his place get not above his wit. And if he pay for half a dozen, 
he may censure for all them too, so that he will undertake that they shall be 
silent. He shall put in for censures here as they do for lots at the lottery; marry, if 
he drop but sixpence at the door, and will censure a crown’s worth, it is thought 
there is no conscience or justice in that. (77-87) 
Watson’s reading that the Stage-Keeper allows the audience to “judge the play 
proportionately to how much they paid for their tickets” certainly fits here, but his 
conclusion that this passage reflects on whether or not money is a legitimate authority 
seems to ignore to the rest of the Induction, let alone Jonson’s oeuvre. Rather, I would 
suggest that this stipulation is a comment on Jonson’s experiences as a popular writer 
being critiqued, unfairly or otherwise. 
Of course, it is not enough for an audience member to be physically present at 
the play and pay the price of admission before they may comment on it. They must also 
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be capable of making their own judgments without undue outside influence. After 
insisting that no man complain unless he actually paid for the privilege of watching, the 
Scrivener provides the third contractual stipulation: “It is also agreed that every man 
here exercise his own judgement, and not censure by contagion or upon trust from 
another’s voice or face that sits by him, be he never so first in the Commission of Wit” 
(73-5). This statement privileges the interpretation of an individual, based on personal 
observations rather than relying on someone else’s claim; “censure by contagion” also 
suggests disdain for this kind of critique, likening it to a plague or obscuring miasma. 
Moreover, the Scrivener distinguishes between visual and aural evidence: “another’s 
voice or face” similar to how he contractually addresses the audience as “Spectators and 
Hearers.” Taken altogether, this stipulation most explicitly identifies Jonson’s 
recommended interpretative method. The importance of personal interpretation, based on 
sensory evidence rather than hearsay or evidence mediated through another person, is a 
major issue that Jonson will explore throughout the remainder of the play in various 
ways, most clearly through the exemplum of Overdo, which I will discuss in the next 
section. 
This item of the Articles of Agreement also critiques the fickle audience member 
whose opinion changes daily. Using direct references to The Spanish Tragedy and Titus 
Andronicus, the Scrivener assures the audience that  
He that will swear Jeronimo or Andronicus are the best plays yet shall pass 
unexcepted at here, as a man whose judgement shows it is constant and hath 




virtuous and stayed ignorance, and, next to truth, a confirmed error does well. 
(Ind. 79-82) 
While Jonson cannot resist a jab at his predecessors, this additional clarification for 
“every man here [to] exercise his own judgement” reminds the audience if they cannot 
be correct, then they should at least be consistent in their dramatic assessments. 
Moreover, as Jonathan Hart elaborates: 
Constancy, truth, ignorance, and error become themes here in the differences in 
taste between author and audience. Kyd’s and Shakespeare’s revenge 
plays…become touchstones for old tastes. The implication is that to stick to these 
old Senecan tragedies of bloody revenge is ignorance with staying power and a 
confirmed error.146 
Taste then becomes part of the conversation. Jonson acknowledges (or at least, attempts 
to acknowledge) that individual playgoers do have preferences that differ from his own. 
Yet even as he allows for dissenting tastes, he still judges old-fashioned tastes as 
wanting. Nevertheless, “a confirmed error,” or a consistent misjudgment, is certainly 
preferable to the alternatives of fickleness whether due to personal tastes or the influence 
of other playgoers.  
Once Jonson has stipulated that an audience member must actually watch the 
play and judge for themselves, he discusses two related points: the audience must not 
expect a perfectly mimetic Smithfield (the play’s fictional and Bartholomew Fair’s real-
                                                 





world setting), and the audience must not read the play allegorically. Near the end of the 
Induction, the Scrivener announces one final item requesting that the audience not 
assume the play’s characters have an intended offstage counterpart. The audience must 
not, the Scrivener asserts,  
search out, who was meant by ginger-bread-woman, who by the Hobby-horse-
man, who by the Costard-monger, nay, who by their Wares. Or that will pretend 
to affirm (on his own inspired Ignorance) what Mirror of Magistrates is meant by 
the Justice, what great Lady by the Pig-woman, what conceal’d States man, by 
the Seller of Mouse-traps, and so of the rest. (104-8)  
This comical list references several characters that appear in play (Trash the Gingerbread 
Woman, Leatherhead the Hobby-horse-man, Justice Overdo, and Ursula the Pig-woman) 
and a handful that do not (the Costard-monger and the Seller of Mouse-traps). It is clear 
from the quotation that Jonson does not hold this type of interpreter in high regard—the 
Scrivener both states that this person is “presenting” to know based “on his own inspired 
ignorance, “after all. Who would be so arrogant to presume, for instance, “what Mirror 
of Magistrates is meant by the Justice?”  
I want to deliberately go against the Scrivener’s express wishes in order to 
discern exactly what the justice means in his reference to the Mirror of/for Magistrates, 
or even which Mirror he means. The Induction does not specifically identify the 
“justice” in question as Overdo, though by the end of the play he is the individual who 




reference is intended to be to him.147 While I am certainly not the first to ignore Jonson’s 
insistence on to not read into a reference too much, I want to consider less of who is 
being satirized for which text is specifically being referenced and more of how a text like 
the Mirror may reflect the play at large.  
Despite Jonson’s insistence to the contrary, scholars agree that there is most 
certainly topical satire in Bartholomew Fair, with Justice Overdo having a real-world 
counterpart. C. S. Auden, in the 1904 Yale edition, identifies Overdo as the Lord Mayor 
of London who was in office while the play was first staged, Sir Thomas Hayes.148 
However, as David McPherson astutely points out, Hayes had only taken office two days 
prior to the staging of the play, and instead identifies the satirized party as Hayes 
predecessor, Sir Thomas Middleton “(no kin to the dramatist).”149 Citing McPherson, 
both Creaser and Hibbard concur that Middleton is the intended counterpart to Overdo. 
More broadly speaking, the satire expands to specific groups. Overdo, along with two of 
his irascible and outspoken foils, Zeal-of-the-Land Busy and Humphrey Wasp, who are 
placed in the stocks during the third act, emphasize the warping of a basic value like law, 
religion, and learning, respectively. G. M. Pinciss further suggests that the three also 
represent different religious factions in England, with Overdo as the stand-in for the 
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Church of England, Busy “for the arch-Puritan faction,” and Wasp for Catholics.150 Such 
scholarship suggests that perhaps the Scrivener (and Jonson) doth protest too much. 
When modern editors comment on the Scrivener’s mention of The Mirror for 
Magistrates,151 they assert that the reference in the Induction refers “not to the tragic 
monologues in verse collected under that title by William Baldwin and others (1559 and 
following), where ‘mirror’ means warning, but to George Whetstone’s A Mirror for 
Magistrates of Cities (1584), where ‘mirror’ means model of excellence or paragon.”152 
G. R. Hibbard, editor of the New Mermaids edition of the play, offers a similar gloss: 
“The phrase probably has a double meaning: (i) paragon of magistrates (ii) in allusion to 
George Whetstone’s A Mirour for Magestrates of Cyties (1584), in which it is argued 
that good magistrate should find out the truth for himself by visiting places of 
entertainment in disguise.”153 This philosophy of infiltrating potentially villainous places 
in disguise appears explicitly in Overdo’s introduction, thus confirming that it is more 
likely Whetstone that Jonson had in mind. David Bevington does not identify which of 
the two texts (or even that there were multiple contenders in his note) and glosses the 
reference as “what a paragon of a magistrate. Named after an enduringly popular 
sixteenth-century lesson book for those in power, filled with object lessons about the 
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abuse of authority.”154 The description suggests he is referencing the earlier Baldwin text 
as the Mirror focuses specifically on English royalty and nobility, including favorites 
like Richard III and, in later editions, the Duchess of Gloucester. Bevington’s gloss 
reflects his editorial decision to only capitalize the “Mirror of Magistrates” rather than 
provide italics (as in the original printing) or quotation marks (as in the Cambridge 
edition). Bevington’s choice emphasizes that the reference is an allusion and not a direct 
quotation.  
Nevertheless, although it seems clear that Jonson is explicitly evoking the 
Whetstone text, I would suggest we can nevertheless think about the effect of having 
both texts in the same ether as Bartholomew Fair. That is, in focusing on the Whetstone, 
we are invited to think about the exemplum solely as an ideal phenomenon, and then 
Overdo’s characterization becomes an ironic one. This reading works—much of the 
play’s humor comes from its ironies—but when we think about the purpose of the 
Baldwin et al Mirror, we realize that the exemplum does not have to be a morally 
upright one in order to function as an exemplum. Negative exempla may also instruct 
and entertain. 
While I have been focusing on the Articles of Agreement as Jonson’s primary 
mode of instruction in the Induction, Jonson also uses the textual and theatrical space to 
physically present the lesson he wishes to teach. In the Induction, Jonson provides his 
                                                 
154 David Bevington, ed., Bartholomew Fair by Ben Jonson in English Renaissance 
Drama: A Norton Anthology, eds. David M. Bevington, Lars Engle, Katharine Eisaman 




audience with the visual and aural evidence to make judgments on the reliability of any 
given character. Although the Scrivener’s Articles provide the most overt warning 
against trusting the judgments of the uninformed, the lesson itself is underway before he 
and the Book-Holder even show up. For over thirty lines, the raucous Stage-Keeper 
gives his opinion on the forthcoming play against the wishes of “the poet…or his man, 
Master Brome, behind the arras” (6), and goes on to suggest that the show would be 
much improved the presence of prostitutes and the celebrated clown Richard Tarleton. 
All this works humorously enough, but it is not until the Scrivener and Book-Holder 
show up that we are able to understand the Induction’s ethical purpose. Upon being 
asked what he’s doing, the Stage Keeper insists that “the understanding gentlemen o’the 
ground here asked my judgement” (36-7). The Book-Holder responds incredulously, 
scoffing that, “It’s come to a fine degree in these spectacles when such a youth as you 
pretend to a judgement” (39-41). The key words here are “judgement,” “spectacles,” and 
“pretend.” By drawing attention to the spectacle of the play proper and the Stage-
Keeper’s performance, we are meant to understand the presence of sensory evidence and 
that same evidence may be misinterpreted, or misjudged, by an individual who pretends 
to know what he’s doing. The Stage-Keeper provides an interpretation of the events that 
are about to happen, and had he not been interrupted, ejected, and corrected, to what 
extent would we have believed him?  
Ultimately, as Leo Salingar suggests, “the Prologue and Induction to 




not, is personal ‘judgement’ stemming from and confirming self-knowledge.”155 The 
knowledge as evinced in the Induction is not intended to be the knowledge of the self, 
but rather evidence that is collected by the individual using all the epistemological tools 
at a given audience member’s dispersal. Therefore, the Induction establishes not just a 
set of articles that audience members are encouraged to follow but a set of practices that 
will inform the actions of major characters.  
 
Justice Overdo as Counter-Exemplum 
 
After establishing his expectations for the audience in the Induction, Jonson 
proceeds to introduce his exemplum for precisely how not to read and interpret dramatic 
evidence in Justice Adam Overdo. Though mentioned earlier in the play, the first time 
that the audience sees and hears the man himself is at the beginning of the second act. In 
his first soliloquy, Overdo reveals both an overarching concern for obtaining reliable 
knowledge and that his current methods for acquiring evidence have proven 
ineffective—even dangerously so. As a justice, Overdo’s job is to judge and sentence the 
local ne’er do wells, and he hopes that his sentencing is based on appropriate sources. 
Unfortunately, as Overdo points out, his current method of relying on the sensory 
experiences (specifically sight and sound) of others has not worked, largely due to the 
unreliability not of the evidence but by those providing it. “A foolish constable or a 
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sleepy watchman is all our information,” Overdo bemoans, “He slanders a gentleman by 
the virtue of his place (as he calls it) and we by the vice of ours must believe him” 
(2.1.23-5). In these lines that ask what he, as a justice, could possibly know, Overdo 
simultaneously performs his concern for reliable knowledge with which to make 
honorable, just decisions as well distances his own agency for any mistakes in judgment 
he has made in the past.  
To solve the problem of corrupt officers and over-reliance on the testimony of 
historically unreliable informants, Overdo boldly announces that he will take to the 
streets himself to spot crimes: “I, Adam Overdo, am resolved…to spare spy-money 
hereafter, and make mine own discoveries” (2.1.30-31). Referencing Whetstone’s The 
Mirror of Magistrates that encourages the would-be magistrate to investigate local 
criminal activity, the irony in Overdo’s declaration is that he seeks to discover examples 
of falsehood by presenting a false front himself. After all, Overdo does not start his 
soliloquy with the larger epistemological query. Rather, he begins by justifying he 
decision to disguise himself as Mad Arthur of Bradley in order to infiltrate the Fair.156 
This disguise, Overdo himself remarks proudly, is thoroughly convincing: “Fain would I 
meet the Lynceus now, that eagle’s eye, that piercing Epidaurian serpent (as my Quint. 
Horace calls him) that could discover a justice of peace—and lately of the Quorum—
under this covering” (2.1.3-5). Referencing Lynceus, an Argonaut known for his vision, 
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and a line from Horace’s Satires that includes the similarly sharp-eyed eagle and serpent, 
Overdo’s intended message is clear: not even the best seer could penetrate his 
disguise.157 Though he will later justify his decision to resort to subterfuge, Overdo 
nevertheless emphasizes his own visual deception.  
Although not immediately apparent, Overdo takes the reference to the eagle’s 
eye and the Epidaurian serpent out of context, thus signaling that his readings of a given 
situation are based off of accurate yet limited information. Horace’s original passage 
from the Satires reads thus: 
cum tua pervideas oculis mala lippus inunctis, 
cur in amicorum vitiis tam cernis acutum 
quam aut aquila aut serpens Epidaurius? at tibi contra 
evenit, inquirant vitia ut tua rursus et illi.158 
 
Before examining your own faults you smear ointment 
on your bloodshot eyes, but when it comes to your friends’ foibles 
your sight is as sharp as an eagle’s or the Epidaurian snake’s. 
Unfortunately they in their turn scrutinize your deficiencies. 159  
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In the lines above, Horace uses aquila (eagle) and serpens Epidaurius (Epidaurian 
snake), two creatures renowned for their sight, to illustrate the level of detail in which an 
individual scrutinizes another. This scrutiny stands in contrast, Horace argues, with its 
utter lack of focus that an individual uses for identifying their own faults. By directly 
referencing this passage, Jonson simultaneously reveals that Overdo cannot accurately 
interpret a fairly straightforward text and reminds the reader/listener of the warnings 
given in the Induction. As to the former, the issue is not that Overdo does not have 
access to evidence—he directly (and correctly) cites Horace as his source—it is that he 
takes the line quam aut aquila aut serpens Epidaurius out of its original context. What is 
intended to be a simile used to describe the focus in which an individual judges the faults 
of others (rather than himself) is instead taken as an epithet of praise for someone who is 
already sharp-sighted. But once context is introduced, Lynceus is not simply someone 
with far-ranging sight, he instead becomes a relentlessly critical spotter of faults.  
 This detailed context, and whether or not an audience member catches that 
Overdo is using his classical sources speciously, fits into the play’s larger 
epistemological concerns of negotiating interpretative strategies associated with 
humanism and empiricism. Overdo, a justice, is thoroughly embedded in the humanist 
system, thus granting him access to knowing classical texts like those of his “Quint. 
Horace,” but he is also part of an ever-evolving justice system that calls for personal, 
sensory evidence. Instead of separating the two, Overdo, as a synecdoche for the play at 
large, attempts to combine the methods of interpretative reading and sensory acquisition, 




Overdo is completely aware of the irony of deliberately deceiving the populace 
in an attempt to root out corruption and enormity, that is using sensory obfuscation to 
gain sensory knowledge. He justifies his disguise by explaining the previous flaws in 
knowledge acquisition to the audience. Previously, he relied heavily on the testimony of 
a group of patently unreliable subordinates. Overdo’s deception and the levels he goes to 
maintain his disguise in front of the fairgoers is a deliberate façade made in order to 
better discover other deception. He insists that his deception is necessary and cites 
precedent for its existence: “Thus must we do, though, that wake for the public good, 
and thus the wise magistrate done in all ages. There is a doing of right out of wrong, if 
the way be found” (2.1.7-9). The ends (locating enormity) justify the means (donning a 
disguise), as it were, especially if the doer is “the wise magistrate” or some other 
individual in power.  
 To the careful reader, spectator, and hearer, Overdo’s soliloquy introduces a 
character who outwardly attempts to follow many of the stipulations of the Articles of 
Agreement and who anticipates future challenges with judging and interpreting. He 
announces his intentions to remain at the Fair for its duration, enabling him (in theory) to 
make judgements for himself. Specifically, as Salingar observes, his soliloquy, similar to 
the other act’s opening speeches, “harks back to the idea of ‘judgement,’ which had been 
the key word in the Induction—either judgment in ‘conceit’ or judgment by law.”160 He 
also reveals that in the past he had relied too heavily on the testimony of his subordinates 
                                                 




who misled him due to negligence and malice, and that he will rectify his error by 
cutting out the middle man and infiltrating the Fair in disguise so as better to spot 
enormities. This overreliance on unreliable sources returns with a vengeance when 
Overdo relies on single, reported sources of information during his investigations.  
 To the even more careful and learned reader and listener, Overdo reveals that 
while his intentions can be construed as noble if a bit authoritarian, he is hardly no more 
reliable than his misleading subordinates. In addition to the visual cue of the disguise 
which he continually draws attention to, Overdo’s classical references are either 
complete misrepresentations or allusions to the exact opposite of a wise and benevolent 
critical judge. Jonson successfully here provides audiences with differing levels of focus 
and (humanist) education with bits of evidence of Overdo’s unreliability as a source, 
suggesting that his future findings in the play may not be wholly accurate.   
Overdo, as we see, is neither a careful reader nor listener. As a rule, Jonson views 
the poet and his intention as paramount; misinterpretation occurs once someone else 
reads the text. Jonson’s disdain for those who misread is well-documented by none other 
than the poet himself. In his epigram, “To Groom Idiot,” Jonson chastises the vocal 
performance of the Groom Idiot who read Jonson’s poetry aloud, despite the poet’s pleas 
not to.  
 Idiot, last night I prayed thee but forbear 
 To read my verses; now I must to hear: 
 For offering, with thy smiles, my wit to grace, 




 And so my sharpness thou, no less disjoints, 
 Than thou didst late my sense, losing my points. 
 So have I seen at Christmas sports one lost, 
 And, hood-winked, for a man, embrace a post.  
Lamenting that Groom Idiot gets the jokes wrong and completely mangles the meaning, 
Jonson makes his attitude toward to mis-readers abundantly clear. He has no patience for 
them. Yet he also acknowledges the importance of performance in terms of conveying 
the original message properly, lest it confuse the listeners so much that they mistake one 
thing for another. In “To Groom Idiot,” the source of misreading lies not with a 
particular foolish listener, but rather with an actor who, by name, literally cannot read 
properly.  
 Critiques of inept readers appear throughout Jonson’s considerable corpus. 
Though speaking on Jonson’s ideal reader as opposed to the ideal audience member that 
Bartholomew Fair seems to be attempting to construct, George Rowe’s explanation of 
how Jonson’s fashioned his audience strikes me as particularly apt here: 
Many of the poems in the 1616 Folio deal with interpretive problems and faulty 
readers, and Jonson's preference for the preposition to rather than on in the titles 
of his poems is an indication of the weight he gave to readers: the preposition 
calls our attention not to content but to audience by establishing a particular 
reader or type of reader as the primary receiver of the utterance, and encouraging 




addressee foolish—or to concur with that reader's presumed response—if the 
audience is idealized.161 
Rowe’s description of Jonson’s fashioning is surprisingly dramatic, emphasizing how 
the reader is a kind of a voyeur, looking/listening in on the either inept reader or offering 
a safe distance for the reader we agree with who may face negative consequences.  
Something similar is being done with Overdo, though through the intentionally 
dramatic medium that is performed rather than predominately read. Despite (and because 
of) his disguise, Overdo’s quest for enormity is initially met with success. However, 
while he is successful at locating potential mercantile crimes, he quickly undermines his 
own credibility as an interpreter by getting distracted by flattery and other potential 
enormities as the street/stage becomes more populated. Shortly after announcing to the 
audience—and perhaps himself—his intentions to disguise himself and mark the crimes 
of the playgoers in his little black book, Overdo comes upon two street-peddlers, 
Leatherhead and Joan Trash insulting each other’s wares. “Ay! Have I met with 
enormity so soon?” wonders Overdo as he overhears Leatherhead accuse Trash’s 
gingerbread of being composed of “stale bread, rotten eggs, musty ginger, and dead 
honey” (2.2.7-9). As he watches the quarreling pair from the side of the stage, he 
delights in hearing his name invoked by both parties. Leatherhead threatens to take 
Trash “afore Justice Overdo” in order to have her arrested, to which she replies that she 
is willing to meet Overdo with him, as “though I be a little crooked o’my body, I’ll be 
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found as upright in my dealing as any woman in Smithfield” (2.2.17-21). At this point, 
Overdo comments no longer on the pair’s suspected enormity but on his personal effect 
on Smithfield’s citizens, remarking, “I am glad to hear my name is their terror yet: this is 
doing of justice” (2.2.22-23). Here Overdo assumes that his name is enough to maintain 
order, and he does not pursue any further investigations against Trash or her accuser. 
Inadvertently, Overdo violates the first Article of Agreement mentioned in the 
Induction: he does not remain for the entire exchange in order to verify whether or not 
Trash is selling faulty goods. After announcing that his name is accomplishing justice’s 
work, Overdo never returns to the question of Trash’s wares. His lack of interrogation or 
attempts to verify the information stand in contrast to two other investigations he 
conducts in the remainder of the act where, even if he is wrong, he seeks out 
confirmation of what he overhears and over-sees.  
In Overdo’s defense, he is distracted in his first discovery not just by his own 
name but also a much larger (in stature and kind) second enormity: Ursula, the pig 
woman. While sitting disguised in her pig tent that serves as a hub for several shady 
deals among the fairgoers and vendors, Overdo overhears Ursula coaching her servant 
boy, Mooncalf, how to cheat customers when serving alcohol and tobacco. She 
supplements a half-pound of tobacco with a quarter pound of coltsfoot, thus creating the 
illusion of more tobacco. Her guidelines for cheating customers out of beer money are 
considerably more detailed. Ursula instructs Mooncalf to serve glasses with more froth 
than liquid, suggests he gets drunk to feel less guilty when he calculates the tab 




for all his many faults, Overdo uses his personal sensory experience to inform his 
judgement. This is important because, if only for the moment, Overdo’s judgement is 
accurate because he followed an appropriate method without getting distracted or 
clouded with other outside opinion.  
Of course, the comic Overdo does not remain accurate for very long. He begins 
to display judgmental fickleness with his third discovery of enormity: the vapors-loving, 
horse courser Jordan Knockem. As with Ursula, all evidence suggests that Knockem is 
most certainly up to no good, and initially, Overdo successfully interprets the evidence. 
For instance, when Knockem first enters the scene to joke with Ursula, Overdo 
immediately observes his dress, remarking, “Another special enormity: a cutpurse of the 
sword, the boot, and the feather! Those are his marks” (2.3.9-10). Knockem’s 
flamboyant clothing serves as visual evidence for his professional identity, an identity 
that Overdo successfully deciphers. If his outfit were not enough, Knockem’s speech and 
Ursula’s chiding of him further suggest that he is a cutpurse. Ursula even submits that he 
may be imprisoned and hanged for his petty thievery (2.3.3-7) and accuses him of 
spreading rumors that she died “of a surfeit of bottle-ale and tripes!” (2.3.11-12). 
Overdo, who feels fairly confident that Knockem is not to be trusted based on what he 
has both seen and heard, turns to Ursula’s serving boy, Mooncalf, and requests his 
testimony confirming that Knockem is a thief. Mooncalf vehemently denies such a 
claim, suggesting that Ursula’s accusations are not to be taken seriously. Upon receiving 
Mooncalf’s testimony, Overdo immediately flips on his interpretation of Knockem. This 




that the Scrivener raises for the individual audience member not to rely overmuch on the 
testimony of others. 
In the first three examples of potential enormity, Overdo attempts to use his 
investigational practices in order to determine if Trash, Ursula, and Knockem are indeed 
guilty of any crimes. From a distance, he watches and listens to the characters’ 
conversations, taking in their appearance and what is said about them. In Trash’s case, 
Overdo is less interested in what Trash has to say to defend herself from Leatherhead’s 
accusations and more on what Leatherhead accuses her of, and even later, what both 
have to say about the justice himself. He does not offer any specific judgment on Trash 
before moving to Ursula, opting more to consider his role as Justice the concept. In 
contrast to Trash and later, Knockem and Edgworth, Overdo only uses his interpretation 
of the evidence he’s gathered while sitting the pig-tent as well as his personal experience 
with Ursula in order to pass his judgment on her. The connecting factor between 
Overdo’s successful initial reading of the first three enormities is his dedication to locate 
the evidence for himself. What causes that judgment to change or falter is when Overdo 
begins to rely on secondary information like testimonies or accusations rather than visual 
evidence or confessions.  
Overdo’s greatest misinterpretation occurs when he fails to begin with any sort of 
investigation and instead relies solely on testimony in order to judge a character. The 
character in question is Edgworth, the play’s resident pickpocket who steals onstage 
twice. Relying on Mooncalf, whom he trusts implicitly from providing testimony on 




 OVERDO. [Aside to Mooncalf] Child o’the bottles, what’s he, what’s he? 
 MOONCALF. A civil young gentleman, Master Arthur, that keeps company with 
 The roarers, and he disburses all still. He has ever money in his purse; he pays 
 For them, and they roar for him: one does good offices for another. They call 
 Him ‘the secretary’, but he serves nobody. A great friend of the ballad man’s: 
 They are never asunder. 
 OVERDO. What pity ‘tis, so civil a young man should haunt this debauched 
 company! (2.4.21-8) 
The jokes are many. Although Overdo takes Mooncalf’s description of Edgworth to be 
verification of Edgworth as “a civil young man,” Mooncalf’s actual words suggest that 
Edgworth is anything put. In addition to associating with the irreputable “roarers” and 
Nightingale the ballad-seller, Mooncalf provides a pun on “disburses” (de-purses) as 
well as indicating that he always has money. Nevertheless, as with Knockem, Mooncalf 
does not reveal Edgworth’s profession by name, thus protecting both men from the 
justice’s investigations. 
 While Overdo too quickly jumps to testimony in order to create his impression of 
Edgworth, he misses actual verification of serious enormity. While Overdo is onstage 
and in the same room as the others, Edgworth, in the presence of Ursula and Knockem, 
tells Nightingale, the ballad-seller: “All the purses I give you today by conveyance, bring 
hither to Urs’la’s presently. Here we will meet at night in her lodge, and share” (2.4.32-
4). The audience, who at this point has been following Overdo’s investigations, now has 




clerk that Overdo assumes he has. With Edgworth’s announcement of his criminal ties 
and intent, Jonson displays the danger of relying overmuch on another’s testimony, 
particularly when one does not interrogate the primary evidence for themselves in the 
first place.  
While Overdo-as-exemplum is at its clearest in the play’s second act, Jonson 
maintains the moral lesson throughout the play. To illustrate that Overdo’s example is 
not what a viewer should aspire to, Jonson sets Overdo and his constant, comical 
misinterpretations in contrast to the skeptical commentary of Quarlous and Winwife. 
Whereas Overdo locates enormity only where he expects it based on his assumptions or 
reliability on less-than-reputable sources, both Quarlous and Winwife rely on visual 
evidence and their own interpretations of the evidence.  
Like the justice, the two friendly rivals exist outside the intermingling groups of 
characters, only intermingling when necessary, opting instead to view and assess the 
situations in front of them until they too become swept up in the play’s action by the 
final act. Richard Levin describes the pair as “stand[ing] apart from and above the rest 
by reason of their social status and, more important, their insight. They become the 
‘wits’ of the play, not primarily by tricking the ‘gulls’…but by understanding and 
judging them.”162 A clear example of Quarlous and Winwife’s judgment occurs when 
they observe Overdo during his second soliloquy after having been beaten by Humphrey 
Wasp, who assumes that the disguised justice stole his master’ purse. Winwife remarks 
                                                 




to his companion, “What does he talk to himself, and act so seriously? Poor fool!” 
(3.3.38).  
This deceptively brief comment indicates a few key things. First, the actual 
viewing audience at the Hope, at Court, or wherever the play may be currently staged is 
simultaneously reminded that they are watching a play. Early modern and twenty-first-
century viewers alike know that characters will occasionally speak to themselves and to 
the audience whether as soliloquies or asides. Prior to Winwife’s observation, an 
audience member could reasonably assume that when Overdo is talking alone, he is 
simply acting like a character in a play. By drawing attention to how foolish one would 
look narrating events, Jonson reminds us of a play’s artifice, and obliquely, its duty to 
both entertainment and instruct.  
Secondly, by signaling that Overdo is literally talking to himself, Winwife also 
motions to the possibility that Overdo has been addressing an imaginary audience the 
entire time he has been on stage. Salingar reminds us, “All the visitors, and the Fair 
people themselves, are alternatively observers of a sort and impulsive actors, and 
sometimes both together.”163 No one embodies this statement quite like Overdo, who 
acts as if he were in a play. After all, this speech is not the first time Overdo has utilized 
the theatrical conventions of a soliloquy and asides. Prior to Winwife’s comment, we are 
encouraged to think of Overdo’s comments as internal because of theatrical conventions. 
Yet this convention is an artifice, and one that stands out “in the real world.” To what 
                                                 




extent then is Overdo aware of his vocal performances? And who exactly is he 
performing to or for?  
We may find further evidence that Overdo styles himself as a character in a play 
by yet another theatrical trope: a wise figure in disguise. As many scholars have noted, 
Overdo’s disguise as Mad Arthur is an inversion of the “disguised duke” trope that was 
popular in other plays including Measure for Measure and Rollo Duke of Normandy.164 
Like his incognito dramatic counterparts, Overdo pursues information that he can only 
gain while in disguise. Yet, unlike other disguised rulers, Overdo anticipates the moment 
where the duke reveals his disguise. The justice wants to be discovered so that he may 
dispense his knowledge (and judgment). 
Whether Overdo is aware that he is in a play or he just opts to act like he is one, 
Overdo nevertheless has a desire to be seen and heard. At the beginning of each of his 
soliloquies, he draws attention to acts of seeing and hearing. To recall, in his opening 
speech, Overdo wishes that he would encounter the eagle-eyed Lynceus so that he may 
be seen and not recognized due to his disguise. In the speech that Quarlous and Winwife 
overhear, he ironically announces, “I will make no more orations” in favor of elaborating 
on what will happen when he is later recognized by his family and friends (3.3.1). 
Overdo’s theatrics are premeditated on the assumption that he will reveal his disguise 
and will be recognized for his feats of “justice.”  
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 Whereas Overdo functions as a negative exemplum, his major detractors—
Quarlou and Winwife—function as the positive exemplum. Winwife’s brief observation 
of Overdo (and Quarlous’s immediate dismissal of him) illustrates hierarchies of 
interpretation. Upon hearing Winwife point out that Overdo is talking to himself and 
acting strangely, Quarlous responds that they simply ignore him and look at something 
more interesting: the next scene of the Cokes/Overdo/Wasp/Grace party being 
panhandled by the various fair vendors. “No matter what,” Quarlous brushes off 
Overdo’s thirty-plus line prose speech, “Here’s fresher argument, intend that” (3.3.39). 
The juxtaposition of Overdo’s speech length and overwrought style—complete with first 
person narration and Latin phrases—with Quarlous and Winwife’s two short lines forces 
to us to consider how much weight we should give to an Overdo when making our own 
judgments.  
 In contrast to the near-constant misinterpretation of the disguised justice, the 
example of Quarlous and Winwife provides the audience the appropriate way to view 
and incorporate evidence through personal experience. Though not perfect themselves, 
Jonson grants his authorial blessing upon both characters by the end of the play by 
granting them the final words against Overdo and Busy as well as the prize of two 
desirable brides, a rich widow for Quarlous and a young (also rich) heiress for Winwife. 
Despite reputation for exerting control over nearly aspect of his texts, including 
production and interpretation, Jonson’s ultimate solution to the problems of 
interpretation lies in a middling way where an interpreter relies on sensory evidence and 




point relies on methods that are closer kin to humanism, specifically rhetorical 
manipulation and storytelling.  
At its core, Bartholomew Fair is a play about interpretation, that is, the proper 
way to interpret and the dangers when the interpretation goes awry. Overall, while 
Overdo’s quest to discover the many enormities concludes without any arrests or long-
lasting consequences for any of those he had determined guilty of enormity, Overdo’s 
investigational practices serve as an example for a viewing or reading audience of the 
dangers of imposing judgments without sufficient evidence or based solely on another’s 
taste. Throughout Bartholomew Fair, Jonson both anticipates coming plot revelations 
and throws back to previous moments, reinforcing a cyclical plot structure that is meant 
to reinforce major themes and provide continual nuance with subsequent re-readings and 
re-viewings. In Overdo’s case specifically, the justice becomes the very model of what 
not to do as he goes against the Articles of Agreement first with Knockem and again 
with Edgworth. Moreover, Jonson uses Overdo to illustrate the artifice of drama, thus 
linking different modes of inquiry (humanistic and empiricist) together. In linking the 
rhetorical and poetic power of drama with the concrete and inductive allure of sensory 
personal investigation, Jonson highlights uncertainty of even the most objective forms of 





HISTORICAL KNOWING, DRAMATIC TECHNIQUE, AND 
TEMPORAL DISJUNCTION IN 1-3 HENRY VI AND RICHARD III 
 
This chapter detours from the challenge of visual versus spoken evidence to 
consider time and historical epistemologies, how they interweave and collapse in drama, 
and how they relate to the preceding discussions on humanist and empiricist ways of 
knowing. To achieve this aim, I examine Shakespeare’s first tetralogy: the three Henry 
VI plays and Richard III, with specific attention on how Shakespeare and his 
collaborators utilize time as an epistemological and dramatic tool. In these four texts, 
dramatic experimentation with time manifests as mantic utterances (including prophecy, 
auspicious dreams, and curses), as historiography, and as grammar, with all three 
elements being interrelated and part of the larger tapestry of shifting knowledge 
paradigms that we have seen in earlier chapters.165  
 When considering the transition of late humanism and early empiricism, history 
as a productive knowledge paradigm is often forgotten. This is not to say that historians 
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have not been discussing the development and history of their field, especially in relation 
to other fields such as science and literature—far from it. It seems to me that once we 
introduce science as a modern concept and framework, we tend to only look for methods 
that are associated with empirical inquiry and discovery. Early modern historiography is 
therefore bracketed off as a distinct category and not part of the larger conversation. In 
this chapter, I consider historiography as a methodology and see how its developments 
affected and echoed the epistemological shifts of the period.  
In thinking through ways of knowing the past, and by extension, knowing 
temporally, I examine how these more occult and hidden methods of knowing impact 
historical drama, especially when mixed with the humanist education of the playwright. 
Through playing with tense, mood (both grammatical and dramatic), and audience 
knowledge, I argue that Shakespeare takes various methods of knowing the past and 
translates them into dramatic tools that present history as a dynamic continuum that 
simultaneously touches the past, the present, the future, and the imaginative spaces in-
between.  
I begin this chapter with a discussion of English historical chronicles with 
particular emphasis on two of Shakespeare’s major sources, Edward Hall’s The Union of 
the Two Noble and Illustrious Families of Lancaster and York (1548) and the second 
edition of Raphael Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland (1587) and 
their relationship to the genre of English chronicle history. I then turn to 1 Henry VI 
itself where I focus on the many elements in dialogue, character, and presentation that 




normal. I examine the relationship of temporal disjunction to Shakespeare’s presentation 
of prophecy in the second tetralogy, explicitly juxtaposing Joan Purcel’s prophecies with 
Henry VI’s. Finally, I look widely at other forms of divination-as-knowledge throughout 
the entire tetralogy and how they manifest as part of a larger, if disjointed, set.  
 
English Historical Chronicles and the Early Modern Understanding of History 
 
In this section, I discuss how history and historiography was understood during 
the early modern period, particularly in the written chronicles, to set the stage for how 
Shakespeare and his contemporaries understood historical information in relation to truth 
and narrative. The transition from how history, particularly chronicled history, was 
understood during the medieval period versus how it would be understood as part of the 
adaptive process of the early modern English history plays is noteworthy in its 
conception of time. In his preface, F. J. Levy describes the mindset surrounding 
compilers and authors of medieval chronicles: 
The late medieval chronicle may be seen as a compilation, loosely organized, 
whose author had no firm grasp of the essential differences between past and 
present, who thought of the events of a hundred years before his own time as 
occurring in a context identical to the world in which he himself lived. Because 
history writing had to be didactic, and because the lessons were those of personal 
morality and the workings of Providence, it was difficult to decide what was 




worked on the principle of including as much as possible. Nor did these didactic 
motives encourage either accuracy or the criticism of sources. What mattered 
was whether the lesson was clear.166 
Levy’s lengthy description reveals several key themes that Renaissance playwrights, 
such as Shakespeare, adapt from the medieval chroniclers. For one, there was not a clear 
division between the past and the present at least in terms of context. The medieval 
chronicler, according to Levy, did not view the world of the past as fundamentally 
different from their own. As Phyllis Rackin elaborates, for these compilers, “The first 
cause of all things was the will of God, the alpha and omega who contained past, 
present, and future in one eternal, unchanging presence.”167 This lack of contextualizing 
makes sense given a providential view of history—if all is ordained and the purpose is to 
find the moral from swaths of evidence, the context is not as important. Moreover, 
histories in general, to evoke Philip Sidney among others, were intended to teach. This 
purpose and mindset combined created documents with large amounts of information, 
portions of which that were not expected to be relevant until the appropriate present and 
future events had passed, giving them significance beyond a recording of past times.168   
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In contrast to medieval chroniclers who more or less copied down important 
secular events in chronological order without comment, the many sixteenth-century 
English chroniclers focused their attention on non-religious events and sought to place 
them in some sort of causal order. This search for causes and order, as Rackin explains, 
takes on a more human dimension than the divine and moral one of the writers’ 
predecessors: 
The new “politic historians” of the Renaissance still made reference to the will of 
God as the first cause behind historical change; but, impelled by a new concern 
with the life of this world, they described historical causation primarily in terms 
of ‘second causes,’ that is, of human actions and their consequences; and they 
evaluated actions more in terms of their expediency, less in terms of their 
morality.169 
In short, the chronicles of the English Renaissance narrativized the historical events and 
reasoned why things happened the way they did beyond simply ascribing all events to an 
inscrutable divine will. An example of this structuring may be found in Polydore 
Vergil’s Anglica Historia, as Levy explains: “Edward IV forswore himself before the 
gates of York; God saw to it that the sin was punished by destroying Edward’s young 
sons. Thus, history remained a moral subject in that it enshrined the woes that came to 
the sinner, but it left the roots of actions entirely in the hands of man.”170 Moreover, 
chronicles began to be organized by individual monarch’s reigns, and as chronicles 
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continued to be produced, compilers tended to equate the persona of the monarch with 
the events occurring during their reign.  
 Earlier literary historians including Rackin and Daniel Woolf described 
sixteenth-century chronicles as “univocal,” meaning that while they were more often 
than not composed and compiled by multiple authors, the overarching messages were 
consistent and evocative of dominant power structures. More recently, this assumption 
has been challenged by scholars including Peter C. Herman, Annabel Patterson, and 
many of the contributors of The Oxford Handbook of Holinshed’s “Chronicles.”171 
Patterson’s work has been especially influential in this regard.  
 The development of early modern historiography echoes epistemological 
developments from medieval scholasticism to Renaissance humanism to early 
empiricism. We have seen two of the three major changes above: “a new interest in 
causation” and “a recognition of anachronism.” A third, “a questioning of textual 
authority,”172 or as Peter Burke describes it, “the awareness of evidence,”173 also 
emerged during the latter part of the 1500s.  These changes occurred in tandem with the 
English adoption of a humanistic education system, a system that emphasized personal, 
text-based learning and memorization of rediscovered and now more widely available 
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classical writing.174 Newfound secular knowledge in the form of education as well as 
printed books allowed for people to begin thinking about their world in “knowable” 
human terms as opposed to “unknowable” divine ones. As humanism pushed towards its 
logical conclusion of individuals reading and mimicking classical texts, thinkers were 
able to both see the distinctions between a distant past and present as well as the amount 
of knowledge necessary to know when something reported in another source did not 
“fit” within the previous mind frame. This related knowledge further compounded the 
problem of reliability of historical sources—how could one really know if they were 
true?  
Also enmeshed in the larger epistemological trends of Renaissance humanism 
and empiricism, many historians moved from verbal and written testimonies and 
documents to material remains such as coins or buildings. The historian thus transformed 
into an antiquarian. “Unlike earlier humanists,” Rackin explains, “who looked to the past 
for moral and political guidance in the conduct of present life, the antiquarians, replacing 
rhetoric with archaeology, were motivated by a curiosity about the actual details of past 
life rather than by a desire to discover large, significant patterns.”175 This description of 
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“new history” parallels with the emergence of early empiricism which emphasizes the 
search of individual pieces of evidence that can be acquired through the senses rather 
than through text.  
 
Generic Instability, Historic Instability, and the English History Play 
  
The plays that developed out of an English chronicle tradition were in vogue 
during a fairly short time in English literary history. In his discussion on the serial nature 
of Shakespeare’s two major tetralogies, Nicholas Grene states, “There hardly was any 
such thing as an English history play in the professional theatre before 1590; there was a 
marked falling off in the genre after the turn of the century.” Using Felix Schilling’s 
counts in his 1902 The English Chronicle Play, Grene notes that over half (80) of the 
estimated number of English plays focused on English history (150) were from the 
1590s.176 Shakespeare’s publication record echoes this trend as well, with all but one 
play identified as “Histories” in the First Folio (Henry VIII) produced during this same 
decade. Henry VIII is an anomaly among the Shakespeare histories, with the influential 
if oft-criticized E.M.W. Tillyard neglecting to include it in his monograph on 
Shakespeare’s history plays (but including discussions of King John and Macbeth). The 
only history play produced after Elizabeth’s death, Henry VIII reads less like the other 
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history plays and more akin to “problem plays” associated with Shakespeare’s later 
work. 
Curiously, other plays that use history as their primary source are not always 
called “histories.” Case in point are Shakespeare’s plays dealing with Britain’s (rather 
than England’s) distant past such as Macbeth and Cymbeline and plays focused on 
Roman history such as Julius Caesar, Antony and Cleopatra, Coriolanus, Titus 
Andronicus, and Timon of Athens. The First Folio identifies all these plays as tragedies, 
raising the question: what are the generic markers of a history play for an early modern 
reader? 
Despite the ambiguity of the boundaries of history and literature, Shakespeare’s 
contemporaries displayed that there were indeed distinctions between the two. Edmund 
Spenser and Philip Sidney offer two of the more famous takes on this debate. In his letter 
to Ralegh that precedes The Faerie Queene, Spenser distinguishes the difference 
between the historian/historiographer and the historical poet: “An Historiographer 
discourseth of affayres orderly as they were donne, accounting as well the times as the 
actions, but a Poet thrusteth into the middest, euen  where it most concerneth him, and 
there recoursing to the things forepaste, and diuining of things to come, maketh a 
pleasing Analysis of it all.”177 Spenser’s description evokes the classical epic—the poet 
beginning in medias res—and thus simultaneously establishes himself as an English epic 
poet as well as explaining that the organization of historical events is key in determining 
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whether something is history or a literary adaptation based on historical sources. 
Furthermore, Spenser contends that by collapsing the “forepast” and the “things to 
come,” the poet creates a more entertaining understanding for their readers and listeners.  
In An Apology for Poetry, Sidney argues for the superiority of poetry over 
historical writing because poets may fabricate the ideal exempla for a given lesson 
whereas historians are limited to real people. “The historian,” he explains, “is so tied, not 
to what should be but to what is, to the particular truth of things and not to the general 
reason of things, that his example draweth no necessary consequence, and therefore a 
less fruitful doctrine.”178 Underlying these claims is the assumption that history in 
Sidney, Shakespeare, and Spenser’s time was understood to be a true account of what 
had occurred in the past. What is more important for Sidney and for the literary author in 
general is how effective moral instruction is in terms of examples and of entertainment. 
Following the Horatian dictum for poetry to both delight and instruct to an extreme 
degree, Sidney divides the historical poet from the historian by the historical poet’s 
willingness to equally emphasize delight with instruction. 
For his part, Shakespeare lives up to Spenser and Sidney’s descriptions of the 
historical poet, playing particularly fast and loose with chronology and historical 
accuracy. Several sources, both print and digital, compare the distinctions between the 
two, all supporting this conclusion.179 Indeed, as Jean E. Howard remarks, “He 
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notoriously alters and adds to his sources, compresses into a single year events that took 
decades, and frequently assigns speeches to characters that are entirely the creation of 
his own brain and not of any historical record.”180 Shakespeare’s choice to do so, 
moreover, does not seem to have excited any comment from his contemporaries. 
Regarding the history plays themselves, David Riggs reminds us that the early modern 
audience was far more concerned with rhetoric and spectacle than it necessarily was with 
faithful accuracy or even the “moral” of an historical anecdote, explaining: “Where 
modern scholarship looks for an allusive, didactic commentary on Renaissance politics 
and the ways of Providence, Shakespeare’s contemporaries were more likely to begin by 
expressing their enthusiasm for a visual and rhetorical display of heroic deeds.”181 In so 
many ways, the early modern audience is little different form a popular modern 
audience, who enjoy spectacles of books adapted in film and artistic representations of 
favorite characters in fan communities. Ultimately, we need to be careful in over-
focusing and fretting over concerns that, for the original audience, were not large 
concerns at all.  
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Rackin contends that there are three distinct “temporal perspectives” at work in 
the history plays: the chronological, the achronic, and the anachronistic.182 The 
chronological perspective refers to the actual past that the play is set in as well as the 
division between the viewing audience and the performing actors. To perform 
chronological time is to acknowledge a past and the space between the then and the now. 
In contrast, the achronic perspective immerses the audience and places them not as 
distant spectators but spectators in the historical moment that the play stages. Rackin 
offers the example of Richard’s deposition in Richard II as a key scene where 
Shakespeare (and Richard) implicates the audience in his removal from power.  
The final perspective that Rackin identifies, the anachronistic, is her major 
contribution to how time works within the history play. Anachronisms abound 
throughout early modern plays based on historical events from the inclusion of 
technology that had not yet been invented like clocks and firearms to the aging up or 
down of individual characters, like Hotspur turning into Hal’s contemporary in 1 Henry 
IV or Margaret living well into the events of Richard III though her historical 
counterpart died years later to the ascribing of (early) modern feelings and priorities to 
decidedly medieval persons. Rackin contends that these anachronisms offer a distinct 
perspective on the play that is altogether metatheatrical and deliberate. Operating in 
                                                 




contrast to and in-between chronological and achronic temporalities, the anachronistic 
perspective: 
separates the audience from the historical action represented on stage by 
reminding them that they are, after all, simply an audience in a theater. 
Exploiting the instability of dramatic illusion, which can at any moment be taken 
for truth or falsehood, this final perspective directs an audience’s attention to the 
difference between past and present, stage and audience, that are obscured by the 
other two.183 
In other words, the anachronism is a literary method available to a hybrid genre that is 
simultaneously history and dramatic poetry. Temporally speaking, an anachronism is an 
insertion that highlights the challenges of representation of things that we could not 
possibly know (having no direct sources to tell us exactly what happened in an event like 
Richard’s deposition or Henry V’s funeral or Joan’s winning over of the Dolphin) and 
the freedom that imaginative literature allows to create these very images and scenes. 
The connections among the distant past, nearer pasts, the present, and the future 
flood typical history plays—indeed, it is a strong thematic thread that connects and 
defines them as a genre. Philip Lorenz remarks that history in Shakespeare specifically 
“is a history obsessed with the problem of time, indeed ‘mortified’ [specifically, as 
Walter Benjamin sense] by it.”184  In his work to identify just what a history play is, 
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Andrew Griffin considers the specific ways history plays deal with presenting the past: 
“If early modern history plays emphasized connections between the diegetic past and the 
theatrical present, they did so in part by incorporating subsequent history into the play’s 
diegetic reality. This incorporation of action subsequent to the staged action is clearest 
when the historical content’s significance is determined by subsequent action, or when 
the play points conspicuously to future action.”185 That is, early modern history plays 
focused not just on the historical event itself, but also linked the past to the present by 
referencing subsequent events that are in the play’s chronological future, but also still in 
the audience’s chronological past.  
Time becomes even messier when we consider the many points-of-contact an 
early modern audience member or reader would have encountered the history 
surrounding the War of the Roses, especially in relation to the entries in Shakespeare’s 
first historical sequence which follows the reigns of Henry VI, Edward IV, Edward V, 
and Richard III. Famously, the tetralogies were not composed in order of their historic 
chronology. The first tetralogy was first written and performed not with 1 Henry VI, but 
with 2 Henry VI, followed by Part 3, and then Part 1, with the First Part operating as a 
kind of prequel in our contemporary understanding.186 The Henry VI plays are then 
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concluded with Richard III and the crowning of Elizabeth I’s grandfather, Henry VII 
(who, incidentally, does not get his own play). Then, sometime after completing the first 
set of four interconnected plays, Shakespeare produced what becomes known as the 
second tetralogy, or the Henriad. This set of plays, Richard II, 1 and 2 Henry IV, and 
Henry V, while composed and performed after the Henry VI plays, examine characters 
and events that precede Henry VI’s reign.  
 If we were to map out the earliest theatrical productions of the two tetralogies, 
we would most certainly not have a straight line nicely moving from king to king in 
succession, as it was presented in the various chronicles—but this is not to suggest that 
there is not any linearity. This bumpy chronology neither implies that Shakespeare was 
somehow lazy or careless in his composition, nor that he had a secret motivation for 
writing any of his plays in the order that he did. David Scott Kastan explains that “at 
least two models of historical time existed for Shakespeare’s age…: one, providential 
and fundamentally linear, derived from patristic and medieval historical writings; and 
one, exemplary and essentially cyclical, derived from the traditions of late classical 
historiography.”187 Once completed, the compositional and original performance order 
allows for the Henry IV, V, and VI plays (as well as Richards II and III), to be both linear 
and cyclical. The plays are linear in that, individually, they follow a progressive 
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timeline, and as a grouping of plays, their sources follow a progressive timeline 
beginning with Richard II and ending with Henry VII. The plays are cyclical on the 
practical level by being re-performed over and over in multiple orders, and on an 
abstract level by simultaneously alluding to contemporary events and concerns while 
still presenting the past.  
The link that joins the first and second tetralogy, according to Rackin, is the body 
(both his historical persona and the actor’s physical self) of Henry V. She remarks, “For 
the plot of Shakespeare’s historical reconstruction bends the teleological, chronological 
line of his historiographic sources into a circle, beginning and ending with the death of 
Henry V….It replaces the purposeful, linear progress of history with the endless work of 
historiography and the endless repetition of theatrical performance, obsessively moving 
about a lost center they can never recover.”188 Although chronologically Rackin’s 
argument strikes me as true—Henry V reigns in the middle of the middle of the named 
monarchs (and he shares the spot with Henry VI if we include Edward IV in the mix)—
her assertion does not consider how early audiences would have encountered the plays. 
While Henry V serves as a significant through line through all eight plays (even in 
Richard II, where he is foreshadowed though he never officially appears onstage), the 
plays themselves do not join neatly in the middle due to the order of their composition. 
Or perhaps, the two sets of plays do unite in the figure of Henry V, but they only do so 
retrospectively once placed in the larger, printed canon.  
                                                 





Thick Time and Subjunctive Spaces 
 
The challenge with history plays in general is determining if it is even possible to 
extract temporal threads and categorize them into past, present, and future. 1 Henry VI 
begins with such a temporal blend, presenting the funeral procession of the late Henry V 
with a series of ill omens. The interplay of past and future is already on full display at 
the very beginning of the play. Specifically, the Duke of Bedford remarks on the state of 
the sky and its relationship to the young king’s recent demise: 
 Hung be the heavens with black. Yield day to night. 
 Comets, importing change of times and states, 
 Brandish your crystal tresses in the sky 
 And with them scourge the bad revolting stars 
 That have consented unto Henry’s death. (1.1.1-5) 
These five lines, along with the subsequent clarifications on Henry V’s battle prowess 
spoken by Gloucester, operate on several important levels. For one, Bedford and 
Gloucester provide the opening backstory that grounds the viewer/listener or reader in 
the setting. On a fully lit stage in the afternoon, Bedford’s lines illustrate to the audience 
that the atmosphere is meant to be (literally) dark and uncertain. In his work on 
Shakespeare’s use of astrology, Moriz Sondheim cites these lines as the representative 




atmosphere.”189 Moreover, as Edward Burns offers, the first line “hung be the heavens 
with black” may also be a direct reference to the dark fabric canopy that covered the 
stage to signal a tragedy. He elaborates that in this moment, “the English lords may wish 
to create a sense of tragedy, but the line is ambiguous as to whether Bedford is 
describing a black-hung stage or demanding one.”190 In either case, Bedford draws 
deliberate attention to the different temporal relationships that Rackin identified with 
Shakespeare’s later histories. Bedford’s lines are chronological in that they highlight a 
historical past through Henry V’s death, they are achronic in that they draws attention to 
the artifice of the stage and thus being a past event occurring in the present, and they are 
anachronistic both by virtue of being imagined words and by providing a celestial 
pathetic fallacy that lacks any historical referent.  
Throughout the scene, past and future remain in tension as the speakers 
remember their king while adding in allusions to the future. Winchester, for instance, 
references the end of the world and the Book of Revelations, invoking “King of Kings” 
(1.1.28) as the epithet of choice for God and likening Henry himself to “Judgment Day” 
for the French (1.1.29). Likewise, he calls back to the Old Testament (and the distant 
past) by naming God as “Lord of Hosts.” These callbacks and allusions invite several 
readings. For one, they place Henry and his English followers in the moral right as 
warriors blessed and chosen by their deity to eliminate the wicked French who, by 
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linking their fate to a final judgment, deserve their bloody end. The specific references to 
Judgment Day and the violence of the Old Testament also evoke a merciless blood bath, 
perhaps subtly reminding us that, deity-approved or not, war is violent and, for many, 
final. Moreover, the reference to Henry’s French Judgment Day places the audience in 
the hypothetical space of a future that is both certain yet indeterminate.  
As Winchester’s references look forward, they also look back. The Bible and its 
promises and prophecies of Judgment were from the past, and the past is more distant 
than the reigns of Henry V and Henry VI. Ironically, although the events, composition, 
and messages from the Bible occurred chronologically further back, they directly 
affected the everyday existence of the early modern playgoer.  
This scene evokes two key concepts: Walter Benjamin’s dialectical image and 
the palimpsest. My understanding of the dialectical image draws on from Philip Lorenz’s 
application of the concept in Henry VIII.191 Describing the moment between das 
Gewesene (“Then”) and das Jetzt (“Now”), Benjamin argues that when the past is 
spoken of, it does not progress in a linear fashion—it merely appears: “For while the 
relation of the present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of 
what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is not progression but image, suddenly 
emergent.”192 The image itself is what Bedford has created with his words—the scene of 
Henry V conquering France like a just (if grim) harbinger of judgment and apocalypse, 
                                                 
191 Lorenz, “‘Rupture, Reflection, and Repetition in Henry VIII,” 63. 
192 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin 




occurs in a flash for the audience. Simultaneously, while the audience can see Henry in 
their mind’s eye, they are also literally seeing either an actor, speaking their lines in real-
time, the words on a page, or whatever is before their eyes if they are listening to an 
audio recording. The first scenario wherein the audience is both seeing and hearing the 
play ends up presenting the most complexity as it simultaneously offers competing 
images and temporalities. This is not to say reading and listening to a recording do not 
offer the dialectical image, but what that reader/listener actually sees is much easier to 
partition off and ignore as superfluous.  
 This leads me to the second concept that this scene evokes: the palimpsest. 
Simply defined, a palimpsest refers to a document that contained some form of writing 
that was then covered or removed in order to accommodate new writing. The palimpsest 
itself is the image of both the previous recordings and the new text. As plays that rely on 
historical events as the source of its action as well as an audience’s awareness, the Henry 
VI plays are, by nature, “palimpsestuous.” This is both expected and part of the appeal, 
as Paulina Kewes explains: “Any dramatization of the past evokes memories of what had 
come before and foreshadows what was to come later. It therefore established a broad 
frame of reference, encouraging the audience to situate the events represented in the 
context of what they know (or are told) actually happened.”193 Playgoers, especially 
early modern playgoers, are able to adapt the play’s actions to their larger frameworks, 
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seeing one super-imposed upon the other. To continue the metaphor, the older (prior 
knowledge of history) may be faint or obscured given the new sensory imprint. 
The first scene provides an excellent microcosm of the various timelines running 
through the play at large and their repeated imbrication with the theatrical, the literary, 
and even the cosmological. Even in the first lines, Bedford, Gloucester, Exeter, and 
Winchester manage to evoke the past (Henry V’s death and the history of English 
kingship), the present (the heavens’ reaction to Henry’s death), and the future (Judgment 
Day and plans for dealing with a French threat). While the scene moves in a somewhat 
teleological progression (it begins roughly with the past and concludes with the 
characters dispersing and announcing what they will be doing, the temporal state of the 
scene is less clear. On the one hand, several characters are conversing in real-time in 
front of a real audience, setting them all firmly within the present. Yet intermixed with 
this metadramatic present are the tenses the characters use to reflect on past, present, and 
future events, sometimes in the same speech.  
We can see the clearest juxtaposition of past, present, and future with the 
Messengers and the reactions of the nobles, especially the eager Bedford. All three 
Messengers bring with them reports of various length, the first announcing that several 
territories “are all quite lost” (1.1.61), the second delivering letters revealing that “the 
Dolphin Charles is crowned king in Reims” (1.1.92), and the third offering a lengthy 
narrative detailing Talbot’s capture. These messengers, to recall Chapter 2, are 
anonymous nuntii who only appear in this scene and thus, by convention, are considered 




deliverer, the Messenger speaks in the present tense, though all are discussing events that 
already passed. From a dramatic standpoint, the present tense highlights the immediacy 
of the information and serves to juxtapose the excitement and the stakes with the 
melancholy bickering of the nobles. It also contrasts heavily with the nobles’ reactions. 
After hearing about Talbot’s capture, Bedford immediately swears that he will do 
everything he can: 
 His ransom there is none but I shall pay. 
 I’ll hale the Dolphin headlong from his throne; 
 His crown shall be the ransom of my friend. 
 Four of their lords I’ll change for one of ours. 
 Farewell, my masters. To my task will I. 
 Bonfires in France forthwith I am to make, 
 To keep our great Saint George’s feast withal. 
 Ten thousand soldiers with me I will take, 
 Whose bloody deeds shall make all Europe quake. (1H6 1.1.148-56, emphasis 
added) 
In nearly every line, Bedford speak in the future tense, peppering his speech with wills 
and shalls and the appropriate contractions. The surrounding dialogue from the Third 
Messenger and Exeter’s subsequent lines, in contrast, all remain in the present tense. For 
instance, Exeter commands Bedford and the others: “Remember, lords, your oaths to 
Henry sworn” (1H6 1.1.162). He speaks in the present tense while simultaneously 




Though he uses modals for the future, I would suggest that Bedford here (and 
elsewhere) operates in the subjunctive. Although nowhere near as common as in Old 
English and Middle English, or other languages with inflected endings like French and 
Latin, the early modern subjunctive mood plays a key role in 1 Henry VI especially.194 
Being a mood, the subjunctive is not a tense, like past or present; it is also not a category 
of nouns or a declension; nor is it a conjugation. Most English is written in the indicative 
(descriptive) mood, with easily identifiable interrogative (questions) or imperative 
(commands) moods interspersed. Among its many other uses, the subjunctive mood 
places sentences in an imaginative state or describes events that have not yet taken place 
(and can change how a verb is conjugated). 
 Bedford prefers to view the world in, if not the future, a potential alternate world 
where he has already completed previous acts. As the three Messengers enter in 
succession, Bedford’s speech relies more and more on the future. In response to 
Gloucester’s doubts of Bedford’s lack of battle prowess, he responses indignantly: “An 
army have I mustered in my thoughts. / Wherewith already France is overrun” (1H6 
1.1.101-102.) Even when he speaks in the past tense, Bedford is thinking in alternative 
times. In Bedford’s mind, before he learns about Talbot’s capture, the English have 
already won.  
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Shakespeare’s subjunctive further reiterates the both careful and lopsided balance 
of literary technique and historical thought common to his historical sources like 
Holinshed and Stow and to his actual plays. When we look at a line like “An army have I 
mustered in my thoughts / Wherewith already France is overrun” alludes to a future 
event that has, in Bedford’s mind, already happened. The play itself ends up being a 
subjunctive space where real-world time still flows linearly for a viewing or reading 
audience, but through the power of rhetoric, performance, and historical thought, the 
audience and the players can experience multiple and contradictory times.  
Ultimately, this first scene from 1 Henry VI adapts the epistemology of time from 
the chronicle histories and transforms it using dramatic and poetic technique in a manner 
that exacerbates the goals of history that both Levy and Rackin have identified. In this 
play Shakespeare collapses entire decades in order to have his major characters—Joan, 
Talbot, and Henry himself—of age (or even just alive) interact. But it is not enough to 
pull characters or ideas from different points in the historical record—Shakespeare 
transforms a prose history into a completely new genre where not just temporal events 
are collapsed but the language itself.  
 
Prophetic Knowledge and Dramatic Historiography 
 
Shakespeare’s play with time and subjunctive possibility extend throughout the 
tetralogy. Outside of the opening scenes where he situates the audience into both the 




prominent examples of mantic (that is, prophetic or related to divination) speech that 
extend often extend across scenes, acts, and whole plays. In these  moments, 
Shakespeare uses knowledge that is simultaneously future (for the characters), past (for 
the audience), and present (in being found, spoken, and performed) not only to create 
dramatic tension, but also to illustrate the multivocal nature of history that was being 
attempted in his chronicle sources. 
I suggest that a prophetic or mantic statement may take on one of three major 
forms throughout the second tetralogy. These forms range from utterances that are 
textually signaled as prophetic to those that are implied to be prophetic. The first is the 
conventional prophecy, signaled by the speaker announcing that she or he is actively 
prophesying. We see this explicit type of prophecy throughout the tetralogy, with the 
majority of prophecies stated by King Henry himself in 2 and 3 Henry VI, or in 
deliberate contrast, Joan in 1 Henry VI or the summoned demon Asnath in 2 Henry VI. A 
variation on this form is the reported prophecy wherein a speaker relates an explicit 
prophecy given by another character sometime in the play’s past. The second form is 
curses, with the most famous examples coming from the women in Richard III—
Margaret’s curse in particular—and other curses such as those uttered by Suffolk in 2 
Henry VI. The third major form is auspicious dreaming, as in Clarence’s, Richard’s, and 
Richmond’s prophetic dreams in Richard III or Cardinal Beaufort’s claim of a dream 
where Gloucester dies in 2 Henry VI. In the case of dreams, the dreamer seems to be 




they struggle to come to terms with whether it is a genuine foreshadowing or the results 
of a worried mind.  
Below, I discuss examples of all three mantic utterances—prophecies, curses, 
and auspicious dreams—and their relationship to the larger historical knowledge project 
that Shakespeare experiments with in the first tetralogy. A play’s prophetic statement, 
regardless of its form, mixes knowledge across multiple categories: supernatural, human, 
and poetic. In all three types of mantic utterance, the future predicted is deemed to be 
entirely certain just as the completed past was reportedly supposed to be. This blending 
of epistemological and temporal structures, opens up a space for skeptical inquiry and 




The first manifestation of divination, prophecies themselves, are packets of 
knowledge that are transmitted from a supernatural power (usually a divine or demonic 
being) to a human. For early moderns, as well as their classic and medieval predecessors, 
the challenge of the prophecy was that humans cannot always understand divine 
knowledge and must spend time deciphering the message to understand its larger 
meaning and significance. As any Greek tragedy will tell you, attempts to decipher and 
thwart fate do not end so well. The traditional prophecy as transferred knowledge is thus 




an audience without having to rely on other, more conventional techniques like 
anonymous reporting and visually performing the scene on stage.   
Prophecies are ubiquitous in the early modern period and remain so well past the 
traditional periodization boundaries. In a late seventeenth-century pamphlet, 
Catastrophe Mundi: Or, Merlin Reviv’d (1683), an anonymous “learned pen” responds 
to the “scandalous” accusations “that Englishmen always carry an old Prophecy in their 
Pockets” by assuring the reader that “we are no more Addicted to those Curiosities than 
our Neighbours.”195 The author goes on to link different nations with their preferred 
prophet—such as France with Nostradamus, a Catholic cardinal with an astrologer on 
retainer—before asserting that while there are bad prophets and prophesies, prophecy 
itself, when performed properly and by the proper people, is a good thing. 
Simultaneously humorous and enlightening, this indignant response reveals the 
ambivalent status of prophecy even well after the Restoration and the creation of the 
Royal Society. The author illustrates that individuals across Europe gain something from 
prophecy, whether that be comfort or entertainment. Yet the anonymous author also 
indicates that an over-reliance on prophecy, as shown by their insistence that not all 
(English)men carry pocket-book prophecies and poking fun at their Continental rivals 
France and Rome as actually being the ones guilty of over-reliance, is worthy of scorn.  
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Shakespeare and his contemporaries’ primary sources for their history plays—the 
English chronicles of Holinshed, Stow, Hall, and others—contain their own share of 
prophecies. In the 1577 and 1578 editions of Holinshed’s Chronicles, the compilers pair 
a prophecy with its fulfillment. The most famous and elaborate example of this 
immediate linkage between prophecy and fruition occurs in the story of Macbeth’s and 
Banquo’s encounter with the witches. This meeting, which follows the same trajectory 
as Shakespeare’s play, begins with the three “women in straunge & ferly apparell, 
resembling creatures of an elder worlde” greeting Macbeth by successive titles before 
vanishing.196 We know what happens next: after becoming the Thane of Cawdor, 
Macbeth and his wife hasten the fulfillment of the remainder of the prophecy by 
murdering the current king, and in the process, teach the reader a very important lesson 
about trusting otherworldly women with the ability to see the future. 
Holinshed notes two different interpretations of Macbeth’s encounter. One 
interpretation holds that Macbeth and Banquo had imagined the encounter that evolved 
into an in-joke between the two. The other takes the prophecy and the story surrounding 
it at face value, holding that the three women were very real and very otherworldly, 
though it is unclear which otherworld they are a part of: 
This was reputed at the first but some vayne fantasticall illusion by Makbeth and 
Banquho, in so muche that Banquho woulde call Makbeth in ieste kyng of 
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Scotland, and Makbeth againe would call him in sporte likewise, the father of 
many kings. But afterwards the common opinion was that these women were 
eyther the weird sisters, that is (as ye would say ye Goddesses of destinie, or els 
some Nimphes or Feiries, endewed with knowledge of prophesie by their 
Nicromanticall science, bicause every thing came to passe as they had spoken. 
[no closing bracket]197 
As the modus operandi of most sixteenth-century chronicles, the appearance of multiple 
interpretations of a given event of story does not warrant comment. What does merit 
attention, however, is how the chronicler frames both interpretations in terms of time and 
importance. In terms of the temporal divide, where (logically) the first interpretation 
goes first in the chronicle, placing the doubtful interpretation earlier allows for the 
second reading to seem verified by the passage of time, something that is always 
required for the fulfillment of prophecies.  
Prophecies proper abound throughout the three Henry VI plays. Unlike general 
auspicious utterances where a character will assert that something is about to happen or 
illustrate discomfort at unfortunate events, the prophecies that I speak of are explicitly 
marked in the playtext or a source as prophecies. Normally, these prophecies either have 
the prophesier themselves announce that they are prophesying or another character will 
do it for them, though infrequently, a prophecy may be identified as such in Hall or 
Holinshed.  
                                                 




 As a knowledge practice, prophecies are significant because they represent a 
mode of knowledge acquisition entirely different from the traditional sensory or 
rhetorical methods that we have seen elsewhere in this dissertation. Unlike ocular proof 
or testimony, the content of a prophecy was thought to come straight from the divine or 
demonic force, bypassing all human modes of inquiry and simply imprint itself on the 
prophet’s mind and tongue.  
 A prophecy may be granted by one of two supernatural forces: God or Satan and 
his devils. With the exception of Joan in her earliest appearances in 1 Henry VI, which 
category a prophecy falls in is fairly easy to spot. Whether or not a prophecy is demonic 
or divine also seems to be linked to the gender, whether of the prophet or the 
commissioner of prophecies. The divine prophecies in the tetralogy are all ascribed to 
highborn men whereas demonic prophecies are linked to women who also are either 
lowborn or employing individuals of a lower class.  
 The most complicated example of gendered demonic prophecy occurs in 2 Henry 
VI, where Eleanor the Duchess of Gloucester commissions a conjurer, a witch, and two 
priests to summon “a spirit, raised from depth of underground” (2H6 1.2.79) who will 
answer any of her prepared questions. As the wife of “Good Duke Humphrey,” the Lord 
Protector who has a claim to the tenuous English throne, Eleanor’s brief appearance in 
the play is marked by her ambition. After being chastised by her husband for dreaming 
of taking the throne over Henry and Margaret, she decides to take matters into her own 
hands to advance the Gloucesters’ state, remarking: 




 I would remove these tedious stumbling-blocks 
And smooth my way upon their headless necks. 
And, being woman, will not be slack 
To play my part in Fortune’s pageant. (2H6 1.2.63-67) 
Shakespeare anticipates Lady Macbeth here, highlighting Eleanor’s comparative 
powerlessness as a woman to the power afforded to her husband as both a man and a 
duke while simultaneously granting her personal agency in attempting to achieve her 
goals. This agency, as we see shortly after this speech, includes secretly employing the 
corrupt clerk John Hume to solicit Margery Jourdain the witch, and Roger Bolingbroke, 
the conjuror. The form of Eleanor’s agency, as she herself notes, is stereotypically 
feminine—she cannot simply chop off heads, but she can work discretely to locate 
otherwise unknowable information. 
 Where the gendered link to demonic prophecy becomes complicated in the scene 
that follows is that the majority of the actual conjuring of (and most of the conversation 
with) the summoned demon is completed by men. Eleanor herself watches the conjuring 
from above, and Margery Jourdain only speaks briefly. Yet while Eleanor is not part of 
the summoning per se, and while she herself does not ask any questions, Bolingbroke’s 
inquiries are still Eleanor’s that she had written down (or someone had copied) for the 
conjurers.  
Jourdain’s brief lines further illustrate the complexity of learning needed to 




over and reads Eleanor’s questions, Jourdain commands the spirit by name and invokes 
God in order to control it:  
 Asnath,  
 By the eternal God whose name and power 
 Thou tremblest at, answer that I shall ask; 
 For till thou speak thou shalt not pass from hence. (2H6 1.4.24-27) 
In so many lines, Jourdain confirms the adage that names have power, and that (the 
Christian) God supersedes all other powerful creatures. Asnath’s name, as Ronald 
Knowles suggests, may be “an anagram for ‘Satan’, or ‘Sathan’…Other editors have 
suggested that ‘Asmath’ [as it appears in F] is a corruption of or derivation from 
Asmenoth, Astmeroth, Asteroth, and Asmodeus.”198 Regardless of who the demon is 
actually supposed to be, all of the suggestions indicate that Asnath is demonic. By 
knowing this particular spirit’s name, and using it, Jourdain and her fellow conjurers are 
able to control the demon. In addition to illustrating the conjurer’s book knowledge, 
Jourdain’s lines not only complicate the gender divide but also the demonic/divine 
divide common in certain types of early modern and medieval spirit summoning. In the 
lines above, Jourdain explicitly names God and uses the spirit’s fear of the deity’s “name 
and power” (2H6 1.4.25) to control them. But she is also still summoning a demon if not 
Satan himself.  
                                                 




 Added to this confusion of who is permitted to acquire and access the demon’s 
knowledge is the mixed company of listeners and readers. Eleanor faces the brunt of 
punishment for summoning and consulting Asnath whereas the summoners themselves 
are released. York and Buckingham who arrest the errant Duchess, while they are not on 
stage to witness the actual giving of the prophecies, read the report of them and faces no 
dire consequences. In a soliloquy, one of the summoning squad, John Hume, informs the 
audience that the summoning is a set up. He has been hired by the Cardinal and Suffolk 
“to undermine the Duchess / And buzz these conjurations in her brain” (1.2.98-99) in 
order to orchestrate her husband’s fall from grace. York and Buckingham, and by 
extension Suffolk and Beaufort, do not seem to really care one way or another that the 
Duchess is anachronistically violating laws or moral dictums. What they care about is 
that her consultation with witches, priests, and devils would offend both the pious Henry 
and the common people who otherwise adore Gloucester, thus undermining their 
influence and proximity to the English throne.  
1 Henry VI too offers several examples of prophecies that also capture the 
complexities of access to and sanctity of knowledge granted wholesale through outside 
intervention as opposed to investigation or study. As a rule, whether or not a prophecy is 
acceptable is based not on whether the prophecy itself comes to fruition (though all 
“good” prophecies do come true in some form by the end of the tetralogy), but rather on 
who is giving the prophecy. Similar to his stance on any number of issues, Shakespeare’s 
personal take on prophecy is obscure, open to interpretation by whoever is performing, 




made by a variety of characters—male and female, English and French, high-class and 
low-born. It is not coincidence I think that these binaries are largely consistent in 1 
Henry VI, though Parts 2 and 3 allow for some collapse.  
This collapse of time and genre, as Alice Dailey argues, is part of the history 
play, as she explains: “Disruptions to the binary distinction between history and 
performance…are embedded in the history play itself, a form that exposes the 
cooperation of archival and performative evidence to construct the past in the dramatic 
present.”199 Dailey is careful to position her argument within performance studies 
specifically here, drawing attention to the human bodies an audience sees in performance 
as well as the remains of dead bodies from the past, an issue which becomes all the more 
complicated when dead bodies or separate body parts appear on stage. For the history 
play, all of these things—embodiment, time, memory, historical knowledge, and 
dramatic practices—are imbricated within each other. 
While the major prophets of the first tetralogy are women, prophecy is hardly an 
exclusive feminine domain. Men throughout the plays prophesize or work with 
prophecy, though they tend to do so as intermediaries rather than as prophets themselves. 
For certain, male soothsayers do exist in Shakespeare’s corpus, most notably in plays 
emphasizing Roman history like Julius Caesar and Cymbeline, but they seem to be a 
rare breed here. In the history plays, particularly 1-3 Henry VI, are male prophets that 
also just happen to be kings with a direct divine connection as I detail below. 
                                                 
199 Alice Dailey, “The Talbot Remains: Historical Drama and the Performative Archive,” 




In 1 Henry VI, the first inkling of prophecy comes not from Joan but from 
Bedford. As the play’s first speaker, Bedford immediately signals to the audience that 
the events of the play are set within a specific cosmological framework where the events 
on the earth are echoed in the heavens, and in turn, heavenly bodies effect mundane 
control. As part of a prayer where he calls to the recently deceased Henry V to offer 
succor, Bedford first predicts:  
Posterity, await for wretched years 
 When at their mothers’ moistened eyes babes shall suck, 
Our isle be made a nourish of salt tears, 
And none but women left to wail the dead. (1.1.48-51) 
The prediction itself is short and, and when placed in comparison to the larger point that 
Bedford is making (the invocation), it is easy to miss. 
In addition to Bedford’s propensity to dwell in a future perfect tense, Exeter 
references two prophecies that he knows from varying sources. The first prophecy plays 
with the expectations of an audience that understands not just the story of Henry VI’s 
reign but the origins of the reign of his father. As the English nobles prepare to set off 
for France, Exeter remains alone onstage to bewail the growing civil tensions and what 
that means for future England. 
 And now I hear that fatal prophecy, 
 Which in the time of Henry, named the Fifth, 
 Was in the mouth of every sucking babe— 




 And Henry born at Windsor lose all. (3.1.197-201) 
Exeter attributes this strange prophecy not to a particular character or figure but 
to nursing children, thus providing a divine cause for the prophecy. If babies cannot lie 
(and cannot speak in two complete lines of iambic pentameter), the prophecy obtains 
more credibility as a divine act rather than a demonic one. The suckling babes are also 
verified by way of Exeter who concludes that the events unfolding around him are “so 
plain that Exeter doth wish / His days may finish ere that hapless time” (3.1.202-3). That 
is, Exeter has seen the writing on the wall, and it is obvious what is happening.  
Another surprising character who prophesizes is the deceased Henry V himself. 
Exeter, attributes a posthumous prophecy to the king, viewing Winchester’s upgrade 
from bishop to cardinal as confirmation of his utterance. He says to Henry VI, who 
promptly ignores him to receive Winchester and the rest of the Roman ambassadors: 
“Henry the Fifth did sometime prophesy: / ‘If once he come to be a cardinal / He’ll make 
his cap co-equal with the crown’” (5.1.31-4). In his discussion on curses and prophecies 
in the Henry VI plays and Richard III, Nicholas Grene takes great care to note that line 
does correspond to a similar statement made by Henry in Edward Hall’s The Union of 
the Two Noble and Illustre Famelies of Lancastre and Yorke. The comment in question 
refers to a comment that Henry reportedly made, prohibiting Winchester from becoming 
a cardinal due to his ambitious nature: “kynge Henry the fith knowing the haute corage, 
and the ambicious mynde of the man, prohibited hym on his allegeaunce once, either to 




Princes.”200 Grene explains, “In the sources this is not a prophecy at all, merely a 
proscription on the part of the king…With the King dead, the political savvy of Henry V 
is turned into vatic foresight.”201 By attributing the prophecy to the previous king, Exeter 
grants the prophecy considerable weight as Henry V was linked with prosperity and 
divinity. That Henry VI chooses to ignore Exeter’s words, of course, contributes to his 
inevitable downfall.  
Standing in opposition to these divinely inspired male prophets is the 
demonically-empowered Joan Purcel. The fictional Joan, based on the real-life Joan of 
Arc, is the first in 1 Henry VI to give an explicit prophecy rather than reference one. As 
a prophet, she simultaneously uses the methods of reporting that we have seen earlier in 
this dissertation alongside historical knowledge available to the audience and 
supernatural knowledge that has been given to her, presumably by the demons that 
appear in the play’s final acts. Joan’s prophecy displays the intimate connection of 
England’s glorious past and dismal future clearly. After being accepted by the Dolphin 
as a legitimate prophetess, she asserts: 
 Assigned am I to be the English scourge. 
 This night the siege assuredly I’ll raise. 
 Expect Saint Martin’s summer, halcyons’ days, 
 Since I have entered into these wars. (1H6 1.2.129-32)  
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Joan’s opening lines constitute the prophecy proper. (Self)-assured of her identity as a 
divine warrior for France, Joan promises unexpected success of the “Saint Martin’s 
summer,” which refers not to summer itself, as Edward Burns notes, but to an 
unseasonably warm autumn as Saint Martin’s feast day is in November.202 Her word 
choice points to an expectation of French losses, particularly when in combat with the 
English. This use of prophecy is fairly straightforward—Joan claims that she will do a 
thing due to her chosen status as “English scourge.” 
Joan’s prophecy, however, does not end there. As she continues her speech, she 
seeks to connect her future success with the past success of the English Henry V, whose 
demise removes not just him but his glories. Building upon the reference to Alycone 
from “halcyons’ days,” Joan visualizes the spread of glory as “a circle in the water / 
Which never ceaseth to enlarge itself / Till by broad spreading it disperse to nought” 
(1H6 1.2.133-5). This utterance also proves to prophetic but for Joan herself and the 
French army in addition to the deceased king. By the play’s end, Joan’s watery circle 
also disperses as she magnifies her attempts to win multiple battles against the English 
invaders. Joan’s gradual bids for martial advantage start conventionally enough—she 
bests the Dolphin in hand-to-hand combat and through rhetoric and guile, she manages 
to inspire the French troops and even persuade Burgundy to defect—but they take an 
immediate turn for the strange and occult in the final act when she summons literal 
demons to assist her. This major scene encapsulates the point where Joan’s ripple of 
                                                 




glory breaks. Here, when initially summoning the spirits, Joan reveals that her prophetic 
power is apparently genuine but demonic. After demanding “signs of future accidents” 
(1H6 5.3.25), Joan assures the audience that she has been communing with spirits for 
some time and that their “speedy and quick appearance argues proof / Of your 
accustomed diligence to me” (1H6 5.3.29-30).  
The play itself offers multiple possibilities as to the source of Joan’s abilities to 
prophesize, see through disguise, and defeat armed men in combat. For an individual not 
familiar with the mythology surrounding Joan of Arc, the playtext (spoken by Joan 
herself) claims that her strength and knowledge come from the Virgin Mary, as opposed 
to from God. This claim aligns with the historical Joan’s affinity with the Virgin and 
also reinforces the Catholic/Protestant and Woman/Man binaries that informs the play 
and places Joan firmly on the “wrong side” with her French compatriots. Prior to 
defeating the Dolphin in individual combat, she describes her vision of Mary: 
 God’s mother deigned to appear to me 
 And, in a vision full of majesty, 
 Willed me to leave my base vocation 
 And free my country from calamity: 
 Her aid she promised and assured success. 
 In complete glory she revealed herself. (1H6 1.2.78-83) 
The revelation is sparsely detailed, as Joan opts to focus not on painting the picture of 
the event itself but rather summarizing the vision’s message. Plotwise, this choice makes 




as her ordained mission or the rhetorical move that will most convince the French 
leaders. However, the lack of details of the vision stands in direct contrast to other 
reports in the play such as the messengers’ descriptions of the battles and Talbot’s 
capture as well as Joan’s deliberate decision to explain how the vision transformed her 
from a “black and swart” shepherd’s daughter (1H6 1.2.84) to a great beauty.  
 Whether a person’s report or prophecy needs to be verified by other means varies 
based first on their dramatic role, and then their intrinsic ethos, or the words and actions 
of a character to add to their reliability as opposed to any audience foreknowledge. 
Messengers, if we recall from Chapter 1, are generally imbued with a sense of 
trustworthiness. While other plays certainly toy with this convention and have 
messengers provide false or misleading information, the words of the unnamed 
messengers in 1 Henry VI may be taken at face value as the main points of their reports 
are later validated. With Joan, however, the verification is much more complicated. We 
do not receive the thick description that would add credence to her report of a holy 
vision entrusting her with the fate of France, but we do receive some initial evidence that 
could potentially support her claim that she has been imbued with divine power when 
she defeats the Dolphin in combat.  
 In the early acts of the play, Joan’s claims are seemingly validated with the 
option for comic subversion depending on the staging. Upon hearing her description of 




trial, as Edward Burns suggests, that is the fabrication of the playwright.203 The Dolphin 
states: “Only this proof I’ll of thy valour make--/ In single combat thou shalt buckle with 
me, / And, if thou vanquishest, thy words are true” (1H6 1.2.94-6). And vanquish him 
she does, thus providing enough evidence for the Dolphin that she is who she says she is.  
 The text itself, however, offers additional possibilities. On one level, an audience 
member may take Joan’s overcoming of the Dolphin as a divine act. This move is no 
different than the medieval trial by combat—God favors the winner. An audience may 
perfectly buy that she has some form of Virginal aid. On the other hand, the playtext 
offers several lines that strongly imply a sexual overthrow that perhaps “unmans” the 
Dolphin to make him more aligned with the play’s already established binaries. Prior to 
the combat, Joan informs the Dolphin that “thou shalt be fortunate, / If thou receive me 
for thy warlike mate” (1H6 1.2.91-92). The choice of “mate” here is interesting as it 
offers the possibility of Joan as a combative bedfellow or wartime ally or both. The 
sexual innuendo continues for the remainder of the scene as Joan defeats the Dolphin by 
knocking him down either physically or, at minimum, metaphorically, rendering him her 
“prostrate thrall” (1H6 1.2.117). Moreover, the play may be staged so that the Dolphin 
remains physically on the ground while Joan forcibly keeps him down by standing or 
sitting on him, thus emphasizing the bawdy nature of their interaction.  
 Shakespeare’s presentation of multiple possibilities for Joan’s motivations stages 
what English chronicles show. That is, frequently in the chronicles, writers will 
                                                 




incorporate multiple sources that do not always agree. Given the medium of drama, 
Shakespeare’s actors cannot simply repeat the same scene from a different perspective, 
but they can evoke skepticism in an audience through juxtaposing a known quantity such 
as Joan (whom the audience at the very least knows is a woman, French, and Catholic) 
with her early heroic actions or speeches.  
 In addition to these comic possibilities, the play keeps the source of Joan’s power 
an enigma throughout until the final act where it is revealed that she had demonic rather 
than divine aid. Interestingly, this sudden twist is not the first time that Joan is associated 
with witchcraft in the play. Talbot drops several hints to the audience that Joan (and by 
extension the French) are associating with some sort of illicit magic. Talbot, during their 
first encounter, associates her with the devil: 
 Here, here she comes. I’ll have a bout with thee— 
 Devil, or devil’s dam, I’ll conjure thee. 
 Blood will I draw on thee—thou art a witch— 
 And straightway give thy soul to him thou serv’st. (1.5.4-7) 
Despite these blunt accusations, Joan does not directly respond to them, opting instead to 
return a quick challenge and attack. They engage for two bouts, with Joan seemingly the 
victor of the first and retreating after the second. Once she retreats, she informs Talbot 
that his “hour is not yet come” (1H6 1.5.13), though it is unclear if she actually has 
access to foreknowledge regarding Talbot’s death or if she’s goading him. If we read this 
moment as Joan having foreknowledge, we may link it either to her claim in the earlier 




she is a witch. Joan’s lack of response to Talbot’s accusation seems to be key here, as 
she does not remind the audience by contradicting Talbot that she is assisted by the 
Virgin Mary, which she later does when attributing her victory over the Dolphin.  
 As the play continues, Talbot seems thoroughly convinced that Joan is dealing 
with supernatural forces. In the second act where he speaks with Bedford and Burgundy 
about the cross-dressed warrior maid, he dismisses Joan and the French: “Well, let them 
practice and converse with spirits. / God is our fortress” (2.1.25-6). On one hand, it is 
clear that Talbot has plenty of reasons to despise his previous captors as well as the 
woman who bested him in battle. Yet, on the other hand, the specific evocation of 
communing with spirits and placing it in juxtaposition with God makes it abundantly 
clear that Talbot is still associating Joan (and the French) with Satan and the English 
with God.  
Upon an initial read, Joan’s demonic connection comes out of left field, as 
Patrick Ryan asserts: “But Shakespeare, despite the Tudor chroniclers’ expressed 
condemnations, gives no conclusive dramatic evidence through most of 1 Henry 6 that 
Joan receives power from Satan, not, as she claims, from God.”204 At first glance, 
Ryan’s reading of the revelation of Joan’s power source makes sense. When Joan 
communes with demons at the play’s eleventh hour—or the fifth act—she has to explain 
to the audience that the fiends immediate response to her call “argues proof / Of [their] 
accustomed diligence to [her]” (5.2.29-30). These two lines hint at the artifice of 
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theatricality by justifying the sudden the demons’ sudden appearance, but they also 
suggest that the playwright knows full well that he hasn’t provided any ocular proof of 
Joan’s black magic before this late point. Nevertheless, despite an initial feeling of 
whiplash, if we re-examine the play at length, we can see that Shakespeare, primarily 
using Talbot as a mouthpiece, makes it perfectly clear that Joan Purcel was always a 
witch, at least insofar as 1 Henry VI is concerned.    
Indeed, summarizing feminist dismay at Joan’s reduction from complex 
character who is simultaneously comic and threatening while also being androgynous, 
clever, and charismatic to consorting with demons, Burns admits that the scene “can 
seem disappointing to a modern audience in its apparent reductiveness, by suggesting 
that Talbot was right all along.”205 But that is exactly the point. Of course Talbot was 
right all along—he’s one of the few central characters who is always presented as having 
a trustworthy and honorable ethos. What troubles many modern readers about Joan’s 
seeming turn to the dark side is a set of expectations that are not immediately mappable 
to the original viewing and reading audience. When we read Shakespeare, we want and 
expect to see nuanced central characters who are imperfect yet charismatic people that 
we may empathize with. For many, Joan certainly starts out that way, especially in 
comparison to her foil Talbot. Yet while modern readers may see more of a hero in Joan 
who lives by her wit and rhetoric (coupled with a few fight scenes where she emerges 
the victor), the early modern reader is always going to be Team Talbot.  
                                                 




What we know about Talbot’s fame comes from Thomas Nashe’s 1592 Pierce 
Penilesse, His Supplication to the Divell. In his brief defense of plays, contending that 
they are “a rare exercise of vertue,” Nashe directly references a play where Talbot 
features as a central character: 
How would it havu ioyed brave Talbot (the terror of the French) to thinke that 
after he had lyne two hundred yearrs in his Tombe, hee should triumphe againe 
on the Stage, and haue his bones newe embalmed with the teares of ten thousand 
spectators at least (at severall times) who in the Tragedian that represents his 
person, imagine they behold him fresh bleeding. 206 
This oft-quoted section alerts us to several issues that Shakespeare addresses 
predominately in 1 Henry VI. First, Talbot is set in juxtaposition not with Joan or the 
Dauphin or any particular rival but the French as a collective unit. Nashe presents Talbot 
as an idolized hero whose death excited the emotions of the audience, an audience were 
so moved to tears that they “embalmed” the real Talbot’s bones. Moreover, Nashe’s 
claim illustrates the popularity of 1 Henry VI and its hero, quantifying that Talbot’s 
tragic death moved a minimum of “ten thousand spectators” across multiple 
performances, as shown by the parenthetical “many times.” This claim is given further 
credence by “Henslowe’s records, which” as John D. Cox and Eric Rasmussen report, 
“show fourteen more performances over the next twenty-two months.”207  
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Ultimately, the hero-worship of Talbot that Nashe expresses and Shakespeare’s 
presentation of him, particularly in contrast with another, more irascible character, 
strikes me as similar to what he will do with Hal and Hotspur in 1 Henry IV. Joan, like 
Hotspur, ultimately loses to her noble rival due in no small part to their hotheaded 
natures. However, while these two are ostensibly the historical “losers” in the ongoing 
drama of succession, Shakespeare frames them with characteristics that make them if not 
likable then interesting, with motivations that resonate perhaps even stronger now than 
then. Following Rackin, Richard Hardin illustrates the many ways Joan contradicts the 
privileged social mores of gender, religion, and class: 
A renegade daughter, Joan violates the cherished patriarchalism of the age. She 
also offends prejudice in adopting a male role, in pretending to the virginity so 
prized in a male-dominated culture, and in being a Catholic at a time when 
Catholics were associated with outrages like the Inquisition and the St. 
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre…Finally, Joan offends in being a low-born person 
pretending to aristocratic rank and modeling with the aristocracy’s mysteries of 
love, honour, and war.208 
By framing her in this manner, as a character that’s on the wrong side of every 
traditional power boundary, Joan becomes a character that excites both fascination and 
discomfort. She represents everything Talbot is not, but she also exudes charisma and 
competency in battle, traits which make her a worthy rival as well as interesting foil.  
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 Joan ultimately epitomizes the temporal disjunction and epistemological 
confusion that the audience experiences throughout the play. Even if we do not 
immediately trust Talbot’s take on the situation, Joan’s multiple characterizations as 
prophet, warrior, and witch are all verified in the text. Her prophecies do come true, she 
does physically fight, on stage, with both Talbot and the Dolphin, and she casts spells 
and summons demons in audience view. In her work on Joan’s several identities 
Gabriele Bernhard Jackson explains that “the changing presentation allows Joan to 
perform in one play inconsistent ideological functions that go much beyond discrediting 
the French cause or setting off by contrast the glories of English chivalry in its dying 
moments.”209 By her costuming and rhetoric, Joan is visibly and aurally identified as 
stock female characters such as the Amazon. By presenting Joan as an Amazon or virago 
in armor, Joan is able to evoke all the positive literary associations of the Amazon, 
including their link to Elizabeth. The image, however, also evokes the threat of 
femininity and the Other. Of this multi-nature, Bernhard Jackson concludes: “Joan in 
armor is as fair and foul as the traditional double-potentialed Amazon, and that what she 
says or does is as likely to undercut ‘the glorious deeds of the English in France’ as to 
set off their splendor. She is a powerful warrior and a powerful enemy, but also an 
inverted image of both.”210 Moreover, Joan is not only an Amazon, she is explicitly a 
witch, two figures that while feminine, are at odds. In terms of age and humors, the 
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Amazon woman is like her young male counterpart: hot-blooded and wet whereas the 
witch is a crone, overly dry and cold. The pair are also opposed in how they threaten 
established power structures, as Diane Purkiss observes: “In terms of nationhood, 
witchcraft and Amazonian invasion are opposite threats; one is invisible, the other 
visible.”211 Joan is a contradiction who somehow manages to exist as multiple ciphers 
and types within one coded body. This ideological functions dovetails into her 
epistemological function as prophetic packet of knowledge that needs to be interpreted. 
 As 1 Henry VI’s grammar and images that simultaneously evoke past, present, 
and future, so too the figure of Joan illustrates a complex multiplicity that is only 
somewhat contained within the larger, forward-marching narratively. Bernhard Jackson 
argues, “whereas the play’s structure points in the direction of synthesis, of the 
synchronic or temporally transcendent reading, the exempla point towards 
differentiation, the temporally disjunctive reading.”212 That is, while the play moves 
forward in time like the chronicles, guided both by Providence and the audience 
knowledge that these events have already occurred, more or less, specific characters and 
their allusions disrupt that flow. Character-wise Joan is the clearest example of this 
phenomenon in 1 Henry VI due in no small part to her identity as other in literally every 
sense. She simultaneously claims virginity and pregnancy (both claims though not 
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explicitly verified are strongly suggested to be false), she is woman and a warrior, and 
she is connected rhetorically to the divine and the demonic. 
 Epistemologically speaking, Joan functions a bodily manifestation of prophecies, 
a combination of human and divine knowledge that is made resolutely physical through 
her presence on the battlefield and her self-reflexive femininity. The same as her fellow 
characters, Joan is both a historical figure and a fictional construct; yet whereas her 
counterpart Talbot represents a comfortable, heroic historical narrative of English 
superiority over the French, Joan is less easy to pin down. Like the play and the 
prophecies she gives, she is ultimately contained within a set of closed boundaries, but 
within those boundaries, she is in creative flux.  
 Counter to Joan is Henry VI himself, although he prophesizes in 3 Henry VI 
rather than in direct real-time proximity to her character. Henry VI offers two prophecies 
that the audience know will come true: the claiming of Richmond as his heir in Act 4 
and his scathing prophecy that all will come to hate Gloucester, the once and future 
Richard III. Theatrically, they also function as moments of respite and heightened 
anxiety respectively. His prophecies are always marked not as simply predictions but 
rather as explicit prophecies, either by calling them a “prophecy” or by appealing to 
Christian divinity. This deliberate choice, coupled with the historical knowledge 
surrounding Henry VI as a pious king, allows the prophecies to not just be accurate—the 
audience already knows that—but sanctioned within the worlds of the play and the past. 
 The first prophecy that Henry VI gives combines visual and the verbal modes in 




combat in order to verify her prophetic status and Bedford repeats the words of the 
previous King Henry V (thus adopting Henry’s ethos in place of his own), Henry VI 
mixes his own internal and external ethos with historical knowledge and the visual prop 
of Richmond in order to make his prophecy all the more real: 
Come hither, England’s hope 
(Lays his hand on his head) 
   If secret powers  
Suggest but truth to my diving thoughts, 
This pretty lad will prove our country’s bliss. 
His looks are full of peaceful majesty, 
His head by nature framed to wear a crown, 
His hand to wield a scepter, and himself 
Likely in time to bless a regal throne. (3HVI, 4.6.68-74) 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Henry’s prophecy is not explicitly verified within the context of 
3 Henry VI, though it does come to fruition at the very end of Richard III when Henry 
VII takes the throne. The proof of prophecy comes not from outward verification but 
rather from audience knowledge and Henry’s association with the divine.  
 After he becomes King Richard III in the final installment of the series, Richard 
himself remarks on Henry’s selection of Richmond, identifying the moment explicitly as 
a prophecy and Henry as a prophet. Upon hearing the news that Richmond has fled, 
Richard begins to obsess over the young man and completely ignores Buckingham’s 




KING RICHARD. As I remember, Henry the Sixth  
Did prophesy that Richmond should be king 
When Richmond was a little peevish boy. 
A king: perhaps, perhaps— 
BUCKINGHAM.   My lord. 
KING RICHARD. How chance the prophet could not at that time 
Have told me, I being by, that I should kill him? 
BUCKINGHAM. My lord, your promise for the earldom. 
KING RICHARD. Richmond! When last I was at Exeter, 
The mayor in courtesy showed me the castle 
And called it Rougemont, at which name I started, 
Becaue a bard of Ireland told me once 
I should not live longafter I saw Richmond. 
BUCKINGHAM. My lord! 
KING RICHARD. Ay, what’s o’clock? (R3 4.2.94-107) 
Shakespeare uses prophecy in this scene to link Richard III and 3 Henry VI together. 
How Richard frames the conversation does not require an audience member to have seen 
the preceding play in order for the scene’s mantic (and manic) tone to work, but it is a 
convenient callback for those who have either seen the previous play or know their Hall. 
Though likely not intended to make a larger comment on the often disjointed nature of 




such as a cult of personality or divine will, Buckingham’s constant interjections 
nevertheless echo the multiple voices that appear in sixteenth-century chronicles.  
 Richard’s musings about the prophecy of Richmond becoming Henry VII 
through the sanctioning of the notably pious Henry VI echo the the Tudor Myth, at least 
certainly on the surface. As Tillyard explains, the “Tudor Myth” was a framework 
encouraged by Tudor monarchs that situated the incoming royal family as not only the 
union of two competing lines of Lancaster and York which had splintered from the sons 
and grandchildren of Edward III through Elizabeth of York and Henry Tudor (aka 
Richmond above), but also through his ancestor Owen Tudor the last of the British kings 
before the Norman Conquest and, by extension the mythical King Arthur.213 This 
framing situated the Tudor rule and Elizabeth’s rule in particular as a return to the a 
“golden age,” regardless of whether there really were any substantial improvements. 
Based on historical documents and the need for yet another incoming dynasty to justify 
its claims, this framing of history as providential makes sense as a strategy for the 
Tudors and their supporters. Shakespeare could have chosen not to include the prophecy 
at all in either play, but he opts to double down. As a literary technique, this makes sense 
as the repeating of a prophecy and its fruition across plays as opposed to across scenes or 
even acts allows for pleasure and for a convenient thread to keep the larger plot in tact. 
Shakespeare is also able to draw on audience expectations. If he holds the party line—
                                                 




that the Tudors are the culmination of a divine plan—he can create a satisfying narrative 
that creates comfort in the world the playgoers inhabit.  
 Of course, both history and Shakespeare are never that simple. In his study on 
divine providence and the chronicles, Henry Ansgar Kelly confirms that the 
establishment of similar patterns of divine justification not just for the Tudors but for the 
Lancatrian and York monarch in historical chronicles that precede the sixteenth century 
and these “providential patterns tended to repeat themsleves in accordance with the the 
political alignment of the authors.”214 Yet in the later chronicles such as Hall, this 
narrative, providential, and even vocal consistency is not as common. Of Hall 
specifically, Kelly explains:  
In the case of an historian like Hall, who records his own views as well as those 
he finds or invents for his characters, it might be thought a good rule to assume 
that he agrees with the providential sentiments of the characters he treats 
sympathetically. But a rule like this is dangerous, and implies a consistency and 
depth of thought that is not evident in Hall. Much of his characterization is not 
his own work, and much that is his own is influenced by consederations which 
have nothing to do with his main theme of the divison and union of York and 
Lancaster. The speeches he gives his charcters seem to be constructed primarily 
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with a view to their rhetorical effectiveness, than from any consideration of their 
place in a coherent thematic structure.215 
Hall’s method follows less the medieval thought-structures the sought to offer a closed 
system that, while perhaps unknowable to humans, was known and guided by a divine 
plan, and more the humanist tendency to emphasize rhetoric and context. However, this 
is not to say that Hall completely throws God and determinism completely out the 
window when compiling and composing the chronicles. Structures of thought, especially 
when they are so imbricated within the socio-cultural consciousness do not suddenly 
disappear when other modes of thought become popular.  
Throughout his histories, Shakespeare seems to be doing something similar to the 
historiographers in the English chronicles. He uses prophecies and other divinely 
sanctioned knowledge to give order and structure to the play, but he himself does not 
seem to articulate a specific “canon” interpretation that wholeheartedly supports or 
denies any of the myths. We can see an example of this in Henry’s second major 
prophecy. As Gloucester prepares to murder him (after confessing/bragging that he also 
had murdered Henry’s son), Henry predicts that all will turn on Gloucester and regret 
that he was ever born: 
And thus I prophesy, that many a thousand, 
……………………………………………. 
                                                 




Shall rue the hour that ever thou wast born. 
The owl shriek'd at thy birth,--an evil sign; 
The night-crow cried, aboding luckless time; 
Dogs howl'd, and hideous tempest shook down trees; 
The raven rook'd her on the chimney's top, 
And chattering pies in dismal discords sung. 
Thy mother felt more than a mother's pain, 
And, yet brought forth less than a mother's hope, 
To wit, an indigested and deformed lump, 
Not like the fruit of such a goodly tree. 
Teeth hadst thou in thy head when thou wast born, 
To signify thou camest to bite the world: 
And, if the rest be true which I have heard, 
Thou camest— (3H6  5.6.37, 43-56) 
This passage stands in fascinating contrast to other examples of prophecy that we have 
seen in 1 and 2 Henry VI.  Similar to Joan in Part 1, Henry VI is specifically marked as 
a prophet—Gloucester calls him thus as he stabs him—and he announces that his speech 
is an act of prophesy. Yet while the prophesy begins by looking to the future, Henry VI 
focuses over half of his attention on auspices of the past. At his birth (which Henry, we 
should note, was not present for), the king claims that animals—predominately birds—
made a commotion, thus signaling a disturbance in the natural order. Moreover, Richard 




 In the passage above, Henry combines the actual act of prophesying that the 
plays typically associate with women characters and the act of reporting on past 
prophecies and auspices more common to the male characters. His actual act of 
prophesy, we should note, is not a particularly challenging interpretation or unlikely—
Gloucester is in fact, committing regicide after all. But he calls it a prophecy, thus 
attempting to imbue it with a divine sanction for how else can Henry, one of the few 
genuinely religious and scholarly characters portrayed in these plays know the future? 
Prophecy as a knowledge-making act breaks down at three points: the prophet is 
a woman or Other by race or class, the prophecy is given in real-time (rather than the 
past and recorded or repeated by the speaker), and the prophecy comes not from God but 
from devils, demons, or some other non-God supernatural source. We have seen 
variations of some of these breaking points in the preceding chapters. Going by their 
base definition, prophecies are translations of knowledge given to the prophet by some 
outside source—they are, in effect, reports. As reports, prophecies rely just as much of 
the ethos of the prophet in order to attain credibility as they do content or their source. It 
is telling that even though men do prophesy during the Henry VI plays (most notably 
Henry VI himself when he is about to be murdered by Gloucester in the Third Part), their 
prophetic acts remain distinct from the women who take on the bulk of foreseeing the 
future.  
 Prophecies further collapse as reliable knowledge practices when we consider the 
source of the extra-temporal knowledge. This point is particularly important with Joan 




beauty, clear skin, and battle prowess) by the Virgin Mary. This association with Mary 
certainly aligns Joan with medieval mystics and several modern readers would come into 
the play knowing that the historical Joan of Arc was canonized as a Catholic saint in 
1920, well after Shakespeare’s play. Yet for an early modern audience, I would suggest 
her avowed connection to Mary could be interpreted as a red flag, suggesting to the 
audience that this armor-wearing woman is particularly Catholic and thus potentially 




The second type of mantic utterance which I call “auspicious dreams” are related 
to the prophecy proper by accurately foretelling information that a character would have 
had no other way of knowing. Also like prophecies, dreams are given by an outside 
source to the dreamer—presumably a deity but the plays themselves do not mention the 
source—but they are only shared through reporting. In the reporting, the information 
often becomes jumbled and confused as the dreamer simultaneously attempts to present 
their experience and interpret what its symbolism may mean. These highly visual and 
metaphorical descriptions introduce the audience to the life-or-death stakes of the near-
future and collapse the distinction between the real and imaginary. As part of a 





Dramatically speaking, on their basic level, auspicious dreams function as 
foreshadowing and generating audience terror and dread. In 2 Henry VI, Gloucester and 
Eleanor, as they exchange descriptions of dreams from the previous night and morning, 
respectively, emphasize these trends. Gloucester explains his auspicious dream first: 
 Methought this staff, mine office-badge in court, 
 Was broke in twain; by whom I have forgot 
 But, as I think, it was by th’ Cardinal; 
 And on the pieces of the broken wand 
 Were placed the heads of Edmund, Duke of Somerset, 
 And William de la Pole, first Duke of Suffolk. 
 This was my dream; what it doth bode, God knows. (2H6 1.2.25-31) 
Even those who do not know their history can likely guess what is coming. Gloucester, 
whose death is stated in the play’s title as it appears in the 1594 quarto, relates an only 
slightly cryptic dream where he sees his role as Lord Protector removed from him by the 
treacherous Cardinal Beaufort, who also happens to be his uncle. He also sees the 
admittedly gruesome image of the severed heads of Somerset and Suffolk as if on pikes, 
though in his dream they are on the broken halves of his staff.  
 Eleanor’s assuring response to her husband’s dream and her subsequent telling of 
her own “morning” dream ironically work to reinforce the terror Gloucester’s dream 
engenders rather than soothe it. Assuring Gloucester that his dream is a grisly warning to 
anyone who would dare “break a stick of Gloucester’s grove” or affront his position 




meaning. Levin reads similar situations of comfort as akin to “the moment in the horror 
movie when…one [character] assures the other that, despite one’s premonition of 
danger, it is perfectly safe to walk through the graveyard or to explore the haunted 
house. Such refusal to acknowledge the ability of dreams to foretell the future usually 
portends that the dream’s validity will prove true all-too-soon.”216 An audience member 
may indulge in some skepticism here, perhaps allowing themselves to believe (if shortly) 
that everything will work out for good Duke Humphrey. Yet what is more likely given 
audience foreknowledge of the War of the Roses as well as dramatic foreshadowing, 
Eleanor’s words serve only to confirm the worst. 
 Eleanor’s dream, while as vivid (if not as violent) as Gloucester’s, reveals her 
own preoccupations that are perhaps less prophetic and based on personal ambition and 
desire. She elaborates: 
 Methought I sat in seat of majesty 
 In the cathedral church of Westminster, 
 And in that chair where kings and queens are crowned, 
 Where Henry and Dame Margaret kneeled to me, 
 And on my head did set the diadem. (1.2.36-40) 
Robert K. Presson contends that her dream is a prime example of the somnium animale, 
or a dream that results from one’s emotions or desires. In this case, Eleanor’s dream is a 
manifestation of her ambition and, though Presson does not go this far, her noted, mutual 
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distaste for Queen Margaret. By viewing this dream as a somnium animale, Presson 
explains that the dream “connects a present state of mind with an expected future 
happening, and thereby a causal relationship between events in the drama is 
established.”217 In so many words, a prophetic dream must come from outside the 
dreamer through some exterior connection. Another explanation for why Eleanor’s 
dream is not auspicious while Gloucester’s is may have to do with whether the dream 
was actually a dream or a daydream. Eleanor specifically identifies her dream as her 
“morning’s dream” (1.2.24) in contrast to Gloucester’s “troublous dreams this night” 
(1.2.22). In the Arden 3 edition, Knowles repeats H. C. Hart’s note from the first edition 
on Eleanor’s lines, asserting that “Dreams in the morning are said to tell the truth.”218 
This timing-specific element, as Carol Schreir Rupprecht elaborates, is confirmed by 
ancient and medieval dream treatises. The physiological reason, she explains, is as 
follows: 
The early morning, pre-dawn dreams are regarded as more reliably prophetic and 
meaningful since they are less somatically involved. The digestive process 
having been completed in the first hours of sleep, physiological activity related to 
the body  and to waking life is over with and thus the faculties (of soul) become 
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more refined as the night passes and the dreamer thus gains access to the 
divine.219 
Eleanor’s identification of her dream as somehow more auspicious leads to a subversion 
of audience expectations when her prophecy does not come true but Gloucester’s does. 
Another, related reading situates Eleanor as lying that she had a dream at all and is 
instead sousing out Gloucester’s attitude toward her royal aspirations. Scheir Rupprecht 
takes this interpretation as a definite possibility by explaining how Eleanor’s report 
compares to Gloucester’s less certain description where he identifies metaphors and 
must attempt to remember what had happened: “Her reported dream…is so directly 
correlated with her expressed hopes for advancement, and so little altered through the 
usually selective process of dream formation, that it rings false.”220 As the above 
examples and their later verifications display, when dreams are truly prophetic in 
Shakespeare’s plays, as with other types of mantic utterances, they require the possibility 
of interpretation and multiplicity of meaning.  
 The other major examples of auspicious dreams occur in Richard III where 
Clarence relates his dream about his impending murder and the ghosts of Richard’s 
murdered victims appear to Richard and Richmond as they dream before meeting on the 
battlefield. Clarence’s dream echoes Gloucester’s, foreshadowing a dark future that 
comes to fruition before the scene even ends. Richard’s and Richmond’s shared dream 
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are no less auspicious, but the question of whether they are dreaming or actually being 
visited by apparitions is less clear.  
 Clarence’s dream language echoes that of Humphrey and Eleanor, though his 
description is considerably longer and focused upon his own death and afterlife. The 
keyword that Clarence repeats is “methought,” typically at the beginning of a line or 
phrase, as a signal that what he reports to Brakenbury is a vision in his mind rather than 
a literal thing that happened. The same “methought” we saw prior with both Eleanor’s 
and Humphrey’s descriptions. With Clarence, the dream takes on additional sensory 
dimensions, especially when he describes his death by drowning: 
 Lord, Lord, methought what pain it was to drown; 
 What dreadful noise of waters in my ears; 
 What ugly sights of death within my eye. 
 Methought I saw a thousand wrecks… 
   …the envious flood 
 Kept in my soul, and would not let if forth 
 To seek the empty, vast, and wandering air, 
 But smothered it within my panting bulk, 
 Which almost burst to belch it in the sea. (R3 1.4.20-23, 34-39) 
The descriptions here are as vivid as any we have seen or heard before in previous 
chapters. As he relates his terror, Clarence appeals to a general terror of drowning and 
captures it by capturing the agony of suffocating of the waves pressing down on him and 




well as visions of death under the sea and the hollow rushing of water that is 
simultaneously a sound but not a sound at all. His dream, after promptly terrifying 
himself, Brakenbury, and likely audience, sets up several expectations for murder.  
 Clarence’s dream maps especially to Humphrey’s dream as well as to prophecies 
in general for its combination of ekphrastic specificity and its opacity of meaning. The 
two differ in how they subvert audience expectations. In Humphrey’s case, Shakespeare 
uses Eleanor to introduce the smallest bit of skepticism that Humphrey and the people he 
identifies as threats or in danger, will reach their appropriate ends. With Clarence, once 
we actually see the murders, we are given the expectation that his death will be either by 
literal drowning or suffocation. This expectation, coupled with the comic banter that 
Clarence exchanges with murderers, messes with audience foreknowledge and permits 
us the fiction that, at least at this point, Clarence may just make it out alive. His vivid 
dream will not come to fruition so soon after he has it. 
 But of course, Clarence is murdered, and his dreams of a long-term drowning are 
fulfilled in a rather unexpected manner. First, the First Executioner stabs him as 
Clarence pleads for the Second Executioner to take pity on him. Then, in accordance to 
their plan, Clarence’s dismembered remains are place “in the malmsey butt in the next 
room” (R3 1.4.244). Clarence’s body is indeed submerged in liquid, albeit not quite the 
same as the waters between England and Burgundy, and his dream comes true even 





 Shakespeare further plays with the conventions of dreams in the final act of 
Richard III where he stages the ghosts visiting Richard and Richmond the night before 
their final battle. This scene differs significantly from the previous examples as those 
dreams were given exclusively as reports from the dreamers. We do not know exactly 
where their dreams came from or if they were true or if they were the imaginings of 
stressed or ambitious mines, but we do know that they are either confirmed or denied 
within a short amount of time. For Richard and Richmond, however, the audience 
literally sees and hears the ghosts of Richard’s many murder victims as they curse their 
murderer and heap praise and support on the future king. But all the other textual 
markers indicate that both Richard and Richmond have been dreaming. In one of the few 
stage directions that is not an entrance or an exit, the 1623 folio edition of play states 
that “Richard starts out of his dreame,”221 and the two commanders separately relate that 
they had been dreaming. Richard’s “Soft, I did but dream” (R3 5.3.176) as he sits up 
alone is echoed and juxtaposed by Richmond’s proclamation that he has had “the 
sweetest sleep and fairest-boding dreams / that ever entered in a drowsy head” (R3 
5.3.225-226). They also use the parallel language of “methought” to summarize what 
they state to have seen in their mind: 
 KING RICHARD. Methought the souls of all that I had murdered 
 Came to my tend, and every one did threat 
 Tomorrow’s vengeance on the head of Richard. (R3 5.3.202-204) 
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 RICHMOND. Methought their souls whose bodies Richard murdered 
 Came to my tent and cried on victory. (R3 5.3.229-230) 
The proximity and parallels of these lines emphasize the question of whether the dream 
is actually a mantic dream, a shared vision, the actual appearance of ghosts, or just a 
coincidence. Richard III allows for all these possibilities, but regardless of how this 
scene is staged, Shakespeare uses the expectations for dreams that he established earlier 
in Richard III and 3 Henry VI to established dramatic tension and link to the historical 
events he has decided to stage. That the question of whether the ghosts are actual ghosts 
or the manifestations of the mind is decidedly unclear because ghosts, dreams, and other 
forms of prophetic utterance all fall under a general supernatural category that lacks 




To elaborate on the porousness of divination and the supernatural, I will now turn 
to curses. Closely related to prophecies proper, the many curses of the first tetralogy 
dramatically function similar to prophecies, but they are powered by very different 
sources. The power behind the curse lies both in the speaker’s language and their 
corresponding suffering as opposed to an outside, supernatural power. Margaret, the 
ultimate curse-giver in Richard III, is perhaps the best example of the exchange of 




everything. If we compare her to her 2 Henry VI counterpart, we see that her curses are 
less specific and less dire than in Richard III. After her lover, Suffolk, is banished for 
assisting in the murder of Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, she angrily calls after the 
exiting lords and her husband: 
Mischance and sorrow go along with you! 
Heart’s discontent and sour affliction 
Be playfellows to keep you company! 
There’s two of you, the devil make a third, 
And threefold vengeance tend upon your steps. (2H6 3.2.300-304) 
At this point, Margaret’s curse is not quite a curse as she does not explicitly mark her 
speech as a curse, though the first and last lines of this short speech certainly do convey 
a curse. Margaret’s anger here manifests in a call for “mischance,” “sorrow,” and 
“vengeance.”  
 In order for a curse to work, it must be fueled by the speaker’s experience. If the 
speaker lacks the equivalent experience, the curse itself ends up rebounding and taking 
the speaker down with it. After being goaded by Margaret into cursing, Suffolk first 
questions why he should even bother cursing the enemies who called for his banishment:  
Wherefore should I curse them?  
Could curses kill, as doth the mandrake’s groan,  
I would invent as bitter searching terms, 
As curst, as harsh and horrible to hear,  




Suffolk’s initial response to Margaret’s question as to whether he lacks “spirit to curse 
thine enemies” (2H6 3.2.308) reflects that he does not really believe that his curse will 
do anything. Why should he waste his time? If his curse were able to kill, he would 
provide the most scathing of curses that emerge not just from his tongue but also from 
his very body. In his description of how he would curse, Suffolk ends up convincing 
himself that he must curse his enemies. And once he begins cursing, he finds that he 
cannot stop: 
 And even now my burdened heart would break 
Should I not curse them. Poison be their drink!  
Gall, worse than gall, the daintiest that they taste! 
Their sweetest shade a grove of cypress trees; 
Their chiefest prospect murdering basilisks; 
Their softest touch has smart as lizards’ stings;  
Their music frightful as the serpent’s hiss, 
And boding screech-owls make the consort full! 
All the foul terrors in dark-seated hell— (2H6 3.2.320-328) 
Until he invokes hell, Suffolk’s curse specifically calls for his enemies to be poisoned. 
He links this poisoning to the natural world, invoking multiple flora and fauna as well as 
specific senses. For taste, Suffolk invokes “gall,” specifically the yellow bile or choler 
from the gallbladder which was notoriously bitter. In addition to bodily bitterness, a gall 
could also be a growth or swelling such as those found on oak trees. Until the nineteenth 




basilisk, a mythological creature that turned whomever met its gaze into stone. 
Moreover, as Knowles explains, a basilisk is also a large cannon, thus “possibly 
evok[ing] his besieged enemies staring into the mouth of a cannon.”222 Touch manifests 
in “lizards’ stings” and potentially the cool of the shade of cypress trees, which are of 
course, metaphors for death and funerals. Finally, Suffolk links sound to the sibilant 
hissing of serpents and the sharp calls of screech owls.  
 While certainly not nice things to wish upon one’s enemies, Suffolk’s early 
curses do not excite comment from Margaret until he specifically invokes hell. As soon 
as he moves from natural curses to demonic ones, Margaret interrupts him, halting his 
cursing and informing him that he has gone too far: 
 Enough, sweet Suffolk; thou tormenst’st thyself, 
And these dread curses, like the sun ’gainst glass, 
Or like an overcharged gun, recoil 
And turns the force of them upon thyself. (2H6 3.2.329-333) 
Margaret’s interruption indicates considerable social awareness as well as knowledge of 
how to curse, knowledge that she will dangle from Queen Elizabeth later in Richard III. 
Here however, Margaret reveals that too much cursing may lead to the curse rebounding 
on its giver, especially if the curse is not in proportion to what the curse-giver has 
suffered. Moreover, as Shakespeare takes care to illustrate, for all his faults, King Henry 
VI is incredibly pious. To damn him to hell, even Margaret realizes, goes too far, both in 
                                                 




terms of how appropriate the curse is in response to actions and the divine protection that 
Henry enjoys.  
 The relationship between curses and prophecies is a curious one. The curse fuels 
itself by the emotions and experiences of the curse-giver. When a curse works, it draws 
from past suffering and emotions in order to effect a change in the future. There is a kind 
of willful, human energy that forces the events into being that contrasts with the 
prophecy. Prophecies proper, as Shakespeare presents them, do not rely on previous 
events so much as divine or demonic inspiration. Rather, they rely on human emotion 
and suffering, as Margaret informs Elizabeth when she asks the former queen how to 
make her own curses: 
 Forbear to sleep the nights, and fast the days. 
 Compare dead happiness with living woe. 
Think that thy babes were fairer than they were, 
And he that slew them fouler than he is. 
Bett’ring thy loss makes the bad causer worse. 
Revolving this will teach thee how to curse. (R3 4.4.112-117) 
In terms of tense, the curse must be based on events of the past that are continually 
relived in the present in order to make an avoidable change to the future. The knowledge 
that comes from the curse is not handed to the curser, but rather the one who curses 
fabricates the knowledge (say of a loved one’s murder) by continually repeating it, and 
imbuing it with even more horror. Margaret is the master of re-emphasizing her own 




whether that be when she tries to one-up her sorrow over her husband’s in 2 Henry VI 
when Suffolk is banished and later murdered, or in conversation with the other mothers 
in Richard III, where she insists that her grief is the most intense as she has dealt with 
her pain the longest.  
 Fueled by strong, genuine emotion the curses of the first tetralogy are put to their 
most effective use as devices for revenge and retributive justice. This tit-for-tat logic that 
the curse follows is ultimately why Suffolk’s curse implodes and why Margaret’s later 
curse largely succeeds. A person may overextend themselves, as Suffolk does, when he 
goes beyond his experiences and decides to call for damnation of his enemies instead of 
a painful, poisonous death. This overextension is due in no small part to King Henry 
himself who is established as particularly pious. Damning him to hell is too strong 
because Suffolk has not faced an equivalent act. 
 Margaret’s curse that drives Richard III, however, does consistently emphasize 
justice, employing the logic of “an eye for an eye” in the curse itself and her later 
explanations of it to Elizabeth and the Duchess of York. Prior to cursing Richard 
exclusively, Margaret turns her attention to the current ruling Yorks and Greys: 
 If not by war, by surfeit die your king, 
As ours by murder to make him a king.  
Edward thy son, which now is Prince of Wales, 
For Edward my son, was Prince of Wales, 
Die in his youth by like untimely violence. 




Outlive thy glory, like my wretched self. 
Long mayst thou live to wail thy children’s loss, 
And see another, as I see thee now, 
Decked in thy rights, as thou art stalled in mine. 
Long die thy happy days before thy death, 
And, after many lengthened hours of grief, 
Die neither mother, wife, nor England’s queen. 
Rivers and Dorset, you were standers by, 
And so wast thou, Lord Hastings, when my son 
Was stabbed with bloody daggers. God, I pray Him, 
That none of you may live your natural age 
But by some unlooked accident cut off. (R3 1.3.193-208) 
Each curse here has a corresponding crime or event that, in Margaret’s logic, will even 
out once the appropriate person either dies or suffers appropriately. She matches the 
royal Yorks with a corresponding Plantagenet: King Edward for King Henry, Prince 
Edward for Prince Edward, and Queen Elizabeth for Queen Margaret. Notably, Margaret 
does not curse Elizabeth to death; instead, she offers something arguably worse: living 
after nearly her entire family has been killed. Elizabeth’s brother (Rivers) and son from a 
previous marriage (Dorset) along with the Lord Chamberlain Hastings also get caught up 
in Margaret’s cursing. Her rage at them is due to their inaction rather than anything they 
consciously did. As she is not armed with any more family members herself, she instead 




 The grammar of the curse and its relationship to a Renaissance humanist 
education are also worth discussing here. Magnusson convincingly links the curses, and 
more specifically, the speech of women to Latin grammar practices performed by boys 
in early modern English schoolrooms. Specifically, these grammar practices include the 
playing with forms and the use of the optative mood. The optative mood, which did not 
exist per se in Latin—wishes are expressed using the same endings as the subjunctive—
was either mistranslated or characterized as its own mood in the common textbook, 
Lily’s Grammar. In his English translations of common lists of wishes in their various 
moods and tenses from Latin, Lily continually uses an invocation to God to indicate a 
particular wish, usually “God grant,” “Would God,” or “I pray God.” Margaret, and by 
turns Anne and even Richard uses these phrases in their curses, offering an additional 
link to the thought structures common to an individual educated in the sixteenth-century 
schoolroom.  The invocation of a wish made English by giving it a divine agency, as 
Magnusson concludes, “substitutes for the ineffectual or nonexistent agency, however 
passionate, of wishing subjects a subject’s paradoxically potent passion—if it can 
awaken God’s agency on its behalf, if it can make it happen that…the ‘curses…are fall’n 
upon thee, / And God…hath plagued thy bloody deed” (1.3.176–78).”223 With this 
connection to an English understanding of wishes, the curse’s power becomes tied with 
the power sources of the prophecy and the auspicious dream.  
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 “It is not hard to foretell the future when it is already in the past,” remarks Grene 
in his discussion of the role of curses and prophecies in the first tetralogy.224 He’s right, 
of course, but this truism oversimplifies the delicate balance of tense and time within 
those plays, especially 1 Henry VI. Through present in his other histories, Shakespeare 
presents a particularly thick swarth of time, weaving the historiographical methods of his 
sources with poetics. What results are not simply temporally thick scenes where the past, 
present, and future coexist, but temporally thick images, characters, and individual lines. 
While Shakespeare concludes the play by containing the French and feminine threat of 
Joan, the container is hardly stable, for while Joan the prophetess and demon summoner 
is no longer a challenge, the French threat embodied by Margaret who appears at the end 
of the play and throughout the entire first tetralogy remains.  
Ultimately, Shakespeare creates a space of dramatic knowledge that presents the 
illusion of stability and potentiality, albeit situated in an imagined past. He succeeds in 
this goal by combining historiographic methods that were already at play in the early 
English chronicles with dramatic techniques, specifically using tools that emphasize not 
a completed past, but a future that is always in potentia. One of his many techniques is 
within the language itself. He relies on the subjunctive case to create tension and 
possibility in play bound by temporal constraints and audience foreknowledge. 
                                                 




Furthermore, he uses multiple types of mantic utterances—prophecies, auspicious 
dreams, and curses—that implicitly acknowledge what the audience already knows to 
create thick temporal spaces. In these spaces, the audience experiences temporal 
disjunction as they attempt to negotiate not only the past, present, and future, but also 
several pasts within pasts, futures within presents, and presents within pasts and futures. 
This disjunction creates an epistemological space of skepticism where the audience is 
aware of how much they both do and do not know, and potentially allows for the 
narrative of the play to become the narrative of history. 
 What I have hoped to show in this chapter is yet another way to view competing 
knowledge practices in the wake of epistemological transition. The development of 
historical methods and historiography, especially when running alongside and within the 
shift from late humanism to early empiricism, is a space that is just as fraught and 
complicated. Yet here, and as we have seen elsewhere in this dissertation, Shakespeare 
deals with multiple, oftentimes competing methods that he uses to present information, 
verify it, and complicate it. This time, in 1-3 Henry VI and Richard III, the knowledge 
practices that he experiments with come from popular knowledge of history acquired 
through reading and hearing about the chronicles as opposed to his schoolboy sources. 
The methods, by being associated with a developing field of history, take on a more 
explicit temporal mode that Shakespeare attempts to wrangle and understand through the 
lens that he understands most: drama. As a playwright, Shakespeare, like the historian, 
must create the narrative that makes the most sense; however, within that narrative there 




With his poetic techniques, Shakespeare manages to emphasize historiographic methods 








Throughout this dissertation, I have aimed not simply to point out that different 
types of knowledge practices exist in the plays, but to argue how dramatists use these 
epistemologies to larger dramatic effect. From this dissertation, I offer the following 
conclusions regarding popular conceptions of early modern evidence and how that 
evidence may be interpreted: 
 The disciplinary frameworks that we use to codify our knowledge today were not 
available to early moderns; however, the majority of methods that make up these 
frameworks were available.  
 Early modern playwrights draw on multiple knowledge types and methods, 
providing a “mixed methods” approach to epistemology in their plays. 
 Even when they find more empirical methods appealing or acceptable, 
playwrights overwhelmingly use humanist modes of inquiry as the default 
paradigm when presenting and evaluating evidence. In addition to “humanist”-
identified methods, playwrights often adapt different methods into a specifically 
dramatic epistemology.  
 Playwrights do not interrogate the reliability of the method itself, regardless of its 
association with empiricism or humanism. Rather, the critique is always on the 




These conclusions ultimately reveal that while early modern playwrights were not 
specifically interrogating “What is knowledge?” in a broad, abstract sense, they were 
nevertheless reflecting popular concerns of what could be knowable and verifiable 
during a period where inherited knowledge was under scrutiny. I will briefly discuss 
each of these conclusions below before turning to ideas for future research.  
Moving from more concrete, sensory evidence to more abstract, a priori 
knowledge, this dissertation displays the interconnectivity of epistemologies in a manner 
conducive to thinking about knowledge organization prior to the construction of modern 
academic disciplines. In the twenty-first century university, one of the central ways that 
knowledge and knowledge practices are codified is through the many academic 
disciplines. To be in a discipline as such means to be legitimate and to have a set of 
methods that define inquiry and the types of information of interest to the discipline. 
There’s also a very real hierarchy, with certain disciplines be subsumed under larger, 
“umbrella” categories that, in theory, share a theoretical framework or set of methods. 
Across the board, these disciplinary identities serve as convenient markers of what a 
member of that discipline is interested in, the types of texts or data she uses, and the 
methods she uses to analyze them. If you were to meet one your colleagues from math or 
history or psychology out in the wild, and they introduced themselves as a member of 
that department, you would have a rough idea of what they do, the types of things that 
they are interested in and the type of work they produce. Disciplinary identities are 




 This structure stands in contrast to the early modern period which, as I have 
shown, possesses its own hierarchical structure and categories of knowledge. When we 
look at a pre-disciplinary period that is in transition from one major epistemology to 
another, as my project does, we can see examples of how to approach a sense of inter-or 
pan-disciplinarity as a model for education.  
  I have argued that early modern dramatists utilize a mixed methods approach for 
presenting and critiquing both types of knowledge and knowledge practices. By 
necessity, the “mixed methods” are not what we understand today—playwrights are not 
combining qualitative interviews with quantitative data analysis. But what they are doing 
is taking methods that are commonly allied with two knowledge systems associated with 
their education and worldview. Due to the nature of their work as playwrights, 
Shakespeare, Jonson, Middleton, and Rowley all default to the primacy of humanist 
methods that place the spoken word and artistic creation. On the surface, this is not 
terribly surprising. Plays are made of words, after all, and playwrights are poets who use 
craft and poetics to make meaning. However, while a play may be composed of words 
and poetic devices, the primary way that an early modern audience would have 
experienced the play would be through their senses. They would hear the dialogue and 
the reactions of their fellow playgoers, they would see the actor on the stage (hopefully) 
“suit[ing] the action to the word, the word to the action” (Hamlet 3.2.17-18), they would 
smell gunpowder, sweat, food (rotten and otherwise), and they would feel the bodies of 




early modern English play, thus serves as an experimental space where competing 
methods were inherently present.  
 While playwrights do indeed blend multiple epistemologies by both necessity 
and general interest, they also overwhelmingly rely on humanist methods as the 
dominant force in the plays. We primarily see this phenomenon on the structural level as 
opposed to the detailed level of individual knowledge practices. This discrepancy is 
largely due to the nature of the practices being staged. Humanism, relying predominately 
on deductive reasoning—that is, starting from the premise and deriving the examples—
requires a structure set in place for it to really work. Plays, as poetic works, require the 
same. Meaning is made just as much through the form of a play as it is its individual 
words and movements. Moreover, empiricism-as-method was still in the process of 
being understood as a framework, and as Eggert and Spiller have argued, early moderns 
understood empiricism through their prior experiences. 
 In many of the plays I have discussed, the playwright offers a critique related to 
the knowledge practice, but the critique itself is never on the actual method. Indeed, the 
critique is always on the presenter of the information. Two more obvert examples of this 
critique are Jonson’s use of the exempla in Bartholomew Fair and Middleton and 
Rowley’s warning to not wholly trust one’s “first sight” when making decisions in The 
Changeling. For Jonson, the concern rests in an individual’s (incorrect) interpretation 
and the skills, prior knowledge, and care that the interpreter needs in order to correctly 
understand and apply the text. For Middleton and Rowley (and Shakespeare in Othello), 




unreliability of human subjects in general. Beatrice Joanna and Iago fabricate their 
realities through their own rhetorical savvy and ability to exploit the expectations of their 
listeners. Their ethos, and indeed anyone’s ethos, is a performance that is not always 
entirely honest. We saw this especially at play with the different rhetorical constructions 
of Hamlet’s and Claudius’s ethea in Hamlet, as well as with Joan and Talbot in 1 Henry 
IV. For Hamlet, Shakespeare further reveals the discrepancy between the rhetorical 
construction of an individual versus their actual moral responsibility. In an ideal world, 
the two should be one and the same, but for early modern playwrights, this confluence 
rarely seems to be the case. For 1 Henry IV (and the history plays in general with their 
balance between history and storytelling, an already blended set in the early modern 
period), the extrinsic ethos, that is the ethos constructed through outside knowledge 
about a character, takes on a more noticeable role. Audiences are able to bring in 
additional, frequently detailed expectations regarding a character.  
 Though I have opted to look at canonical authors in this dissertation, the methods 
that I have described are applicable to other types of early modern drama and other 
authors. One under-studied area, the plays of the so-called University Wits, is a 
particularly fruitful place to see the interplay of late Renaissance humanism and early 
empiricism. Thomas Tomkis’s Lingua: Or the Combat of the Tongue and the Five 
Senses for Superiority (1606), for instance, allegorizes all five of the sentences, along 
with two different types of memory, common sense, and the tongue (featuring as the 
only female character who appears onstage), and stages two debates to assert which of 




serves as an obvious blend of humanist education in the form of the debate, the 
rhetorical finesse, and the classical allusions with the rise in popularity of the senses as 
primary and preferred means of knowledge acquisition. By examining plays like Lingua, 
we would be able to expand how the debates that we have seen in commercial drama 
were playing out in a highly educated sphere. 
 Another area worth exploring further are the Stuart court masques. Having seen a 
resurgence in popularity in the past ten years, masque studies already attend to the multi-
modality of the court spectacle. Through the survival of Inigo Jones’s sketches for set 
pieces and costumes, several scholars have been able to articulate the connections 
between the philosophy of Renaissance art and the court masque, particularly with the 
concept of “perspective.” This overt blending of visual, poetic, musical, and kinesthetic 
performances strikes me as yet another space to see competing knowledge practices at 
work, though with the majority of practices associated with what we understand as “the 
arts.”  
 By examining knowledge practices and their corresponding early modern 
categories, I ultimately suggest that we may better understand how early modern 
playwrights and their audiences were negotiating the messy knot that was the transition 
between late humanism and early empiricism. As the plays in my dissertation display, 
playwrights conceived their world according to their formative knowledge systems 
available in their schooling and in popular conventions of history and poetry. Even in the 
face of evidence that the prior methods were not as reliable as the humanists would have 




gave their audiences a framework that was familiar enough to latch onto. Similarly, 
when interpreting literature through the lens of our own experience and theories, which 
even when we attempt to be attuned to context, we cannot always escape from. My 
project therefore adds to clarifying that historical context as well as reminding us that 
reading through what know is really not all that different from Shakespeare and his 
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